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CAED REPORT 35 
Foreword 
The United States is reexamining its domestic and international programs in terms of expected priorities in 
solving various economic and social problems over the next decade. This evaluation is made at a time when problems 
of numerous groups and sectors of the national economy are growing in intensity. It is made as budget restraints 
cause some programs to be reconsidered against pressures of program needs in other areas. 
It is within this framework that farm programs for the next decade will be evaluated. With expiration of the 
1965 Agriculture Act in 1970, either new legislation will need to be enacted or present programs will need to be 
extended. The farm policy seminar reported in this volume was held accordingly. First, it examines the potential 
need for farm programs over the next decade in terms of domestic supply potential and outlook in international 
agricultural development and food demand. It also evaluates existing programs in terms of benefits to different 
groups of farmers and corresponding problem solutions. 
Numerous policy alternatives for the next decade are examined and evaluated in the papers presented at the 
seminar. Among the alternatives examined are mandatory quotas, various types of land retirement programs and 
special programs for cotton. An evaluation is made of the consequences in case no legislation is enacted at the 
expiration of the 1965 Agricultural Act. The outlook under the program being proposed by the Administration is 
evaluated in terms of commodity supplies, prices, farm income and government costs. Finally, it examines the 
political strengths of the numerous groups which have voices in and help formulate policies for different income, 
commodity and regional sectors of agriculture: 
The papers presented include data and analyses which can be useful to administrators, legislators, farm leaders 
and the public as they evaluate and select among farm policy alternatives for the 1970's. The seminar was held to 
extend knowledge of policy consequences and to aid in these evaluation and decision processes. 
Held in St. Louis, Missouri, January 28 and 29, 1970, it included agricultural economists, agricultural editors 
and farm leaders. The membership of the group caused intense evaluation of the basic logic and practical application 
of the numerous alternatives examined. 
Earl 0. Heady 
Executive Director 
The Center for Agricultural & Economic 
Development. 
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Farm Production Capacity in the 1970's 
M. L. Upchurch* 
This conference on farm program choices continues a half century of debate and discussions on economic 
policy for agriculture. Even though the topic has been in the forefront of debate by farmers, farm leaders, college 
faculties, farm and academic associations, government officials and congressmen for many years, it still deserves 
further discussion. This conference is entirely proper and timely because the congressional committees on agriculture 
will be deciding on new farm legislation in the months ahead. 
One key to appraising alternatives for legislation is your evaluation of present and prospective production 
capacity of our agricultural industry in relation to present and prospective demand for farm products. In the 1920's 
we properly blamed our loss of foreign markets for the sad state of farm prices. In the 1930's many thought the 
long-run solution to the "farm problem" could be found in increasing domestic demand. Hungry people stood in 
bread lines while food piled up on farms. Under the original Agricultural Adjustment Act we plowed up growing 
crops to limit output. Many viewed these as "temporary" measures to strengthen farm prices until demand 
increased. 
Repeatedly throughout the history of farm programs, farmers themselves blunted the effects of the most careful 
schemes to improve prices by producing more and more on less and less acreage. They did this chiefly by exploiting 
new technology to boost yields per acre and per animal. Each individual farmer properly strove to better his 
situation by producing more. In the aggregate these efforts tended to defeat the best laid plans to improve the lot of 
all farmers. 
I might add that those efforts by farmers also introduced a high rate of obsolescence on our most careful 
projections of production, price and income. I fully expect our present efforts to become equally obsolete. 
In seeking new directions for future farm programs it is proper, and even crucial, to reexamine our capacity to 
produce and the likely trends in production. Such a reexamination is a hazardous business because past records show 
a high likelihood of being wrong. In the past, farmers' performance regularly relegated our bravest projections to the 
wastebasket. Yields and production kept going beyond expectations. So it is proper to ask, can this continue and, if 
so, how far and how fast? The strength of our farm production capacity relative to market demands will greatly 
influence the choice of farm programs. In view of these considerations, I will center my discussion chiefly on 
appraisal of future production capacity of U.S. farms. 
There are several ways in which we can increase our farm output. In the 1960's, just past, higher yields of 
crops were the source of the 12 percent increase in crop production, as acreage of land used for crops actually 
decreased. What is the probable pattern for the 1970's? One way to appraise prospects is to look at likely demands 
for farm products, relative to projected crop yields so as to estimate potential pressure on cropland resources. As a 
first step, let's look at prospects for demand. 
Prospective Demand for Food and Fiber 
Recent analyses of the Economic Research Service provide some demand projections for 1980.11 In 
developing these projections, prospects for domestic demand and for exports were considered separately. 
We expect domestic markets for farm products to increase only slightly more than growth in U.S. 
population-a rise of 18 to 20 percent from 1968 to 1980. Despite a projected increase in after-tax income per 
capita of 80 to 85 percent between 1968 and 1980, we project a relatively small rise in per capita consumption of 
farm products (Table 1). Most U.S. consumers do not buy more food as their incomes increase. However, the 
composition of the average diet changes in response to growth in income, changes in relative prices, and trends in 
consumer preferences. For example, we expect an increase of 17 pounds, or 15 percent, in per capita consumption 
of beef between 1968 and 1980. On the other hand, per capita use of eggs, milk, and wheat may decline. In the 
aggregate at the farm level, though, per capita use of all farm products may show little change. 
*Administrator, Economic Research Service. The author is indebted to Dr. Glen T. Barton, Rex F. Daly, and many others in the 
Economic Research Service for substantial help on this paper. 
1J See "Exploring the Future of the Agribusiness Industry," presented by Rex F. Daly, ERS, before the Tennessee Farmers 
Cooperative, 25th annual meeting, Nashville, Tennessee. Dec. 5, 1969. 
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Despite decreases in the late 1960's, exports of farm products in I 968 were about 60 percent greater than a 
decade earlier. Total exports in 1968 accounted for about 15 percent of our domestic farm output. Export sales are 
much more important for some crops than others, making up 40 to 60 percent of total >ales of wheat, tobacco, and 
soybeans in 1968-69. Total exports projected for 1980 are half again as large as in !968. 
The export picture becomes very fuzzy and out of focus when you try to see the 1980 milepost. The number 
of forces and their speed and direction of change become very complex. By 1980, will the world succeed in 
decreasing or will it increase barriers to international trade? Will the so-called "Green Revolution" continue to 
progress or will presently unforeseen problems emerge? Will the trend toward urbanization, apparent in many parts 
of the world, accelerate? Will the advocates of family planning begin to enjoy further success in the decade ahead? 
One hopeful trend in world trade of farm products is the increasing per capita income of people in a number 
of poor countries. As this occurs many will demand better diets including more animal products which, in turn, 
accelerates the demand for grain. 
Based on these uncertain prospects for foreign markets and domestic demand, we expect total farm output to 
rise about 20 percent from 1968 to 1980. This is about the rate of increase in the decade prior to 1968. 
Substantial increases in production of poultry and beef will be needed (Table 2). Pork production may 
increase only about as much as population, and total milk output in 1980 may be less than in 1968. 
The largest increases in crop production are projected for feed grains, soybeans, and fruit. Wheat production in 
1980 may be less than the large crop of 1968. 
Yield Potentials and Acreage Needs 
As part of its work on economic projections, ERS makes projections of yields of major crops. These 
projections are based mainly on recent trends in yields, with modifications for prospective developments in 
technology, weather variations in recent years, geographic shifts in production, land selectivity, and other factors. 
We do not hold to the view that crop yields will increase in the future simply because they have increased in the 
past. On the basis of these projected yields, crop production in 1980 could be attained with about the same acreage 
of harvested crops as was used in 1968. In other words, we expect yields to rise about as rapidly as demand between 
1968 and 1980. 
The data in Table 3 help to put the projected yields in perspective. Projected annual increases in yields of corn 
and grain sorghum are less for the period 1968-80 than for 1958-68. Annual increases for wheat and soybeans are 
the same for the two periods. In the case of cotton, we project a much greater annual increase for 1968-80 than 
occurred from 1958 to 1968. This is explained by the very low yields of cotton in the late 1960's when weather 
conditions were abnormally unfavorable for cotton production. 
Reasonably accurate projections of crop yields are a key element in our ability to appraise productive capacity 
of U.S. farms during the 1970's. Although no one can see the future with certainty, I believe our yield projections 
may be too conservative. 
Table 3, Yield per harvested acre of specified crops, United States. 
Change 
Projected 1957-59 1967-69 
Crop Unit 1957-59 1967-69 1969 1980 to to 
1967-69 1980 
Corn for grain Bu. 51 80 84 108 2.9 2.3 
Grain sorghum Bu. 33 53 55 74 2.0 1.8 
Wheat Bu. 23.6 28.4 30.7 34.5 .5 .5 
Soybeans Bu. 23.6 26.2 27.3 30.0 .3 .3 
Cotton Lb. 438 466 436 570 3.0 9.0 
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In the past when we based projections of yields on trends of recent years we underestimated actual 
achievement. This is vividly shown by a chart of crop production per acre which we have used on several occasions 
(Fig. 1 ). If we use the trend for 1910-30, and the trend in each successive decade through 1960 as a basis for 
projecting crop yields, we consistently understate later levels of crop production per acre. Using the trend for the 
first half of the 1960-70 decade as a projector also falls short of yield levels obtained in the late 1960's. I strongly 
suspect history will repeat itself with respect to our projections of yields in 1980. 
I certainly see no evidence that a plateau has been reached in overall crop yields in the United States. Further 
concentration of production in the hands of a smaller number of operators of larger and more specialized farms 
suggests even more rapid adoption than in the past of new techniques and improved production practices. Present 
day comparisons between yields obtained by the best farmers and averages for the area suggest much room for 
increasing yields even without new techniques. Also, I look for a continued flow of new technology and more 
productive inputs from public research and from the research and development efforts of the agribusiness complex. 
The conclusion is that we n y have continuing pressure of farm productive capacity on available market 
outlets because of prospective increases in crop yields. And this is very likely to be accomplished with U.S. farmers 
using no more cropland at the end of the 1970 decade than at the beginning. 
But what about our supply of cropland? In recent years, farmers have harvested crops from just about 300 
million acres. Add about 30 million acres for fallow, rotations, and normal crop failure. So farmers actually have 
used in recent years about 330 million acres for harvested crops. In addition, farmers have idled about 50 million 
acres of cropland annually under various diversion programs. This land or an equivalent acreage is a ready reserve of 
productive capacity. Most of it could come into production quickly without significant increases in current supplies 
of machinery and labor and without significant increases in unit costs of production. 
CROP PRODUCTION PER ACRE* 
Past and Prospective Trends 
% OF 1957-59 
140~----------------------------------------~TR~E~ND~ 
100~--------------------------
1910-30 
--------------- -~-----60~---------------------,··---------------------------------~ 
AO~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1910 '20 '30 '40 '50 '60 '70 
*CROPLAND USED FOR CROPS 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NEG. ERS 1239-66 ( 10) ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE 
Figure 1. 
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Soil surveys tell us that we have in excess of 600 million acres of class I, II, and III land in the United States 
which by definition is suitable for crop production. Some of this is now in crops; some would likely never be 
available for crops; some is now used for grazing and forestry. Specific projections of potential cropland use 
probably are not useful at present because we have very substantial capacity for further production on land now 
used for crops without dipping into any added potential capacity. We need only to know that a potential exists for 
greatly increased production if farmers could expect demand and prices to justify investment in expansion. 
Implications for Farm Income 
Projected productive capacity in relation to effective demand by 1980 implies continued pressure on prices of 
farm products and a continuation of the cost-price squeeze on farmers. The overall effect of the surplus productive 
capacity on farm prices and incomes, of course, will depend on the kind of government programs in existence in 
1980. 
Prospects for income of farmers at the end of the decade can be put in better perspective if we look at the 
changing structure of U.S. farming. In a talk before the 1969 Outlook Conference I pointed out that our three 
million farms are made up roughly of one million farms producing gross sales of $10,000 or more per farm, one 
million "little" commercial farms (those producing gross sales of less than $10,000 per farm), and one million 
residential farms. Likely prospects for continuing the cost-price squeeze in the 1970's will further encourage the 
trends in numbers and sizes of farms already underway. More "big" farms can be expected as many farmers expand 
the size of their operations to increase or maintain income. As in the past, rapid declines in numbers of "small" 
commercial farms will occur mainly because many operators of these farms can find better economic alternatives 
elsewhere. 
The number of residential farms has remained relatively constant for the past 30 years. What the future may 
hold for these units is conjectural. In any event, changes in farm prices and costs will have nominal effect on the 
incomes of people on these farms. 
What are the farm income implications if our projections of crop yields and productive capacity prove to be 
conservative? Again, much will depend on the kind of farm programs in effect. Any further softening of farm prices 
and increase in the cost-price squeeze likely will strengthen further the trend toward more "large" and fewer "small" 
commercial farms as farmers strive to achieve their best income alternatives. Moreover, such a condition would 
dampen investment in irrigation, drainage, land clearing and other practices that make land more productive. It 
would not likely dampen the trend toward greater use of fertilizers and pesticides because these are cheap 
inputs-that is their effect on output far exceeds their cost in most farming situations and at levels of application far 
greater than is currently common in most areas. 
In conclusion it would appear that we face in the decade ahead a situation that has plagued agriculture for 
most of the past half century-the capacity to produce more than markets will take at prices that will make farmers 
happy. 
Income Prospects and Trends for Different Strata of Farms 
Frank Orazem and Paul L. Kelley* 
Men who devote their careers to studying American agriculture, its workings, and its vast implications to the 
people it supports are profoundly impressed by the system's growing complexity. 
There was a time, not too far beyond the memory of many living men, when the small, isolated family farm 
was considered an efficient economic unit. But that was when there was essentially only one way of producing crops 
and livestock, with most of the inputs obtained on the farm. 
Our rural grandfathers wasted little time in commuting. With primitive transportation facilities, bulky farm 
products-hay and feed grains-could best be reduced into a concentrated form of transport by feeding them to 
livestock. 
The ascendancy of human and physical capital over land and water has transformed the industry, has been 
revolutionizing ways of living, and changing customs in the countryside. This technical transformation of agriculture 
has aided everyone, including farmers, in numerous ways. It has removed the drudgery from farm work, reduced the 
uncertainties of production, created a greater variety of higher quality foods, lowered food relative to nonfood 
prices, and supplied large quantities of products to foreign lands. But it has also left a large number of small farmers 
in the backwaters of American economic life. 
The central theme of this conference clearly indicates a growing recognition that relevant farm policy 
discussions of the 70's must take serious account of urban interests and an expanded definition of rural goals. 
The subject assigned for this paper implies interest not only in the adequacy of existing data and their 
predicted measurements at a future date-but the implications of such data within the context of the theme of this 
conference. 
T. W. Shultz in his classic work "The Economic Organization of Agriculture"[21) set forth two major 
hypotheses: 
a) There is a belief that the community prefers a developing economy to one that is stationary, and ... b) 
it prefers economic stability to large, sudden changes in prices and employment. 
Those two hypotheses appear to be reasonable today and seem to be implied in the format of this conference. 
Substantial progress has been made in understanding the processes and barriers to achieving consequences of growth 
and stability but there are still fundamental gaps in our knowledge. Greatly needed are substantially increased 
knowledge of the operation of the factor markets and the personal distribution of income in agriculture. 
Clearly public interest in the farm problem today is vastly different from the 1930's. During the early 
Roosevelt era, programs designed to improve the well being of the family farm (there were nearly 7 million of them) 
had broad public support. Public concern today centers on the absolute cost of farm programs relative to other high 
national priorities and a growing understanding that commodity-oriented programs for commercial farmers cannot 
adequately deal with the low income problem of U. S. agriculture. 
Historically this nation has had two basic policies for agriculture. Third and even fourth major policy areas 
may be developing. If these major categories of past, current and emerging policies are a correct or even approximate 
classification, they provide major guidelines and insights for defining relevant strata of farms and measurement 
variables to use in examining effects of economic and technological change in agriculture. 
1. Developmental Policies for Agriculture 
The Land Grant system is clearly one of the major creations of western thought that has exerted a 
fundamental role in the developmental processes of this country for more than one hundred years. The result is one 
of the most technically efficient agricultural systems of the world with an ever-declining relative input of labor 
resources required for national production of food and fiber. 
*Professors of Economics, Kansas State University. 
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However, the transition in development of the agricultural sector from a food problem stage did not result in 
an equilibrium for agriculture but quickly moved into the so-called farm problem stage with its attendant surplus 
commodities and depressed returns to agricultural resources, particularly the labor input. 
Some argue today that, even with aggregate equilibrium in growth rates of demand and output, low resource 
returns would still exist for a major group of commercial and noncommercial farms. 
Historically this development policy has been heavily oriented towards production efficiency for commodities 
with the hope that such a policy would result in appropriate rewards for all agricultural factors, including labor, so 
that members of the agricultural sector would receive necessary income levels and could enjoy the benefits of the 
"good life" achieved by other members of the economy. The Rural Life Commission nearly a half century ago raised 
voices against exclusive emphasis on that approach. The founding fathers of the Farm Foundation showed a similar 
concern as evidenced in part by its preamble setting forth their objectives. More recently the report of the 
President's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty has provided another major signal that our food and 
fiber development policies clearly have had uneven impacts on the well being of many rural people [17]. 
There is evidence that the Land Grant university system will have increasing difficulty in acquiring funds 
necessary to expand resources essential to continue its contribution to national production. 
While there is concern about the gains in the absolute level of resources devoted by the Land Grant system and 
U.S.D.A. to the development process, there is strong evidence that rather arbitrary and rigid allocation policies 
among commodity and specialization areas are the rule rather than the exception in the Land Grant system [18]. 
Recent concern that we may have reached a plateau in agricultural technology is worth examining seriously. A 
plateau in agricultural technology might be expected to be related to the level of inputs going into the research and 
development process. 
There is evidence of some slowing down of productivity growth in agriculture. However, there is strong 
evidence that technological development still has powerful effects on the structure of farms and their regional 
specialization and will continue to do so in the decade ahead. Needed now are major solutions in other dimensions 
of the food and fiber sector. 
The major task before us is to discover the appropriate level and distribution of inputs to achieve the needed 
levels of development from the agricultural sector and, at the same time, to develop appropriate procedures to insure 
equitable distribution of the gains and losses in and outside of agriculture. These developments require that careful 
attention be given to measurement data that aid in developing and appraising policies to achieve appropriate 
development objectives. 
2. Price and Income Policies 
Objectives of price and income (including support and adjustment) policies in American agriculture since the 
1930's have included triple aims: (I) stabilizing the agricultural economy, (2) providing consumers with abundant 
and reasonably priced food and fiber, and (3) insuring agricultural producers some benefits from economic progress 
arising from the agricultural sector. 
The impacts of programs designed to implement those objectives are no longer transmitted to the agricultural 
sector as they were in the early thirties. It made some sense then to aggregate discussions about impacts of farm 
policy programs to a representative farm type known in some way as the family farm. 
Even in the thirties and early forties such aggregation glossed over many acute problems of regional differences 
in gains and losses, arising from farm technological advances, to individual farms and rural communities. The 
problems, to some extent, were modified by the events of World War II. 
The driving forces of economic progress have clearly resulted in a dualism today in the structure of American 
agriculture, primarily of economic and socio dimensions but also with regional characteristics. Commodity oriented 
programs should be directed to problems of the one million or more farmers who may be said to represent the 
commercial sector of agriculture. A new set of policies is needed to solve the urgent problems of the other two 
million farms in American agriculture. 
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The relevant problem is to define appropriate measurement variables at various levels and dimensions to 
provide useful policy instruments to solve problems appropriate to the commercial sector and other problems of the 
lower income sector. 
3. Emerging Priorities 
The problems of those with low incomes in agriculture are not likely to be solved unless they participate in 
programs and development processes related specifically to low income problems. Broad national development 
policies related to the problems of our large cities, applied to all geographic and place-of-residence areas, should be 
more relevant to low-income problems in agriculture than are current agricultural programs. 
Events of recent years suggest that we may have reached the stage where the development of our large cities 
should plateau and that serious national attention should be given to broad developing strategies that involve 
dispersal of concentrated populations. A movement of national policies in that direction could have pronounced 
effects on regional development, not only on commercial agriculture but also on the low-income sector of 
agriculture. The practical realities of our political system suggest that there is more hope for a linkage of such broad 
national programs to alleviate low-income problems in agriculture than in heavy reliance on programs specifically 
designed for agriculture. 
Serious concern about the problems of dualism in agriculture suggests that, for measurement purposes, we 
need two different data sets. One set would deal primarily with problems of commercial agriculture. The other 
should provide meaningful insights for developing programs to alleviate low income. Perhaps that set of data could 
emphasize a wide variety of non-economic measurements as well as economic measurements. 
The organizers of this conference were specifically interested in an evaluation of unit costs and returns, 
aggregate incomes, and returns to management for different-size farms and farm enterprises from several major 
sources of farm data: {1) economic classes of farms, (2) farm records, and {3) costs and returns data. 
Economic Classification of Farms 
Economists have been major partners with the Bureau of the Census in developing economic classifications of 
farmers. The classification used in 1950 was jointly developed by the Bureau and the U.S.D.A., consulting with 
many interested persons in Land Grant universities[l6, p.1546]. 
Stated objectives of economic classification have evolved over the years. Benedict et al in 1944 recommended 
relatively few but distinct classes to: (1) recognize and understand problems relating to each, and (2) reflect realistic 
major groupings for planning, legislating and administering government programs(3]. Welsch and Moore have 
pointed out that objectives were reduced to essentially objective 1 in the 1945, 1950, and 1954 Censuses of 
Agriculture (27] . 
A major shift in the 1959 Census defined the purpose of economic classification: "to separate the farms that 
provide for the major source of employment and income for the farm operator's family from the farms or places 
that provide part-time employment for workers at non-farm jobs and on other farms and for persons 
semi-retired"(27]. That gave us the commercial and noncommercial-farm division. 
Problems of Measurement 
The literature carries much debate over measurement directed towards farm units or farm people, changes in 
output and input classification, and levels of aggregation (16, 27]. Grove (8] has proposed that classifications based 
on "productive man units," following British methods, be used. In this paper, however, we use primarily gross sales. 
Many limitations of gross sales become serious, particularly at regional levels and where attention is directed 
primarily to livestock farms. 
Concentration and the Drive Towards Dualism 
Evidence of the relentless pressure towards dualism in the organization of American agriculture is indicated by 
changes in farm output from 1960 to 1968. Farm numbers declined about 25 percent from 3,962,000 in 1960 to 
3,054,000 in 1968 (Table 1). Rather sharp demarcations appear in aggregate growth trends based on farm numbers 
and cash receipts from marketings. 
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The proportion of farms in all sales size categories above $I 0,000 increased between I960 and I968 while the 
proportions in all size categories below $10,000 decreased. But percentage gains in cash receipts from farming 
occurred only in size categories above $20,000. Such data suggest that the average competitive break-even point is 
above $20,000 per farm. 
There appears to be some popular acceptance of the notion that one-third of our nation's farms are serious 
producers and are affected by the mainstream effects of farm policy, technology and development. In 1968 the top 
one-third, i.e. economic classes I, II, and III in terms of gross sales, produced 86.4 percent of the nation's cash 
receipts from farming. Even more sobering is that the top I7.3 percent (i.e. economic classes I and II) produced 69.5 
percent of the cash receipts while the top 6% (6.4%) (i.e. economic class I) produced almost I/2 (48.5%) of the cash 
receipts from marketings. 
In the nature of things the dividing line here is not very sharp and it undoubtedly varies from one type of 
farming to another. However, the growing income advantage of the so-called large farm is strongly indicated. It also 
is shown by the trend toward farm consolidation and increasing size of farm enterprises. It is suggested also by farm 
management budgeting and programming studies as well as by other statistics. But there is increasing evidence that 
the break-even point in farming occurs at $40,000 gross sales or above and is attained by less than the top I/5 of our 
farmers (i.e. 17.3%). 
Income 
The absolute level and sources of income for persons defined as farmers provide insight into another dimension 
of the problem of dualism in the organization of American agriculture. In I968, off-farm income was nearly as high 
or equal to realized net farm income for more than half our farms (i.e. economic class IV and higher). But income 
data from farm sources do not provide an adequate measure of the income situation in agriculture when opportunity 
costs are considered. 
Production Costs by Economic Class 
Tweeten has developed data that give some insight into the relation of decreasing average costs in American 
agriculture that should be useful for farm policy considerations [22, pp.810-811] and the problem of "dualism." His 
emphasis has been on explaining the persistence of low resource returns in agriculture. Whether the so-called 
break-even points occur at the economic size levels indicated in his 1960 and 1965 data depends in part on accepting 
the appropriate measure for marginal value product for labor (22, p.802] . 
Using 1960 data Tweeten computed what he called a long-run unit cost of production by economic class as 
follows: "The cost of all inputs (including the opportunity cost of equity capital and of operator and family labor) 
per unit of output (including recipts from farm commodities, nonmoney income, and government payments .... " (22, 
p.809]. 
He concluded that farms with gross sales under $25,000 on the average lost money and did not cover all 
production costs in 1960. Only farms with sales over $25,000 were able to achieve an economic rent. Using 1965 
data and similar analysis, he concluded that only farms with $30,000 gross sales were on the average breaking even 
[23] . The data provide additional evidence of the break-even point shifting higher with increasing pressures of 
technology, development and inflation, and the data provide new evidence of low resource returns in agriculture. 
We may debate the precision of the data and the levels of opportunity costs used but data from other sources 
support the notion that Tweeten's estimates are reasonably valid. Such data are needed for the major farm policy 
decisions of the 1970's. Greater detail by regions and commodities would be most welcome. But his data do show 
that only the upper 10 to 20 percent of our nation's farms are achieving competitive resource returns. 
Farm Records 
Data compiled by Farm Management Associations provide more insight on relationships of costs and returns 
for individual farms. Studies of Kansas Farm Management Association farms, for example, suggest conclusions 
similar to Tweeten's. The lower fourth of the farms, for example, have average gross sales during the 10 years 
(1959-68) of $25,000 and less and had negative returns to the operator's labor and management in 5 of the 10 years. 
Returns in other years were low as well-$I ,500 or less (Table 2). And the poorer Kansas farmers are not members 
of farm management associations. 
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It has long been recognized that to have a net return satisfactory for family living and investment, a farm 
business must be organized to reap a good gross return. While a gross of, say $40,000, does not necessarily guarantee 
a net return of $10,000 on a specific farm, it is impossible to get a high net without a good gross. 
During the last decade, both the investment required to generate a dollar of farm income and the proportion 
of farm income to meet cash or operating farm expenditures have increased tremendously. At the same time the 
spread between high and low income farms has been steadily widening. In 1968 the difference in net income 
between the top and the bottom one-fourth of Kansas Association farms was more than $22,000. In 1959 it was 
$13,740 (Table 2). The top one-fourth of the farms have grown each year and have continued to show favorable 
returns to investment, labor and management. 
Size Economies Concept 
The idea of size economies is well founded in economic theory. It has received much recognition since early in 
the "industrial revolution." However, economists spent much time in argument, often semantic in nature, e.g. "pure 
scale relationships" versus "proportionate relationships": (1) related to changing all the inputs in equal proportions, 
and (2) related to changing inputs in variable proportions. It is the latter that has practical significance, at least, to 
researchers interested in studying cost economies of farm enterprises. 
For years the concept of cost economies, considered largely a "theoretical phenomenon" in primitive 
agriculture, has become more and more valid in a developed and well capitalized agricultural economy. The optimum 
size farm may have eluded confident measurement; nevertheless, no one will dispute that new technologies bring 
about, even apart from the managerial factor, differences in returns to resources and costs per unit of output for 
varying sizes of farms and farm enterprises. 
Studies documenting decreasing average costs and increasing returns to size of farm firms are becoming more 
and more numerous.lJ Madden has compiled one of the most thorough bibliographies of studies on the subject. In 
addition he has reviewed dozens of studies on economies of size in farming [12). While it is important to recognize 
that empirical studies are usually applicable only to area's enterprises for which they were conducted, they furnish at 
least some general guidelines for anticipated outcomes in other places operating the same enterprises. More 
important is to remember that such studies are time-dated; they are based on the assumption of specific production 
practices and technologies used during a specific period of time. The time factor is particularly important because 
technologies change rapidly. 
Most such studies are relatively recent, probably because new technology favoring larger farms is relatively 
recent in origin. While studies directed toward measuring cost economies associated with different sizes of farm firms 
increased during the 1950's, they were still largely directed toward measuring cost efficiencies of small or 
medium-size farms. Research directed toward larger farms or larger size farm enterprises, by today's standards, was 
lacking-perhaps because their number was smaller. The mechanized equipment was still geared to small or 
medium-size farms and research techniques and high speed computers needed more refinement. It was in 1961 when 
Upchurch, in recognizing the need for more research in this area, urged and challenged researchers to increase studies 
aimed at measuring differences in costs as related to size of farming [24] . 
Cost and Returns Studies 
During the last decade, numerous studies have attempted to measure and ascertain cost economies associated 
with different size of farm enterprises in different parts of the country. The efficiency in most studies is measured 
by average total cost curves or by a curve of cost/revenue ratios. While studies of this kind may or may not include 
all possible factors that affect the ultimate viability of the farm enterprises, they suggest the degree of pressure that 
has been or will be exerted, for example, on producers of hogs, beef, wheat, dairy, and other products. 
Wright, in a detailed study of Michigan agriculture, has found more intense use of nonhuman resources, higher 
per unit physical production, and more purchased inputs per unit of fixed resource of the larger farms [ 1, p.44] . 
This supports Tolley's hypothesis that the increase in purchased inputs has been concentrated on high management 
farms and that the gap in output and production costs between high level management and low level management is 
widening. [1, p.45). 
lJFor an excellent discussion of procedures used in cost size studies, see [26, 12]. 
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The costs and return data of Farm Management Association farms also suggest that smaller farms are finding it 
increasingly difficult to compete for purchased inputs with larger farms. Such findings emphasize the duality that 
has been emerging in agriculture for some time and support use of different input-output relationships for farms or 
enterprises of different sizes-particularly in designing large national models of the agricultural sector. 
Technology relentlessly pushes the minimum-size production units beyond the capital and managerial 
capabilities of many of their owners. The gap is widest in livestock and in some specialty crops, narrower in feed 
grains, wheat, and cotton areas. 
The magnitude of the changes that have already occurred can be seen by examining trends in the size of farm 
enterprises over time. Programming and other econometric studies likely will suggest further changes that occur in 
the future. Let us give a few examples that, though restricted to a specific geographic area, indicate trends and 
changes taking place in other areas. 
Livestock 
A trend toward fewer and bigger livestock units has been apparent in Kansas and elsewhere for several years 
[13). In 1940, in Kansas, for example, slightly more than three-fourths of all cattle feeders handled 25 or fewer 
head. The cattle they fed amounted to 23 per cent of total fed cattle marketings. These small feeders were the 
dominant group in both number of operators and in cattle fed (Table 3). In 1967, only 4 per cent of the cattle were 
fed in groups of 25 or fewer. Since the early 1960's, it appears that all of the net increase in cattle feeding occurred 
in herds of more than 400 head (Figure 1 ). 
A trend toward fewer and larger units also is apparent in grassfed cattle and calf operations, but the degree of 
change is not as extensive as with grain-fed cattle (Table 4). It is much more difficult to mechanize and automate a 
cow herd operation than a feed lot. Where some 40 per cent of grassfed cattle and calves were marketed from herds 
of 25 or fewer in 1950, the proportion was 15 per cent in 1967. All other size classifications showed either an 
increase in marketings, or remained essentially the same. 
Number~----------------------------------------------~ 
Total number 
of cattle fed~ 
1940 1950 1960 1970 
Year 
Figure 1. Number of Cattle Fed Annually by Specified Size of Lot, Kansas. 
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In 1967, grass-fed cattle operations were not concentrated in any particular size classification; most still are 
relatively small. Almost 79 per cent of all operations handled 50 or fewer head. During 1950-67 grass-fed cattle 
marketing units decreased from 90,000 to 54,000. The entire net decline occurred in the 25 or fewer herd size. All 
other size classifications increased. No significant geographical shifts were apparent in size of grass-fed cattle 
operations in the state. 
The size of cattle feeding operations has an important effect not only on potential sales or income figures but 
also on cost of operation. The decrease in average per unit cost with increasing size has been observed in commercial 
as well as in farm feedlots. 
Nonfeed costs on commercial feed lots have varied from 3.9 cents per pound of gain for a lot of 2,500 
capacity to 3.4 cents per pound gain for Jots of 20,000 head capacity (Table 5). The 0.5-cent-per-pound is for about 
400 pounds ($2, or $40,000) for each 20,000 head, and feedlots average more than two complete turnovers a year, 
so the half cent means more than $80,000 in that example. 
Analyses of farm record data reveal that many weaknesses in livestock enterprises can be traced to fixed 
nonfeed costs. One of the major problems facing the farmer-feeder seems to be his not having sufficient volume to 
effectively use his investment in livestock equipment and buildings. Farms handling 2 lots (see Table 6 for lot size) 
of cattle instead of one lot per year can reduce nonfeed costs per pound of gain from 2.2 to 0.7 cents, depending on 
the size of the enterprise (Table 6). The nonfeed costs on farm feed lots have varied from 8.6 cents per pound for 
one Jot of 40 head to 4.4 cents per pound gain for a lot of 925 head and from 6.4 cents per pound gain for two lots 
of 40 head to 3.7 cents for two lots of 925 head. Major cost economies appear to be achieved on farm feed lots of 
450 head capacity. 
TableS. Average total non-feed costs in cents per head per day and per pound gain for different sizes commercial 
feedlots in Kansas [ 14] . 
Average total non-feed cost 
Capacity 
per pound gain (No. of head) per head/day 
2,500 10.6 3.9 
5,000 10.0 3.7 
12,000 9.6 3.5 
20,000 9.2 3.4 
Table 6. Average total non-feed costs in cents per head per day and per pound gain for one and two lots of cattle fed 
per year in Kansas [ 1 S]. 
One lot of cattle Two lots of cattle 
Capacity Average total non-feed cost Average total non-feed cost 
(No. of head) per head/ day per pound gain per head/ day per pound gain 
40 22.3 8.6 16.6 6.4 
115 14.9 5.7 11.7 4.5 
225 12.9 5.0 10.5 4.0 
450 11.9 4.6 9.8 3.8 
925 11.6 4.4 9.6 3.7 
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COST PER DOLLAR OF GROSS INCOME 
/ 
~ 1.001---\-------/~-----oooo~ 
~ DOLLAR OF GROSS INCOME 0: 
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ll.. .90 
0 
0: 
<[ 
.J 
.J 
0 
0 
0: 
w 
a.. 
...... ~ .60 
(.) 
I BREAK 
~EVEN 
I LEAST~I 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
GROSS INCOME ( $1000) 
Figure 2. Optimal organization of a one-man hog farm with four-row equipment to achieve least-cost per dollar 
of gross income at various levels of gross income [25, p. 35). 
I.IOr----.------------------------------. 
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LONG-RUN AVERAGE COST 
I-(/) 
0 
l) 
0 40 80 120 160 200 
GROSS INCOME 
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Figure 3. Short-run and long-run average cost curves for hog farms with one to six regular workers and selected 
sizes of field machinery [25, p.38]. 
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Similar conclusions are suggested from studies using synthetic-farm budgets. Heady and Gibbons [10] for 
example, compared the effects of different cattle feeding methods and systems (varying in degree of labor and 
capital intensiveness), on costs per steer fed, profit maximization and stability of returns. They reported no 
important cost advantages once the size of cattle feeding operation reached 400-500 steers. When the cost of labor is 
considered ($2.50 per hour), then large size cattle-feeding operations achieve cost advantages by adapting more 
highly mechanized systems rather than intensive labor. Because the cost of farm labor is rising, larger and more 
specialized cattle feeding operations can be expected as off-farm employment opportunities expand. 
Hogs 
Kansas data show a relatively pronounced trend toward fewer and bigger hog operations (Table 7). In 1940, 
slightly more than two-thirds of the hogs were from units marketing 50 or fewer head. In 196 7, units of that size 
accounted for only 7.5 per cent of the hogs. On the other hand, in 1940, units marketing more than 150 head 
accounted for only about 7 per cent of the hogs, while in 1967 they accounted for 69 per cent. As with cattle, most 
producers handled small herds in 1940-i.e. 91 per cent of the operators had 50 or fewer hogs while less than one per 
cent had more than 150 head. In 1967, the percentages were 36 and 29, respectively. 
Bauman and Eisgruber [2] almost 10 years ago, reported on farm experiences producing hogs with different 
sizes of sow herds. The 50-60 sow-herd size reduced costs (compared with 1 0-sow herds) in all major 
categories-feed, man labor, building use, equipment use, and miscellaneous. Differences in total costs between the 
10- and the 60-sow herds amounted to about $2.20 per hundred pounds gain or about $5.00 per hog marketed. Net 
returns per man hour increased from about $1 for 1 0-sow herds to about $4.50 for 50 to 60-sow herds. 
Recently, Van Orsdall and Elder [25] used linear programming models to determine potential cost minimizing 
farm plans for Illinois cash-grain and hog farms under varied resource (including different combinations of field 
machinery) situations. 
On a one-man farm with four-row equipment, a gross income of about $20,000 is needed to break even 
(Figure 2). Average costs drop rapidly as annual production reaches $58,000. Major enterprises on the optimum 
574-acre Illinois farm include corn, soybeans, and hogs. Production per man on hog farms of optimal size ranges 
from 130 to 150 litters annually, plus enough corn for feed. Gross output averages $55,000 to $60,000 per man. 
Costs per dollar of gross income among optimum and different-size farms of about $0.70 do not vary appreciably 
(Figure 3). 
Dairy 
Buxton and Jensen's study [5] shows substantial economies of size in dairy farming. Using economic 
engineering (a synthetic approach) and considering available dairy technology, they demonstrate how sharply the 
average cost per unit of output decreases as size of dairy enterprise increases to 80 cows or more (Figure 4). The 
same figure shows the relationship between gross income and per-dollar cost of gross income. For one-man dairy 
farms, costs per dollar of gross income are much higher than those observed for larger farms. Total investment per 
dollar of net return varies from $32.05 on a one-man, 40-cow farm to $17.21 on a four-man, 141-cow dairy farm 
(Table 8). 
Similar findings were noted in a Michigan study [20]. A dairy farmer using up-to-date technology and 
operating at near optimum level can offer wages and hours to hired help competitive with industry. The results in 
both studies indicate that large dairy farms have considerable cost advantages; therefore, so long as operators push 
for higher net returns, economic pressure is to expand dairy operations. 
Size of herds suggested by the Buxton, Jensen, and Shapley's studies of 80-150 and possibly more cows is 
considerably larger than those presently found on average Minnesota, Michigan, or U.S. dairy farms. So current 
trends should continue toward fewer and larger dairy farms in the future. 
Rapidity of the adjustment will depend on conditions of existing dairy facilities, availability of investment 
capital, accessibility of more land, and availability of labor as well as such institutional factors as farm organization, 
government programs, taxation, etc. 
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Cotton and Wheat Farms 
Several cotton and wheat farm studies reviewed by Madden [ 12, pp.41-54] indicate that economies of size in 
producing those crops are not so pronounced as those associated with production of livestock. Studies indicate that 
larger farms are not necessarily any more efficient than highly mechanized one-man farms. Such one-man farms were 
440-acre, irrigated, cotton farms in Texas and a 1 ,600-acre, wheat-summer-fallow farm in Oregon. However, studies 
also indicate that the total net returns can often be increased by extending the crop acreage beyond the point of 
lowest average cost. 
Area Specialization 
Technological changes often cause a shift in the most profitable crops produced in certain areas. Some crops 
may move into an area while others may move out or decrease in importance. Let us look at some examples. 
Currently Kansas is faced with the fact that some other states and other nations are getting so much higher 
yields from wheat that the "wheat state" may be losing or may have already lost some of her competitive advantage 
with the crop. Crosses and selections of the Japanese dwarf wheat have helped scientists in Mexico, India and 
Southeast Asia as well as U.S. scientists develop high-yielding hybrid wheat varieties. Gaines, one of the resulting 
wheats, holds the record wheat yield of 216 bushels an acre on a Washington farm. Indiana's short wheat is called 
Arthur and scientists there expect Indiana's best farmers to get 90 to 100 bushels an acre with it. Blue boy has 
averaged over 100 bushels an acre in North Carolina and is being planted in other southern states, including Missouri. 
Michigan crosses have yielded up to 90 bushels an acre. 
Kansas has bred the dwarfing trait into hundreds of wheats but has not yet found one that outyields the 
wheats she has. Hybrids may well put Kansas back into the wheat competition. However, Kansas farmers are looking 
for substitute crops and enterprises. Average yields of other crops have gone up in Kansas while that of wheat has 
not. 
Another example of how technological development changes areas' competitive positions and thus has an 
important bearing on farm enterprises and incomes is that of hybrid corn and hybrid sorghums. In the early 1930's, 
Kansas produced about 3 million hogs and 3~ million cattle a year. Then hybrid corn became available to feed 
hogs and cattle. Compared with Corn Belt states, Kansas had relatively little corn acreage, so hybrid corn gave the 
Corn Belt states a competitive edge until the late 1950's when hybrid sorghum became available. By then Kansas was 
producing less than one-third as many hogs and about the same number of cattle as she had in the early 1930's. 
Many more people were eating much more meat per person and meat exports had risen. But Kansas was not getting 
even her depression share of the market. Hybrid corn had given the Corn Belt states a competitive advantage in 
finishing cattle and in feeding hogs. 
Table 8. Farm size, total investment per dollar of gross income, net returns to operator's labor and management 
produced annually for four sizes of dairy farms. [ 5] 
(One-man) (Two-man) (Three-man) (Four-man) 
Land acres 234 467 623 817 
Milk cows 40 81 100 141 
Total investment $149,000 $253,000 $325,000 $416,000 
Total investment 
per dollar of net return 32.05 22.16 19.17 17.21 
Total investment per 
dollar of gross income 4.95 4.38 4.06 3.97 
Net return 4,633 11,869 16,925 24,194 
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That changed when hybrid sorghums became available. The first hybrid sorghum seed in Kansas was 
distributed commercially in 1957. By 1966, five counties produced more sorghum than all 105 Kansas counties 
produced in 1956, the year before hybrid seed became available. Within a few years, the sorghum producing areas of 
The Great Plains, called the "milo belt" by some, became a feed-surplus rather than a feed-deficit area. 
In addition, by January 1, 1970 Kansas had nearly six times more cattle on feed than January 1, 1957. The 
increase in cattle feeding in Texas has been even more dramatic. Thus, the "milo belt" became a bona-fide 
competitor with the Corn Belt (Figure 5). In 1956 the Corn Belt fed nearly 50 percent of U.S. cattle and the Milo 
Belt about 20 percent; in 1968 the percentages were about 40 and 33 for the Corn Belt and the Milo Belt, 
respectively. The number of cattle fed in the Corn Belt has not decreased. But nearly all the tremendous gains in 
beef feeding in recent years has been in the Great Plains area-Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico and 
Nebraska. 
None of the changes come overnight, but they come with such rapidity that the packing industry, the grain 
trade, transportation, and other allied industries have had difficulty adjusting to them. 
Generators of Structural Change 
Other participants will describe in detail the major generators of structural change in the agricultural sector. 
Broadly defined they include elements attributed to forces of development, technology, and inflation. They may be 
analyzed in a matrix that includes the effects of product markets (including domestic and foreign), and factor 
markets (including purchased inputs, labor, and land). Linkage of the agricultural sector to nonagricultural sectors 
also needs to be included via the market for consumer goods. 
This is an elusive area and it includes the whole array of problems of growth and farm size. For those willing to 
explore this risky area, Butcher and Whittlesey have provided words of counsel [4]. 
-~ 
wz 
::?.:w 77 108 134 0~ 475 668 857 
~100 
(/) 
~ 95 
a:: (.!) 
90 l..1.. 
0 
a:: 85 <t 
_J 
_J TWO-MAN 80 0 I FOUR-MAN Q 
a:: 75 I w 
a.. 
LRUC CURVE/ r- 70 (f) (MILK- $3.65 PER CWT.) 0 
u L I 
18 30 34 6064 70 82 9094 
GROSS INCOME ($1,000) 
Figure 4. Derivation of the long-run unit cost curve (LRUC) from four short-run unit cost curves representing 
one-, two-, three-, and four-man farm situations respectively. (Adapted from Buxton and Jensen, 
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Farm Size and Income by Economic Class in the 70's and 80's 
Numerous researchers, including Ruttan, Daly, Heady, and Kaldor [19, 6, 9, 11], have explored this problem. 
In 1966 Ruttan suggested that in 1965 only farms with gross sales of $20,000 or more could achieve income 
approaching the $7,500 median family income of metropolitan workers. He estimated then that, if total production 
were concentrated on farms with sales of $20,000 or more, the total U.S. output could be produced on 750,000 
farms. Concentrating production on farms with $40,000 or more sales would result in U.S. farm output being 
produced on fewer than 400,000 farms. Ruttan suggested that it was likely that the technical know-how already 
existed to produce 80-90 percent of total U.S. farm output on 50,000 to 100,000 production units. 
Daly, in a recent study of projections of numbers of farms by economic class to 1980, estimated a total of 
2,140,000 farms (Table 9) [6]. About 710,000 of them would have sales of over $20,000 per year; the top half 
(355,000) with sales of over $40,000. If the break-even analysis of Tweeten and others is reasonably correct, only 
the latter category would be earning an economic rent. 
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Figure 5. Percentage of Cattle Fed by Indicated Areas in the U.S. 1956-68. 
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Basing receipts on I968 prices, and projecting demand-output balance, Daly assumes that 60 to 70 percent of 
the rise in labor productivity reflected in his analyses is due to a change in the number and size of farms. Projected 
increases in labor productivity for agriculture on a whole rise about twice as rapidly as productivity gains projected 
for the major size grouping. 
The trend, represented by a continued decrease in the number of farms through farm consolidation and a 
corresponding increase in the average size of farms and of farm enterprises, is expected to continue in the future. 
The extent of the change will depend on several factors. Some agricultural economists believe that institutional 
factors will limit the growth of larger farm units.Y It is true that the size of farm units has been influenced by 
governmental policies in the past and likely will be in the future. 
Land tenure and transfer laws, as well as difficulty in finding farm land available to purchase, will limit farm 
expansion in some states. Thus, growth patterns may vary from state to state. However, land is becoming less and 
less limiting in expanding the size of business because it is increasingly replaced by purchased nonfarm inputs and 
Table 9. Income and resources of farms by economic class, estimated 1965, and projections to 1980 ( 6]. 
Production 
Number Land in Farms Cash ReceiEts* Assets Labor Used 
Farm Sales Class of 
and Year Farms Total Per Farm Total Per Farm Total Per Farm Total Per Farm 
(I,OOO) (mil. (mil. (mil. (mil. 
acres) (acres) dol.) (dol.) dol.) (dol.) hours) (hours) 
1965 Estimated 
$40,000 and over I70 385 2,265 17,369 I02,17I 64,272 378,070 I ,565 9,206 
$20,000 to $39,999 300 209 697 9,000 30,000 44,235 147,450 I ,20I 4,004 
$10,000 and over 990 798 806 34,I69 34,5I4 I49,733 151,245 4,220 4,263 
$50 to $9,999 1,360 245 180 6,252 4,597 40,865 30,048 2,660 1,956 
Other** 1,025 108 105 1,2I8 I ,I88 19,562 I9,085 I,096 I,069 
All farms 3,375 1 ,15I 34I 4I,639 I2,337 210,I60 62,270 7,976 2,363 
1970 Projected 
$40,000 and over 2I5 478 2,223 23,784 I10,623 88,022 409,405 I,958 9,107 
$20,000 to $39,999 325 227 697 9,750 30,000 47,920 I47,406 I ,189 3,658 
$10,000 and over 1,000 885 885 40,434 40,434 172,394 172,394 4,322 4,322 
$50 to $9,999 1,025 182 177 4,626 4,513 30,123 29,388 1,825 1,780 
Other** 785 84 107 940 1,197 15,096 19,231 771 982 
All farms 2,810 1,151 410 46,000 16,370 217,613 77,442 6,918 2,462 
1975 Projected 
$40,000 and over 270 550 2,037 28,838 106,807 106,696 395,170 2,052 7,600 
$20,000 to $39,999 340 237 697 10,200 30,000 50,132 147,447 1,075 3,162 
$10,000 and over 1,020 948 929 45,188 44,302 189,333 185,621 4,034 3,955 
$50 to $9,999 780 137 175 3,478 4,459 22,656 29,046 1,199 1,537 
Other** 610 66 109 734 1,203 11,776 19,305 517 848 
All farms 2,410 1,151 477 49,400 20,498 223,765 92,849 5,750 2,386 
1980 Projected 
$40,000 and over 335 602 1,796 36,023 107,531 133,287 397,872 2,100 6,269 
$20,000 to $39,999 355 247 697 10,650 30,000 52,344 147,448 920 2,592 
$10,000 and over 1,060 994 938 52,223 49,267 214,964 202,796 3,690 3,481 
$50 to $9,999 590 103 174 2,621 4,442 17,063 28,920 750 1,271 
Other** 490 54 110 591 1,206 9,481 19,349 340 694 
All farms 2,140 1,151 538 55,435 25,904 241,508 112,854 4,780 2,234 
* Cash receipts plus government payments in 1965 and 1970. 
** "Other" is mostly part-time and part-retirement farms. 
JJsee James Nielson. Managerial requirements of farm firms, 1980. CAED Report 24, P. 57 
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technical know-how, and there are few effective institutional restraints on the acquisition of nonland inputs needed 
in farming. 
Probably the most important factor that will continue to influence the growth of farm units is the one related 
to economies of size. Numerous studies have documented decreasing average costs per unit of output with 
farm-enterprise expansion. The disappearance of many smaller farm units is generally attributed to economies in the 
use of technology and equipment which require large capital investments. Many of the investments cannot be 
justified on small farms because the per-unit cost advantages can be realized only by expanding output. In addition, 
an increase in the size of farm operations may lead to efficiencies in the use of labor, and to buying and selling 
advantages.Y 
Modern technology has come to favor the large farm enterprise. The most successful units appear to be very 
large when measured by past standards. In some areas investments already amount to $500,000 or more per farm. 
A farm with a capitalization of half a million dollars is expected to be different, both in its social and 
economic structure, from traditional family farms. Such capital requirements tend to separate management from 
ownership. And where the two are combined, Galbraith predicts an agricultural organization with aristocratic 
tradition, where owner operation is confined, with rare exceptions, to those of well-to-do parents [7] . 
Some long-run trends have already set in which, barring radical government action, are almost mathematical 
certainties. The availability of a seemingly unceasing flow of new technologies into agriculture and the demand for 
farm products and their market structure create competition too great for small commercial farms, unless 
government programs are designed to enable older, family-size enterprises to survive. 
In a rapidly growing industrial economy the farming sector becomes increasingly interdependent with other 
segments of the economy. Highly mechanized farming enterprises have created stronger and stronger linkages 
between the farm sector and other sectors. The whole structure of input production and marketing sectors in the 
food industry appears to be moving toward more coordination. 
?./see James Nielson. Managerial requirements of farm firms, 1980. CAED Report 24, P. 57 
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U.S. Export Potentials and the Green Revolution 
Ralph W. Cummings, Jr.* 
Only a few years ago, such provocative books as Famine 1975 and the Population Bomb appeared, loudly 
prophesying that the Malthusian spectre would descend upon Asia. Public health programs were demonstrating 
dramatic success in lower death rates. Family planning was only a gleam in the eyes of a few dreamers. The numbers 
of hungry mouths were increasing at percentage rates as much as double those of a decade earlier. Against this reality 
of rapidly increasing requirements, planners could offer only hope-a very intangible contribution-that food 
production could respond sufficiently even to maintain the already low per capita consumption standards. Two 
successive, unprecedented droughts in India punctuated the gloomy prospects with an exclamation mark. The U.S. 
reacted to this apparently dismal future with a major reassessment of its agricultural production policy. The previous 
policy limiting food aid to surplus commodities was relaxed. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 directed the Secretary 
of Agriculture to release reserve acreages, as needed, for U.S. uses, commercial exports, and food assistance exports 
[28]. 
Today the Asian Drama is quite different. India, the country whose future looked most depressing to some 
only three years ago, produced a record foodgrain harvest in 1967-68 almost 10 percent greater than the previous 
best year. This was followed with a marginally lower output in 1968-69 in spite of subnormal rainfall. India expects 
its first 100 million ton foodgrain harvest this year and confidently plans for food grain self-sufficiency by the early 
1970's. West Pakistan also has had record wheat harvests and is trying to enter the world market as an exporter of 
low-quality rice. A comparable success story applies in some measure to the wide belt of countries stretching from 
Turkey in the West to the Philippines and Taiwan in the East. 
This is the Green Revolution. Since the mid-1950's Asia has been one of the most rapidly growing markets for 
U.S. agricultural exports. In recent years, the non-communist, less developed countries in the region have accounted 
for over 40 percent of U.S. cereals exports and almost 25 percent of the U.S. exports of raw cotton, animal and 
vegetable fats and oils. The large portion of these commodities was exported under government-aided programs. 
Most probably, the major changes in U.S. farm commodity exports over the next few years will be dependent upon 
the future of agricultural progress in these countries. In no other region has the agricultural potential changed so 
dramatically. 
This paper will attempt to place this sudden change in the balance of food and man in its world trade 
perspective. It will be divided into three parts. The first part will be a brief description of the Asian role in world 
trade with particular reference to its relationship with the U.S. The second part will be a description of the impact of 
the Green Revolution. India will serve as the primary example. Analysis will be extended to other Asian countries 
for which information is available. The third part will be a discussion of the future production significance of the 
Green Revolution in Asia and, in general terms, the implications of the new technology for world trade in farm 
commodities. 
A substantial part of this paper-longer than might be suspected from reading the title-will be spent in 
discussing the development, impact, and future potential of the new varieties. The reason for this is that the Green 
Revolution is very new. Rather than attempt to develop specific figures for future Asian production and 
import/export balances, we will attempt to identify the factors on which the future depends. A long bibliography 
indicates the sources of our information to those who wish to delve more deeply into this fascinating subject. In 
view of recent past experience, we choose to follow Falstaffs advice that "discretion is the better part of valor." 
I. The Role of Asia in World Food Production and Trade 
Asia, the belt of countries stretching from Turkey in the West to Taiwan and the Philippines in the East, is 
characterized by a wide range of climate, topography, and man/land ratios [1]. It accounts for almost a third of the 
world's population. Approximately two-thirds of the world's rice land and about 15 percent of the wheat and corn 
acreage are found in Asia. It also produces significant amounts of tea, rubber, natural fibers Uute, mesta and cotton), 
*Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Illinois. The author has benefitted from correspondence with and unpublished 
working papers by Randy Barker, Walter P. Falcon, Carl H. Gotsch, Leon Hesser, and Delane Welsch; these sources are not cited 
specifically in the paper. He also wishes to thank Professors Falke Dovring, Robert Herdt, and Stephen Schmidt for criticising an 
earlier draft. It should be clearly understood that only the author is to be held responsible for the views expressed. 
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minor cereals, and fruits and vegetables. In many of these countries, agricultural yields are among the lowest in the 
world. Asia is the major food deficit area of the world. 
The United States is the largest exporter to this region. In 1969, U.S. agricultural exports to Asia (including 
West Asia and Japan) totalled $2. I billion or over one-third of our world total. The Asian market has been a growing 
share of the growing world export trade. 
The leading dollar markets for U.S. exports are the more highly developed countries. Japan, the one highly 
developed country in Asia, is our largest world dollar customer for agricultural exports and dominates the dollar 
market in the region. The next largest Asian dollar importer, the Philippines, ranks I 4th among U.S. customers. 
However, Asian countries number prominently among principal recipients of government-aided exports. 
During I 955-66, India ranked I st, Pakistan 3rd, Korea 5th, Taiwan 8th, Turkey II th, Japan 13th, South VietNam 
17th, Indonesia 19th, and Philippines 20th. These countries have been major markets for U.S. cereals (primarily 
wheat and rice) but also for oils and cotton. In 1964, a representative year, Asian countries accounted for over 40 
percent of U.S. exports of food grains and almost 25 percent of U.S. exports of raw cotton, animal and vegetable oils 
and fats. [21, 22, 23] In 1966 alone, India imported $488.9 million of U.S. cereals, $53.4 million of natural fibers, 
and $57 .I million of fats and oils.l/ 
Tables I, 2, and 3 summarize basic U.S. export data with the whole region and with important individual 
countries within the region. 
The growing food deficit of many of these countries has resulted because the traditional agriculture was not 
able to respond sufficiently to the sudden surge in population growth. (Table 4) 
After the war, public health measures dramatically reduced death rates through such simple programs as 
spraying DDT to eliminate malaria-carrying mosquitoes. In some countries, the death rate almost halved in a few 
years. No comparable reduction occurred in births. This led to the "population explosion." 
The tn1ditional agricultural technology was not adequate to respond to these added demands. Grain varieties 
grown in these countries had been evolved over previous decades to excel under ancient methods of cultivation 
characterized by low fertility, shallow ploughing, and inadequate drainage under very intense heat and sunlight and 
highly variable monsoon rainfall. [16] Their sowing and harvest dates were governed by day length; over time the 
varieties had been selected to fit into specific crop seasons in order to make maximum advantage of these often 
severe climatic conditions. The plant type was characterized by a tall, leafy, weak-strawed architecture. Vigorous 
early growth enabled the plants to shade out all competition-but also, by shading its own lower leaves, competed 
with grain formation in the later phases of plant growth. The tall stature permitted the plant to get above the water 
levels brought on by floods during the rainy season. 
The very characteristics which enabled these plants to compete under low management conditions also 
imposed an upper limit to production when modern agricultural practices were applied. High dosages of fertilizer 
showed little plant response or, more seriously for wheat and rice, would cause more leafy growth so that the plant 
toppled when grain began to form. The traditional varieties did not have wide geographical adaptability. They did 
not fit easily into multiple cropping schemes. 
Yield increase in India, Pakistan, and Turkey averaged less than one percent annually. [15] With the exception 
of Taiwan, the major source of production growth was new land. New acreage was becoming increasingly expensive 
to clear or reclaim; this source of growth was being exhausted. 
II. The Green Revolution 
The Green Revolution is the popular name given to the application of modern scientific inputs-high yielding 
varieties of seeds, manageable irrigation, chemical fertilizers, plant protection, and sometimes mechanized power-in 
tested management packages to Asian agriculture. At present it is primarily a cereals revolution. Wheat and rice have 
received the most publicity. Technological advances apply also to corn, sorghum, and millets. 
!/ These are import data reported by Indian authorities for arrivals [30]. Table 3 reports export data recorded by the U.S. for 
exports. 
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The Origins 
Agricultural researchers sought to reconstruct the architecture of the plant in order to overcome physical 
limitations to higher yields. 
Discovery by Japanese scientists of dwarfing genes in the Norin wheat variety provided the breakthrough for 
wheat. It was brought to the U.S. in 1946. In 1961 the dwarf winter variety Gaines was released in Washington 
State. Concurrently, Rockefeller Foundation scientists released several dwarf spring varieties (to which the 
photo-period insensitivity factor was added) in their Mexican program. (18, 19, 25, 27] 
These new plant types had a short, stiff straw; a large head; more stalks (tillers) per seed; highly efficient 
fertilizer utilization even at large rates of application; non-sensitivity to day length; and short growing period. The 
sturdier plant type, high plant density, and higher fertilizer responsiveness produced double the yields of the 
traditional varieties with less danger of lodging. Furthermore, the plant has much greater flexibility among 
geographical areas and seasons to permit extension of acreage to new production areas and integration into multiple 
cropping schemes. 
Table 1. U.S. Agricultural Exports Under Specified Government-Financed Programs, Exports Outside Specified 
Government-Financed Programs, and Total Agricultural Exports, Fiscal Years 1955-66. 
PL 480!/ 
($million) 
Mutual Total Agricultural Exports 
Country Title I Title II Title III Title IV Security Government Other All 
Turkey 466.4 14.5 19.2 20.1 34.4 554.6 15.8 570.4 
Pakistan 892.7 53.6 36.5 16.1 999.0 47.2 1,046.3 
India 2,903.7 17.7 184.5 65.6 67.6 3,239.0 158.4 3,397.4 
Ceylon 25.1 5.8 27.6 1.3 2.2 62.0 22.7 84.7 
Thailand 4.1 0.7 4.5 9.4 126.2 135.6 
VietNam 203.0 29.7 31.0 0.1 68.8 332.6 330.6 
Indonesia 199.7 1.5 12.8 7.7 0.7 1.2 223.6 58.6 282.2 
Philippines 53.2 0.4 47.7 31.7 86.5 219.5 535.5 755.0 
Taiwan 191.7 11.8 61.9 30.6 26.4 267.4 589.8 162.2 752.0 
Japan 213.1 22.1 15.9 207.3 26.1 484.5 5,808.1 6,292.6 
Korea 469.8 36.6 114.6 17.6 256.6 895.2 149.7 1,044.8 
Total Asiald 5,556.8 280.3 657.8 475.9 61.4 927.0 7,959.2 8,395.3 16,354.5 
Total World 9,811.3 760.6 1,922.2 2,078.1 454.3 2,168.7 17,195.2 40,430.3 57,625.5 
Source: [28] 
11 Title I: Sales for Foreign Currency 
Title II: Famine and Other Emergency Relief 
Title III: Foreign Donations 
Barter 
Title IV: Long-term Supply and Dollar Credit Sales 
lJ Includes countries west (but excluding) Turkey. 
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Table 2. U.S. Agricultural Exports Under Specified Government-Financed Programs, Exports Outside Specified 
Government-Financed Programs, and Total Agricultural Exports, Fiscal Years 1967, 1968, 1969. 
($ million) 
PL480 
Foreign Long-term Mutual Total Agricultural Ex2orts 
Country Period Currency Dollars Famine Donations Barter Security Government Other All 
Turkey 1967 0.2 4.4 5.6 10.2 6.2 16.4 
1968 2.6 11.5 1.1 15.2 0.1 15.3 
1969 20.0 2.4 13.4 35.9 * 33.1 
Pakistan 1967 101.0 1.2 0.6 2.8 2.8 108.4 12.3 120.7 
1968 130.5 36.9 0.2 0.2 167.8 1.1 169.0 
1969 34.4 4.9 1.3 0.2 40.9 8.3 49.2 
India 1967 425.1 13.0 36.0 13.8 0.2 488.1 17.7 505.8 
1968 358.1 79.7 9.0 37.4 1.7 2.4 488.3 22.8 511.1 
1969 100.2 69.1 1.0 47.4 0.7 1.6 219.9 28.4 248.3 
Ceylon 1967 4.5 2.7 7.2 1.5 8.7 
1968 7.5 1.8 9.3 0.2 9.4 
1969 17.8 0.9 18.7 1.3 20.0 
Thailand 1967 0.3 0.3 26.2 26.5 
1968 0.9 0.9 27.8 28.7 
1969 0.6 0.6 35.3 36.0 
VietNam 1967 157.7 17.9 0.4 1.0 117.1 18.9 196.0 
1968 127.0 19.6 0.2 0.8 147.5 6.4 153.9 
1969 83.0 16.8 0.3 -* 99.6 11.6 111.2 
Indonesia 1967 41.1 1.3 42.4 * 37.3 
1968 38.3 0.5 1.6 0.2 40.7 8.7 49.3 
1969 99.1 0.3 1.7 101.1 -* 89.4 
Philippines 1967 2.6 0.9 4.5 9.6 17.6 69.5 87.1 
1968 8.3 0.5 4.7 0.6 14.0 79.6 93.6 
1969 6.4 9.4 0.3 16.1 73.2 89.3 
Taiwan 1967 17.5 3.1 1.0 23.1 44.6 58.6 103.1 
1968 18.7 0.8 2.3 1.5 2.5 25.8 95.6 121.5 
1969 22.0 0.3 0.3 22.5 90.5 113.1 
Japan 1967 9.8 9.8 929.4 939.1 
1968 898.3 898.3 
1969 - 839.5 839.5 
Korea 1967 37.2 24.2 2.5 16.6 4.6 85.0 31.0 116.0 
1968 48.4 0.2 22.1 2.8 0.3 0.4 74.1 105.0 179.1 
1969 85.4 54.6 38.2 2.2 180.4 78.3 258.7 
Total Asia 1967 743.5 76.2 65.3 55.6 100.0 8.7 1,049.3 1,375.3 2,424.6 
1968 693.2 193.5 55.6 58.7 5.3 8.3 1,014.6 1,485.3 2,499.9 
1969 325.0 296.1 62.8 70.5 1.3 1.0 756.7 1,345.5 2,102.3 
Total World 1967 803.5 177.2 109.9 157.4 292.6 37.3 1,578.0 5,189.5 6,767.5 
1968 723.0 306.5 99.7 152.1 6.3 17.4 1,305.1 5,010.1 6,315.1 
1969 337.0 410.9 110.4 154.3 1.4 5.5 1,019.5 4,720.7 5,740.2 
Source: [32) 
* negative balance 
PL 480/ Sales for foreign currency 
Long-term dollar and convertible foreign currency credit sales 
Government-to-government donations for disaster relief and economic development 
Donations through voluntary relief agencies 
Barter for strategic materials 
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Table 3. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Major Asian Countries, by Commodity Groups, Fiscal Years 1964-69 
($million) 
Grains & Preparations Cotton 
Wheat & Milled Feed exclud. Vegetable Animal Dairy 
Country Year Total Flour Rice Grains Linters Fats & Oils Fats & Oils Products Tobacco 
Turkey 1964 43.5 11.5 1.1 21.8 5.1 1.1 
1965 38.8 20.7 0.6 0.1 9.0 3.0 2.1 
1966 43.5 24.9 1.8 0.4 3.4 3.6 2.8 
1967 16.5 1.3 1.1 4.5 5.9 
1968 15.4 2.4 0.1 1.5 0.7 1.6 
1969 33.2 17.8 0.3 2.3 0.9 0.9 
Pakistan 1964 138.3 104.2 0.7 2.5 19.4 5.8 2.6 1.0 
1965 168.4 111.0 2.0 43.5 3.5 4.8 1.3 
1966 83.0 56.7 1.3 18.0 2.6 1.7 0.9 
1967 120.7 69.8 25.2 0.6 15.4 7.7 0.5 0.8 
1968 169.0 124.1 3.8 25.2 8.7 0.9 5.5 
1969 49.2 28.8 0.5 0.3 15.7 2.6 0.8 
India 1964 400.5 288.7 55.2 6.5 30.0 0.1 9.7 2.0 
1965 528.7 372.6 51.2 10.2 59.8 10.1 5.6 9.6 0.8 
1966 540.9 430.9 1.2 52.8 15.7 12.1 3.6 13.9 
1967 505.8 256.9 9.5 116.9 42.9 29.9 14.1 8.8 2.3 
1968 511.1 343.3 49.9 50.5 27.3 10.1 5.2 0.4 
1969 248.3 139.1 8.9 6.0 12.0 24.2 15.7 12.6 0.6 
Ceylon 1964 4.4 2.9 0.9 0.4 
1965 4.2 2.5 1.5 0.1 
1966 3.7 2.2 1.1 0.2 
1967 8.7 6.1 0.3 0.2 1.5 0.3 
1968 9.4 8.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 
1969 20.0 18.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 
Thailand 1964 12.7 0.2 4.4 0.3 6.6 
1965 16.1 0.2 5.5 0.4 8.3 
1966 20.5 0.2 7.0 0.1 0.8 9.8 
1967 26.5 0.8 7.3 0.1 0.5 14.3 
1968 28.7 0.6 8.9 0.2 1.2 13.4 
1969 36.0 0.9 0.1 7.5 0.3 1.3 20.5 
VietNam 1964 43.6 5.8 3.3 10.5 1.9 12.7 4.4 
1965 52.9 6.6 4.1 2.6 8.5 3.4 16.9 5.1 
1966 102.6 6.5 45.3 1.9 8.3 2.9 0.1 24.6 6.3 
1967 196.0 11.1 118.9 2.3 13.3 5.6 0.1 23.8 11.5 
1968 153.9 9.1 104.9 1.8 3.1 5.6 0.1 8.7 8.5 
1969 111.2 11.0 41.6 2.2 8.1 6.2 19.8 12.2 
Indonesia 1964 18.9 0.8 11.5 0.6 3.5 0.1 1.7 
1965 9.4 0.1 0.2 6.7 0.2 1.0 
1966 3.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.3 
1967 37.3 0.2 15.2 0.4 20.1 0.3 
1968 49.3 0.2 32.1 0.2 9.8 0.1 0.6 0.5 
1969 89.4 12.3 53.0 14.3 1.2 0.6 
Philippines 1964 60.1 17.3 3.7 0.7 15.1 0.4 1.5 8.4 
1965 64.6 14.3 11.2 0.1 12.1 0.6 1.5 8.8 0.7 
1966 73.6 27.2 4.8 0.3 11.6 1.8 1.3 9.1 1.2 
1967 87.1 32.8 6.0 2.9 15.3 1.5 0.8 6.9 4.4 
1968 93.6 40.4 3.2 0.4 14.6 1.1 0.9 8.1 5.5 
1969 89.3 33.1 0.1 15.5 0.3 0.9 13.2 7.0 
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Table 3. (Con't) 
($ million) 
Grains & PreQarations Cotton 
Wheat & Milled Feed exclud. Vegetable Animal Dairy 
Country Year Total Flour Rice Grains Linters Fats & Oils Fats & Oils Products Tobacco 
Taiwan I964 67.9 I8.2 23.8 I4.2* 3.6 1.1 1.8 
I965 84.6 23.3 1.7 22.0 21.3* 4.5 2.1 4.2 
I966 65.I I7.5 1.0 20.I I4.6* 3.2 1.5 3.3 
I967 103.2 21.4 0.2 36.2 31.6* 3.9 1.6 4.3 
I968 I21.5 31.9 0.2 34.6 32.7* 3.7 1.9 Il.3 
I969 Il3.I 21.8 0.9 28.9 46.I * 3.2 0.7 7.I 
Japan I964 742.2 I27.2 I2.2 I30.5 I48.9 I50.7* 26.3 Il.4 29.9 
I965 750.2 IOI.O 30.2 I71.6 I22.9 I49.3* 38.7 10.9 25.8 
I966 9I3.6 II4.1 38.6 233.6 91.6 2I0.3* 43.I 8.8 39.8 
I967 939.I I38.2 I5.4 248.6 I39.2 I99.5* 39.7 4.0 38.5 
I968 898.3 I40.8 0.5 226.9 II2.3 2I6.7* 38.5 I.4 32.9 
I969 839.5 II2.3 0.4 2I9.1 67.7 I95.0* 33.6 2.7 36.2 
Korea I964 I08.7 46.1 I2.7 33.0 0.1 2.1 4.I 
I965 98.5 35.4 8.3 34.7 0.1 2.3 3.9 
I966 89.I 36.4 0.6 39.0 0.1 3.4 5.0 
I967 II6.0 55.8 1.8 37.3 0.4 4.8 7.1 
I968 176.9 58.3 46.7 13.0 40.5 0.8 4.0 4.2 
I969 258.7 88.9 80.4 I2.6 52.0 1.2 5.6 7.2 
Total I964 6,074.5 I,5I8.4 2I6.3 8I6.4 670.4 186.7 2I5.8 203.3 420.7 
World I965 6,097.0 1,240.3 202.6 940.2 583.9 302.6 244.3 2I6.I 395.3 
I966 6,680.9 I,402.2 220.1 I ,351.0 385.8 229.4 201.7 I74.1 394.7 
1967 6,761.2 I ,311.8 307.8 I,151.4 542.3 I97.1 I91.3 I21.7 550.3 
I968 6,312.5 I,277.4 337.1 I ,000.3 474.8 161.5 157.4 I15.7 493.6 
1969 5,740.9 893.1 315.5 773.8 328.6 147.7 151.9 153.4 506.8 
Source: [32] 
* Oil cake and meal (protein meal) 
Table 4. Demand and Supply Data for Representative Asian Countries 1948 to 1963. 
GNP Increase Income Increase Increase 
Increase Per Per Capita Elasticity in Demand Crop 
Country Population Capita Income of Demand for Food Output 
%annual $ %annual %annual %annual 
India 2.0 90 1.7 0.80 3.4 3.0 
Turkey 2.9 3.2 0.49 4.5 3.1 
Pakistan 2.2 90 0.3 0.80 2.4 2.8 
Philippines 3.2 140 1.7 0.75 4.5 3.2 
Taiwan 3.4 190 3.7 0.63 5.7 3.6 
Thailand 3.2 110 2.4 0.72 4.9 5.4 
Source: [15] 
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The Rockefeller Foundation experience with wheat and corn in Mexico suggested that the problems in 
agricultural research must be specifically identified and pursued with a broad, interdisciplinary approach. [ 4] The 
International Rice Research Institute, which began operation in February 1962, was developed to apply this 
experience to rice breeding and production. 
Using previous research experience which had progressively defined characteristics desirable for an ideal plant 
type as its guide, Institute scientists in several disciplines (plant physiology, plant pathology, genetics and plant 
breeding) joined efforts to develop a high yielding plant type with short stature, stiff straw and erect leaves. Grain 
quality received less initial attention than yield. Scientists were confident that they could bring improved cooking 
and eating quality once the physiologically efficient plant type was developed. 
The IRRI breeding program concentrated on shortening the stature of the existing indica (non-glutinous) 
varieties. Japanese scientists had been carrying out research on the relationship between plant architecture and yield 
since before the turn of the century. Higher yielding japonica and japonica-indica crosses resulted. The major turning 
point, however, was the research carried out in Taiwan on indica varieties. Taichung (Native)-1 was the first 
outstanding variety to appear from this work. Identification of the single recessive dwarfing gene in the Taiwan 
semi-dwarfs ultimately provided the breakthrough which led to the development of IR-8. This variety had the 
desired architecture. It was tested over a wide variety of climatic conditions and consistently performed at or near 
the top yield trials. Its maximum yield was approximately 1 to 2 tons per hectare above the improved indicas and 3 
to 4 tons above the native indicas. At zero fertilizer level, IR-8 yielded at least as well as most other varieties. The 
variety was released in November 1966, after just four years of effort. 
Introduction to India 
The new varieties which were to trigger the Green Revolution made their way to India by a variety of routes. 
[18, 25, 27] The semi-dwarf Mexican wheats were first grown in India in 1962 as part of exotic collections. They 
were subsequently released in 1965. T{N)-1 was first tested in 1964-65 and began a thorough testing to determine its 
adaptability to Indian conditions. IR-8 was introduced to India for testing one year after T{N)-1 and released in 
December 1966, only twelve months after its introduction. 
Research work also was underway in India. ADT -27, a short-duration, medium high yielding, medium quality 
rice was developed from indica-japonica crosses in India in the late 1950's. Improved varieties of corn, sorghum, and 
millets were bred in India with Rockefeller Foundation assistance. The ftrst hybrid variety of corn was released in 
1961, the ftrst hybrid sorghum in 1964, and the ftrst hybrid millet in the spring of 1965. Improved varieties of all of 
the major cereals were available for production. 
The formal move for introduction was announced in the New Strategy of Agricultural Development 
articulated in the Fourth Five Year Plan (original) in August 1966. This was the second of the two drought years. A 
bold departure from past policies was required. The New Strategy was a bold new policy. It focused efforts to 
combine the high yielding varieties of seeds with a "package" of complementary inputs on selected water-assured 
acreages. Required production inputs were made available to adopters. A more producer-oriented price support 
program was implemented. Programs in research, extension, and credit were reorganized. 
Impact in India 
Any production results of the modest beginning of the first year of the program were masked by the drought 
of 1966-67. However, in the second year the success of the New Strategy set off widespread enthusiasm and 
exceeded the expectations of all but the most optimistic. Foodgrain production in 1967-68 rose to an unofficially 
estimated level of 97-98 million tons, over 10 percent above the previous record output. 
An analysis of the relative contribution of rainfall and new technology indicates that the new technology 
added approximately 3% million tons to foodgrain production in 1967-68 and 6 million in 1968-69 to what could 
have been expected from the traditional technology under "normal weather." Rainfall contributed an additional 3 
million tons to production in 1967-68 {the previous best output year benefttted from even more favorable rainfall 
than came in 1967-68), but in 1968-69 the generally poor rainfall reduced production by 4-5 million tons below 
normal. In 1968-69, the contribution of the new technology was sufficient to offset the poor rainfall and prevented 
what otherwise would have been a serious production shortfall. [7] 
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Examination of a few selected indicators clearly demonstrates the pervasive impact of the new technology over 
a wide range of production inputs. Acreage under high yielding varieties surged from a modest beginning of just over 
4 million acres in 1966-67 to 21 million acres in 1968-69. Total fertilizer consumption more than doubled between 
1965-66 and 1968-69 when almost 2 million nutrient tons were distributed. Domestic fertilizer production capacity 
increased from 700,000 nutrient tons in 1964-65 to almost I ,500,000 tons in 1968-69. Minor irrigation was 
extended to more new acreage during the three-year period, 1966-67 through 1968-69, than during the previous five 
years and twice as much as the increase during either the First or Second Five Year plans. In 1966, there were only 
54,000 tractors in India; in 1968-69 alone, domestic tractor production was 14,000 units and another 16,000 units 
were imported. These data demonstrate that the new technology is profitable and that the profits are being 
reinvested to promote further growth. 
Wheat, which accounts for almost 20 percent of the total foodgrain production, provides the clearest example 
of success. In 1967-68, production totalled 16.6 million tons, about 35 percent above the previous record output. 
Punjab wheat markets were practically buried during the peak May and June marketing season. By 1968-69, the 
short-strawed varieties covered almost all of the irrigated wheat area in the north and produced a new record output 
of over 18 million tons in spite of poor rainfall. 
Although there are adjustments for planting depth, fertilizer dosage, and irrigation timing and frequency, the 
management requirements for the dwarf wheats are not too unsirnilar to those practiced on local wheats.1' Under 
proper conditions, the dwarfs can produce double the yields and almost double the profits of local varieties. They 
averaged 70 bushels per acre in Ludhiana district, Punjab, in 1966-6 7. They can be sown late in the season without 
great loss in yield which permits an intermediate crop such as potatoes to be grown preceding the wheat. They are 
insensitive to day length and can be grown over a wide geographic area. In part because of higher dosages of 
nitrogen, some of the new varieties are very high in protein and therefore give a bonus to efforts to upgrade 
nutrition. Market price, initially supported at incentive levels by vigorous government action but now held firm by 
the forces of supply and demand, has been an important factor in this success. 
The progress with rice has been slow only in comparison with the phenomenal record in wheat. By 1968-69, 
high yielding varieties were estimated to have covered 7 million acres or approximately one-quarter of the highest 
potential area. This progress has been made in a very short time and in spite of below-normal rains over most of the 
major growing areas during the first three years of the program. [7) The more normal rains in 1969-70 should bring 
the first of several record harvests. 
Rice is grown primarily during the rainy season when cloud cover reduces the intensity of direct sunlight, high 
humidity increases the threat of disease and pests, and water control is difficult. [17) The new varieties require more 
careful attention to management than do the previously existing varieties, particularly with regard to irrigation. In 
large part due to the lush growth and thick stands obtained at high rates of fertilization, both IR-8 and T(N)-1 are 
attractive to pests. T(N)-1 is also susceptible to bacterial leaf blight during the wet season. Neither of these two 
varieties has superior grain quality; as a result, both encounter price discounts in the market. The new varieties have 
no seed dormancy; the grains will sprout and spoil if they are not dried immediately after the harvest. 
In the areas where the new varieties are adapted, average yields, particularly for IR-8, are much higher than for 
local varieties. ADT-27 has less stringent water requirements than most new varieties and has had wide acceptability 
in Tamil Nadu state. It has enabled a significantly larger portion of rice acreage to be double-cropped for the first 
time, particularly in Tanjore district. Promising crosses of dwarf materials with disease resistance, better grain 
quality, and higher yield are already being released from Indian research programs. Agronomic research, which has 
been neglected in the past, is receiving increasing attention. 
Generally success also has followed the introduction of high yielding varieties of the other important cereals. 
The major advantage of sorghum and millets is that their superior yields show up even under poor rainfall 
conditions. This was clearly demonstrated during 1968-69. The availability of seeds for these hybrids which, unlike 
JJ Agronomic research provided the essential information required for success with the new wheats when first introduced. The first 
year's yield trials in experiments were below expectations. As a result of systematic research, it was discovered that the Mexican 
wheats were particularly sensitive to depth of planting and timing of irrigation. They had to be planted closer to the surface than did 
the local varieties. As a result, the shallow bed was exposed to the hot September sun. If the residual moisture was not sufficient, 
irrigation before planting was necessary to insure adequate germination. Furthermore, an irrigation at the crown root stage, about 20 
days after sowing, was found to add an extra 900 lbs. per acre to yield. [27] After problems were recognized and solved-and the 
lesson of this is that the availability of superior seeds is only the first step of the adaptive program-farmer's yields approached 
expected levels. 
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the varieties of wheat and rice must come from commercial sources, has limited the spread of corn, sorghum, and 
millets. However, these high yielding varieties covered over 3 million acres in 1967-68 and a larger acreage in 
1968-69. 
The initial thrust of the new technology was based largely on varieties which were developed abroad. India is 
closely associated with the international scientific community and has a longstanding and improving research 
facility. With the exception of T(N)-1 and IR-8 varieties of rice (which are already being replaced with new varieties 
released this year), the major high yielding varieties presently grown in India have either been developed in India or 
adapted from the original material to better match Indian conditions. Future research emphasis is already shifting to 
address problems of grain quality (including nutrition), and pest and disease resistance. 
Experience in Other Countries 
Table 5 reports the dramatic spread of the high yielding varieties of wheat and rice throughout other Asian 
countries. In evaluating this progress, it is useful to keep in mind as reference that it took 20 years for the new dwarf 
varieties Qaponicas) to catch on nationally in Japan; in the U.S. it took Iowa 10, the Corn Belt 20, and the entire 
country 30 years to switch most of its corn acreage to the hybrids when they first appeared. [27) By any standard, 
Asian acceptance is vastly exceeding those experiences. 
TableS. Plantings of High Yielding Varieties of Wheat and Rice in Less Developed Asian Countries. 
Total (1000 acres) 
Acreage 
1968/69 
All High Yielding Variety Acreage 
Country Varieties 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 
South Asia I. Wheat 
India 39,432 7.4 1,278 7,269 10,000 
Nepal 371 3.5 16.2 61.3 133 
Pakistan 14,977 12.0 250 2,365 6,000 
Afghanistan 5,500 4.5 65.0 300 
~Asia 
Turkey 20,015 1.5 420 1,780 
II. Rice 
South Asia 
Pakistan 
West!f 4,085 0.2 10 761 
East 23,150 0.5 166 381.5 
India 91,344 l3 2,142 4,409 6,500 
Ceylon 1,657 17.2 
Nepal 2,766 105 
East Asia 
Burma 12,297 7.2 470.2 
VietNam 5,528 1.2 109 
Malaysia 1,182 104.5 157 224.6 
Indonesia 20,950 416.5 
Philippines 7,904 204 1,733.4 2,500 
Source: Adapted from Dalrymple [ 10]; see this reference for specific varieties included. 
lJ Total Pakistan acreage of 27,235,000 divided 15% West, 85% East. 
1969/70 
(Est.) 
(10,000) 
(1 ,500) 
(8,000) 
(1 ,000) 
(494) 
HYV%of 
Total Acreage 
1968/69 
25.4 
35.8 
40.1 
5.5 
8.9 
18.6 
1.6 
7.1 
1.0 
4.0 
3.8 
2.0 
19.0 
2.0 
31.6 
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The semi-dwarf wheats have met with uniform success. In 1968-69, they are estimated to occupy about 16 
percent of the wheat land of the less developed areas of Asia (excluding Communist China). (33] In 1967-68 
Pakistan reported production 40 percent above its previous record output. The 1968-69 output was 8 percent higher 
than in 1967-68. (31] The semi-dwarf varieties cover all or nearly all of the irrigated wheat acreage in West Pakistan. 
The first large planting of dwarf wheats in Turkey was in 196 7-68. While they amounted to only 2 percent of total 
acreage, they contributed 4 percent of total production. [ 19] Turkey, Afghanistan, and Nepal all report increased 
acreage in 1968-69 over 196 7-68. 
The dissemination of the new rice varieties has also proceeded rapidly. In 1968-69 they are estimated to 
occupy about 7 percent of the rice land of the less developed areas of Asia (excluding Communist China). (33] 
Record rice harvests are expected in all of South Asia in 1969-70. (31] 
Differences in acceptance rate among countries can be explained by a variety of environmental and 
institutional factors. Randy Barker, agricultural economist at the International Rice Research Institute whose 
knowledge we will rely on as our primary source over the following pages, has identified nine factors which appear 
to be especially important in the adoption and spread of the new rices. He has compared five of these by major 
producing countries in Table 6.JJ He notes that some of these factors, (i.e., disease resistance or acceptability of 
grain quality can be improved in a relatively short time through work in varietal improvement) are more temporary 
obstacles to expansion than others (i.e., poor water control). 
11 The other four factors identified by Barker are: 
(a.) the quality of farm management; 
(b.) the farm institutional structure; 
(c.) the availability of adequate market resources including drying facilities, storage warehouses, and milling equipment; 
(d.) government institutional structure, incentive, and initiative. 
Table 6. Countries which Appear to be in a More Favorable or Less Favorable Situation with respect to Five Factors 
Influencing Dissemination of New Indica Varieties in South and Southeast Asia, 196811 
Factors 
Yield Quality 
Advantage Acceptance 
Availability over of New 
Water of Existing Disease Rice 
Control Inputs Varieties Resistance Grain 
More Favorable 
India Average Good High Average Average 
Malaysia Good Good High High Poor 
Philippines Average Good High Average Average 
West Pakistan Good Good High High Average 
VietNam Average Average High Average Average 
Average 
Ceylon Good Good Low Average Average 
Indonesia Average Poor Medium Average Average 
Less Favorable 
Burma Poor Poor High Average Poor 
East Pakistan Poor Average High Low Average 
Thailand Poor Average Medium Average Poor 
Source: [ 4] 
!J Those factors thought to be particularly important in influencing the initial rapid or slow rate of adoption are underlined. 
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Next to India, the Philippines has the most acreage in the new rice varieties. A number of factors including 
rapid seed multiplication and distribution, the expansion of fertilizer distribution, the expansion of rural credit 
facilities, and a strong government price support program can be identified as being important to this progress.41 The 
Philippines also has the special advantage of being the home of the International Rice Research Institute. In 1968, it 
apparently won a goal sought for half a century-self-sufficiency in rice production. [29] Acreage in new varieties 
almost doubled in 1968-69, but production was down slightly because of drought. 
West Pakistan has had excellent production response from growing IR-8 in what are considered to be near ideal 
conditions with regard to intensity of sunlight, ability to manage water, and relative freedom from pests and 
diseases. However, problems persist on the marketing and export sides. Millers are not able to handle the increased 
volumes. Antiquated milling equipment causes frequent breakage in the brittle IR-8 grains. In the Central District or 
Punjab where production was disappointing, milling problems severe, and basmati rice (a fme grained, export 
variety) an alternative, IR-8 acreage dropped in 1969-70 to no more than half of that in 1968-69. In the South or 
Sind where production was most favorable, milling problems are less severe (because of parboiling prior to milling), 
and where there are less attractive production alternatives, 1969-70 IR-8 acreage is estimated at about 1,500,000 
acres, triple the previous year (about 1 ,000,000 acres will be replaced by IR-6, a higher quality, more easily milled 
variety, in 1970-71). [6] 
East Pakistan would appear to be a logical export market for West Pakistan wheat and rice. The East is making 
much slower production progress than the West and is a study in contrast. Water control, most importantly caused 
by highly variable rainfall which often results in extensive flooding during the monsoon, appears to pose the greatest 
problem for rapid spread of the semi-dwarf rice varieties in the East. Disease and insect problems are very severe for 
IR-8 during the main growing season.2/ Political uncertainties also pose a constraint. 
Progress in Malaysia has been slower than expected, apparently because of the low quality of the new varieties 
in comparison to the imported Thai varieties. In fact, Thailand itself has had almost no adoption of the new 
varieties. It is surplus in rice and a high quality producer and exporter. This year, the Rice Department has released 
two new non-glutinous varieties, both of which have IR-8 as one parent but which have high quality and more 
disease resistance. A sticky quality is preferred in the Northeast (and in Laos). Thailand is a country where water 
control is difficult. The Central Plain floods annually. Research is attempting to combine the high yielding results of 
the new varieties to floating varieties which predominate the central area. Grain quality, water control, and input 
availability have all hampered diffusion in Burma, another rice-exporting country. Internal instabilities have 
hampered initial adoption in South Vietnam and Indonesia. A record rice harvest in Indonesia this year suggests that 
this situation may be improving. Improvement in fertilizer distribution appears to be one key factor in future 
success. 
Corn is the third important high yielding variety in the Asian region. In Thailand, it is grown on recently 
opened upper regions of the Central Plain and Northeast. It is now a major export crop. Ninety per cent of the corn 
acreage is in improved varieties (developed from Guatemala) with average yields in excess of 2.5 tons per hectare as 
opposed to only 1.4 tons per hectare for unimproved varieties. [12] Even now only 5 per cent of the crop is 
9 The Philippine experience, as reported in studies by Barker [3], clarifies two misconceptions regarding the new rice varieties: 
"The level of inputs was considerably higher for IR-8 than for local varieties-three times higher, on the average, for fertilizer 
and insecticide, and more than 50 percent higher for labor. Many observers therefore conclude that the new varieties 'require more 
inputs.' This statement is misleading. Using the traditional low level of inputs, a new variety will give similar or, in some cases, higher 
yields than a local variety. The new variety is distinguished, however, by its ability to give higher yields at higher input levels .... 
"The question is frequently raised as to whether the new varieties require higher level of management as well as of other inputs. 
To double or triple yields, a farmer must obviously have an adequate supply of irrigation water (although no more than is required 
for the traditional varieties) and he must have a knowledge of the proper timing and application techniques for such inputs as 
insecticides and fertilizer. However, it appears that yield increases of 30 to 50 percent can be achieved with little, if any, increase in 
the existing level of management skills provided that other resources are available." 
~The frrst planting of IR-8 in the 1966-67 winter season was beset with problems. It was preceded by wide publicity. However, it 
was planted early and attacked by virus, blight, and cold. In one important area, floods appeared before the crop was harvested. The 
1967-68 experience-benefitting from what was learned during the previous year-was much better. USAID made the following 
interesting analysis of this experience. It is applicable to other areas: 
"The IRRI-8 had limited adaptability requiring more irrigation water and a longer growing season than traditional Boro 
varieties. It was not the fmal answer to East Pakistan rice needs nor would it likely be a major contributor to overall rice production 
but it did show that high yield potential existed in improved rice plants. It revitalized thinking about the rice plant. Rice was no 
longer a commonplace thing. Farmers, businessmen, professionals and politicians were made aware of the potential of the new 
technology in rice and the agricultural problems of East Pakistan. Farmers and landowners took a new interest in improved cultural 
methods and the use of such inputs as fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation. Everyone in the province became involved with the 
'miracle,' its disillusionment, and later its more realistic appraisal. Agriculture in total profited by this involvement and concern of all 
peoples in agricultural problems." 
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fertilized. Estimates are for a record crop in 1969-70. [31] Once the problems of downy mildew are solved, corn 
production should make much more rapid gains in the Philippines. It is also a significant crop in Indonesia and West 
Pakistan. 
Corn breeding in the region is attempting to follow the successful path charted by wheat and rice. The original 
material has come from the U.S., Central and South America, and the Caribbean. Breeders are attempting to develop 
a shorter plant type in which the upper leaves are erect. [25] This plant would let in more sunlight to improve 
photosynthesis and utilize large amounts of fertilizer without lodging. Higher protein content, higher disease 
resistance, and shorter field duration are also breeding objectives. Some breeders feel that a genetic ceiling has been 
reached with the hybrid materials currently available. Seed production and multiplication are also causing problems. 
Therefore emphasis in corn breeding in the region is turning to pay more attention to synthetic varieties.2./ 
III. Future Production Projections and Implications for World Trade 
As we move from the past and present into the future, our analysis begins to contain an increasing number of 
qualifications. Forecasters were quite wrong in their projections about the future of Asian agriculture only three 
years ago. Why should we be more confident today? 
Future Production Projections 
We can respond with a positive answer for wheat. The new varieties have demonstrated clear superiority and 
already extend to large percentages of the high potential acreages. Additional coverage will be dependent largely on 
development of new irrigation. However, research continues to improve yields and grain quality. Improved grain 
quality will insure more stable prices necessary to maintain economic incentives. Disease and pest resistance, 
heretofore not a serious problem, are receiving increasing research attention.1/ Fertilizer dosages are still much 
below economically optimal levels. Fertilizer supply constraints are being progressively removed; the world is 
currently in surplus supply of nitrogen, and nitrogen prices have fallen significantly during the past five years 
because of dramatic changes in production technology. Finally, research is being increasingly directed to problems of 
dry-land production. In sum, future increases in wheat production should continue in almost all countries in which 
wheat is grown, although not necessarily with the dramatic leaps which we have just witnessed. 
The future for increasing rice production in Asia is guardedly optimistic. [5] The shorter period of experience, 
the diverse set of conditions in the many countries which grow the crop, and the generally more difficult 
management requirements necessary to obtain optimal yields impose a wider range of qualifications to this 
optimism. Factors listed in Table 6 (and the related footnote .31), particularly quality of water control, are most 
important in determining the success of any country. Some current estimates are that only 15-20 percent of the rice 
land in Southeast Asia has water control suitable to make adoption feasible of the dwarf varieties presently available. 
The only research underway on floating varieties (necessary for the deepwater areas that account for approximately 
10 percent of East Pakistan and Southeast Asian rice land) is being carried out in Thailand with results still several 
years away. Among the other production inputs, plant protection may eventually rival chemical fertilizer as the 
leading cash expenditure. The marketing process-facilities for drying, milling, storing, and exporting-must receive 
increasing attention immediately. In the longer run, the level of rice prices, which may be conditional on entry into 
the world rice market (and which will be discussed in the next section) will become important. The role of research 
is important at all times, whether it be to improve grain quality, improve pest and disease resistance, or to develop 
plant types which excel in areas characterized by variable water levels. 
Projections based on explicit input assumptions for future agricultural production possibilities-it should be 
emphasized that these are projections and not necessarily forecasts-have been calculated for two countries in the 
area: India and Pakistan. 
§} Hybrid varieties are developed by supervised crosses between pure parental inbred lines. They must be grown from new seed each 
year if they are not to lose their vigor. An adequately funded, closely planned and supervised professional seed industry is required to 
maintain this purity and to carry out the production. 
The synthetic or composite varieties are complex populations which constitute superior gene pools. A number of promising 
lines are planted together. Winds carry out cross-pollination. If plant breeders choose wisely and if enough different varieties are used, 
a few of the composites turn out to be exceptional. By appropriate breeding procedures, the additive gene variance can be exploited 
and the performance level of the composites raised still higher. The further advantage of the composite is that the seed can be 
multiplied for several years, from stock grown by farmers, without much deterioration. This explanation is paraphrased from [25) 
and [27). 
JJ At present, one dominant semi-dwarf wheat family extends over the belt of acreage from Turkey through India. This narrow 
germ plasm base carries the same rust resistance (and lack of resistance). Fear of a vast epidemic brought on by a new race-to which 
the varieties are not resistant-is a haunting worry to scientists. India is already broadening its varietal base and the danger should 
lessen in the future. [27) 
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Underlying the Indian projections are the basic factors that this country has very advantageous soil, sunlight, 
temperature, and water resources which could produce anywhere from two to ten times present output even with 
current technology [26]; the benefits of two decades of institutional change generated by such programs as 
Community Development and the Intensive Agricultural District Program; a competent indigenous agricultural 
research base; sufficient effective demand generated by expected future changes in population and income to 
support a 4-5 per cent growth in foodgrain output with relatively stable prices; and what appears to be a strong 
resolve on the part of the government to support the New Strategy of Agricultural Development in all its phases. 
A medium set of projections for Indian foodgrain output is given in Table 7. Assumptions on which these 
projections are based as well as alternative low and high metabolism growth paths, associated cropping pattern 
changes, input demands, price implications, and other related growth problems are given in the study paper "Long 
Range Agricultural Adjustment Analysis." [8] The input combinations in this example are only one of many possible 
which could obtain the output levels. 
Adequate government support is the qualifying factor determining whether India will actually achieve this 
goal. Uncertainties regarding availability of foreign aid to finance fertilizer and other production inputs are a 
continuing problem. Domestically, the political problems of inter-personal and inter-regional division of the gains 
may also force a trade-off with economic growth. 
The projections for West Pakistan-also based on explicit combinations of inputs-indicate potential growth 
rates in foodgrain production declining from 8-12 percent annually for 1964-65 to 1969-70 to 4-7 percent for 
1979-80 to 1984-85.§! A set of qualifying factors similar to those for India are applicable. [ 6] West Pakistan is very 
close to if not at foodgrain self-sufficiency and already must worry about the rate of growth of domestic demand 
and the problem of maintaining incentive prices in the future. 
The physical potential is clearly available over the wide range of countries in the area for a much faster growth 
rate than in the past. Whether it will come about for the countries we know best, India and West Pakistan, as well as 
for the other Asian countries must await the test of time. My guess is a qualified yes. 
The Net Import/Export Balance of Asian Countries in FoodgrainsV 
Short of a breakthrough in technology in family planning comparable to that in agriculture, the chances for 
dramatic decreases in the birth rate over the next decade are not promising. In the short run, better food availability 
may even decrease the death rate. The rate of population should increase more rapidly before it begins to slow 
down. With the exception of Taiwan, population in the less developed Asian countries should increase between 2.5 
and 3.5 percent annually. Future income growth should be at least as high as in the past-resulting from the 
increased growth potential generated by the Green Revolution. [13] 
~ Four sets of projections were made based on different assumptions regarding the speed of impact of the high yielding varieties [ 61. 
The lower growth path assumes: 
(a.) Fairly rapid spread of improved varieties to all irrigated land by 1978-79. 
(b.) Steady increase in fertilizer application to 110 lbs./acre for wheat and 130 lbs./acre for rice for all irrigated land by 1984-85. 
The grain/fertilizer nutrient response ratio for wheat is assumed to rise from 12:1 to 16:1 and for rice (milled basis) from 8:1 
to 13:1 on a weighted basis. 
(c.) Widespread introduction of improved implements to complement a primarily "bullock-powered" agriculture. 
(d.) Increases of about 20 percent (wheat) and 30 percent (rice) between 1967-68 and 1984-85 for irrigated land. All rice is grown 
on irrigated land. Approximately 4.5 million acres of rainfed land is planted to wheat; partial introduction of improved 
varieties on this land is assumed. 
(e.) A 42 percent increase in the farm labor force by 1984-85. 
The most rapid growth rate substitutes the following assumptions for a, c, and d: 
(a.) more rapid spread completed by 1973-74; 
(c.) rapid introduction of tractors and less sizable introduction of improved implements; 
(d.) increases of about 52 percent (wheat) and 65 percent (rice). 
The authors consider that the lower projections are "a moderately optimistic prognosis for Pakistan." 
2/ We know of at least three current studies which are expecting to generate specific numbers for future import/export balances: 
(a.) The Foreign Regional Analysis Division, Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture is carrying out a 
research project in cooperation with AID entitled "Analysis of Demand Prospects for Agricultural Products of the 
Less-Developed Countries." Only discussion papers "not intended for quotation or reference in publications" have been 
released from this project to date. 
(b.) The Center for Agricultural and Economic Development at Iowa State University is carrying out a study and an interim report 
has been distributed. [ 14 I 
(c.) The Indicative World Plan sponsored by the F AO of the United Nations has published several regional reports recently. 
We defer to these expert assessments by "braver souls" for any precise numbers. 
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Table 7. Medium Projection of Foodgrain Production for India. 
Units 1964/65 1967/68 1968/69 1973/74 1978/79 1983/84 
I. Gross sown area mil. acres 390.7 392.5 394.2 414.6 429.4 445.3 
2. Allocated to: cereals , 231.5 244.1 240.0 245.0 245.0 250.0 
3. Allocated to: pulses 58.8 56.0 55.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
4. Allocated to: non-foodgrains 100.4 92.4 99.2 109.6 124.4 135.3 
High Yielding Varieties-
Irrigated Cereals 
5. Gross area mil. acres 15.0 21.0 50.0 90.0 110.0 
6. Average NPK dosage lbs./acre 60 70 85 100 120 
7. Package response ratio 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 
8. Package increase lbs./acre 810 945 1148 1350 1620 
9. Basic cereal yield 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 
I 0. Package cereal yield 2110 2245 2448 2650 2920 
11. HYV cereal production mil. tons 14.4 21.4 55.6 108.4 146.0 
Local Varieties - Irrigated Cereals 
12. Gross area mil. acres 53.2 40.0 35.8 21.5 
13. Average NPK dosage lbs./acre 30 40 40 50 
14.% of area receiving NPK 40 70 70 90 
15. Average NPK dosage- all area lbs./acre 12 28 28 45 
16. Fertilizer response ratio 9 9 9 9 
17. Increase due to fertilizer lbs./acre 108 252 252 405 
18. Basic cereal yield 1350 1300 1300 1300 
19. Total yield 1458 1552 1552 1705 
20. Cereal production - local mil. tons 35.3 28.2 25.3 16.7 
Unirrigated Cereal Varieties 
21. Gross area mil. acres 178.5 189.1 183.2 173.5 155.0 140.0 
22. Average NPK lbs./acre 10 15 20 30 35 35 
23.% of area receiving NPK 20 20 22 30 30 40 
24. Average NPK dosage- all area lbs./acre 2.0 3.1 4.4 9.0 10.5 14.0 
25. Fertilizer response ratio 9 9 9 9 9 9 
26. Increase due to fertilizer lbs./acre 18 28 40 81 95 126 
27. Basic cereal yield , 450 450 450 475 500 525 
28. Total yield 468 478 490 556 595 651 
29. Cereal production mil. tons 37.9 41.1 40.8 43.8 41.9 41.4 
30. Total cereal production (normal weather) 73.2 83.7 86.5 116.1 150.3 187.4 
31. Average cereal yield lbs./acre 696 754 793 1042 1350 1649 
Compound growth in yield per cent 5.6 6.2 4.1 
Pulses 
32. Total production (norm weather) mil. tons 12.0 11.5 11.3 13.0 13.6 14.3 
33. Yield lbs./acre 450 450 450 475 500 525 
Foodgrains 
34. Total production (norm weather) mil. tons 85.2 95.2 97.8 129.1 163.9 201.7 
35. Compound growth per cent 5.8 4.9 4.2 
36. Average yield (norm weather) lbs./acre 646 698 737 931 1182 1431 
37. Compound growth percent 4.8 4.9 3.9 
38. Weather index 104.8 103.0 89.1 
39. Actual production mil. tons 89.0 98.0 94.0 
Source: [8] 
Note: "Tons" are metric tons 
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In spite of increasingly higher pressures of domestic demand, it does appear that several of the Asian countries 
can expect to attain foodgrain self-sufficiency in the near future. The market for U.S. foodgrain exports to Asia is 
softening. The countries in which future foodgrain production prospects appear most promising-i.e., India, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines-are large U.S. foodgrain export markets. The calculation for India is 
illustrative. A 5-5% percent annual production increase compared with a 3%-4 percent increase in demand will 
close the present 4-5 million ton import bill within two to four years.W 
Even if the Green Revolution had not appeared, India was determined-by some means-to become much less 
dependent on PL 480 imports by the end of the fourth Five Year Plan. Nationalistic pride and policy flexibility 
dictate that she provide for her own basic food needs. PL 480 programs are getting less concessional. The Food for 
Peace Act of 1966 provides for the transition from sales for foreign currencies to sales for dollars on credit terms by 
the end of 1971. [28] 
On the other hand, there does not appear to be a clear threat that Asian countries will compete more 
successfully with the U.S. for grain export markets in the future than they have in the past. Wheat prices in India are 
currently in the neighborhood of $2.75 per bushel, well above world prices. Pakistan prices are at similar levels. [8, 
24] 
Most of the Asian countries (India included) maintain domestic rice prices which are competitive with world 
prices-but the world import market for rice is also centered in Asia. The U.S. competes in this market almost solely 
by means of government-aided concessional sales on terms which are difficult to match under hard currency 
arrangements. 
The ability to participate in the world dollar rice market will become increasingly important to these countries 
in order to maintain prices at levels high enough to provide incentive for continued high level growth. The total 
market is very thin, averaging6-7% milliontons annually. [2] Approximately a third of this is influenced by special 
circumstances-1.5 million tons under PL480 and approximately 1.0 million tons controlled by transportation costs, 
long-standing market arrangements, or consumer preferences. The competitive hard currency market is only about 
4.5 million tons. Coarser grades comparable to IR-5 or IR-8, the types which potential new exporters would have to 
offer, make up approximately half of this competitive market. New competition of any significant volume would 
undoubtedly drive down prices substantially; there is already evidence that this is happening. Sizeable investments in 
milling and processing will be required to modernize equipment in order to decrease breakages in the new varieties if 
they are even to begin to compete at the bottom of the coarser grades. Special skills required in trading in 
international commodity markets must be learned or acquired. These problems pose serious constraints on 
prospective rice exporters. Surpluses, if they develop, are likely to create downward pressures on prices, primarily 
for the lower grades. West Pakistan is facing this problem already.W 
The Asian market for coarse grains-corn and sorghum especially-is growing. Japan is the primary importer at 
present; other nations might also increase demands as higher incomes generate demands for meat and dairy products. 
!SJ/ Based on: 
(a.) annual rate of population growth declining from 2.7 percent in the fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) to 2.2 percent in the Sixth 
Plan (1979-84); 
(b.) national income growing at S percent annually during the Fourth and Fifth Plans and 6 percent during the Sixth Plan; 
(c.) income elasticity of demand coefficients chosen after a comprehensive survey of empirical studies of India data; 
the projected annual growth rates in domestic consumption demand at stable prices for a range of agricultural commodities are as 
follows: 
rice 3.2 percent 
wheat 4.6 percent 
other cereals 3.0 percent 
pulses 3.9 percent 
W The "like-commodity" export restriction under PL 480 legislation is confronting Pakistan with a dilemma. East Pakistan has 
imported PL 480 wheat from the U.S. (and rice from Japan) in preference to being dependent upon West Pakistan. However, a 
country which imports U.S. PL 480 commodities-and East and West Pakistan are parts of the same country-cannot export a "like 
commodity." Therefore, even aside from the competitive difficulties of entering the world market, West Pakistan cannot export 
wheat or rice until the East changes her policy (in fact the U.S. would relax her restrictions for small amounts of Pakistan rice 
exports). Unless the U.S. does recognize that East and West Pakistan pose an exceptional case, in fact are close to being two distinct 
countries (which would be politically awkward for the U.S. to suggest and for Pakistan to accept) Pakistan may be forced to decrease 
its reliance on PL 480 imports (for the East) sooner than it ordinarily would like. At some point the West will have to test the world 
market for rice (and possibly wheat) if it hopes to maintain incentive prices without accepting an impossible financial burden. 
The problem is more complex than this description suggests. However, it does point out that the flexibility under which PL 
480 is administered might be reevaluated to take into account the present realities of the developing countries. Additional points will 
be made on the following pages. 
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Thailand's corn crop is exported to Japan for animal feed. Japan appears to be encouraging other sources of Asian 
production. She is attempting to improve her markets for industrial products by correcting existing tradeimbalances 
with Asian countries .I 2/ U.S. corn exports to Japan grew rapidly until 1966 but have remained fairly steady since 
then. (Table 3) Some observers feel that Thailand has a large comparative advantage over the U.S. in production of 
corn for livestock feed in the area. The U.S. also has exported sorghum to India. These were PL 480 shipments in 
response to droughts centered in areas where this grain is important in human diet. Future growth in this export 
market is not promising. 
In summary, the Asian market, especially for U.S. concessional exports of wheat, appears to be softening. 
Prospects in India and West Pakistan are the primary reason for this expectation. Most probably, PL 480 foodgrain 
imports will be phased out in these countries over the next two to four years. The Philippines may be a marginal rice 
exporter. Burma and Thailand should maintain their present positions. The remainder of Asia should bear further 
watching. 
Within this aggregate outlook, one should note several qualifications: 
(I.) Urbanization in many Asian countries has been accompanied by the development of a modern baking industry. 
Loaf bread is convenient for busy people to eat. The uniform quality hard wheats required for modern bakery 
operations are not grown in large amounts in Asia, which because of climatic factors produces mainly spring wheats. 
This market accounts for approximately a minimum of a million tons of U.S. exports to India. It is an example 
where concessional exports may be building a bigger eventual dollar market. Ul This same trend, although on a 
smaller scale, should also develop even in the rice eating countries. 
(2.) The market for concessional exports might be enlarged if countries in this region choose to pursue rural works 
programs in order to productively sop up rural unemployment which broader investment programs might not be 
able to influence. East Pakistan has had good experience with this program in the past. Rural works programs in 
other countries could result from increasing concern about problems of inter-regional and inter-personal equity from 
the distribution of gains from the Green Revolution. Many productive infra-structure investments can be highly 
labor-intensiveW [20] 
(3.) The U.S. could increase the economic growth rate in these countries by increasing its foreign aid assistance. 
India can probably produce as much food as will be needed with expected growth rates. However, they could 
consume even more food if incomes rose faster. Per capita food consumption levels are among the lowest in the 
world. A much higher income growth rate might strain the agricultural production capability of even the higher 
productive potential countries of the region. Foodgrain imports might be utilized in the interim. 
( 4.) Internal political stability is most difficult to predict. Production prospects for two of our biggest rice export 
markets, South Vietnam and Indonesia, hang importantly on this balance. 
(5.) Finally, the weather, most especially the monsoon, is still the dominating force over the entire area. Although 
the new varieties and the related inputs may be able to offset its effects somewhat, the weather can significantly 
influence production during any given year or more. 
Implications for Other U.S. Exports 
There is a brighter outlook for U.S. exports to Asia of most commodities other than foodgrains. At present the 
Green Revolution applies only to cereals. There is bound to be some carryover to the non-cereals in terms of general 
build-up of strength in research facilities, the greater availability of production inputs such as chemical fertilizers, 
and the changed attitude regarding the role of agriculture in the overall growth process. However, at least for the 
short run, production increases in the non-cereals must come primarily from acreage shifts. 
l1J I am indebted to Stephen Schmidt for this evaluation. 
!1/ U.S. export market development in India has been weakened by the fact that often our PL 480 wheat shipments have not been as 
clean or as uniformly high in quality as those of some of our competitors. 
l.4f Folke Dovring [ 11] has proposed broadening our concessional export program beyond foodstuffs with a menu of commodities 
approximating the import bill which might be expected when the prospective country attains higher development status. This would 
both aid growth of these countries and help develop the U.S. export market as these countries become used to U.S. products. 
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The increase in the rate of foodgrain production translated into higher agricultural incomes, increased 
consumption and investment, and lower agricultural product prices will lead to higher overall economic growth in 
the Asian countries. Many of the non-cereals such as dairy products, natural fibers, fats and oils, and tobacco have 
relatively high income elasticities of demand. W Therefore to the extent that acreage shifts do not meet these 
demands, increased imports are the solution. 
The cash component of purchased inputs for the new technology is substantial. The input bill for chemical 
fertilizers, plant protection, irrigation pumps, tractors, and related agricultural equipment should grow more than 
proportionately with the rate of agricultural growth. To the degree that domestic investment does not fulftll these 
needs, there is scope for imports or direct foreign investment. 
Growth in these markets is directly related to the rate of economic progress achieved in the Asian developing 
countries. 
IV. Concluding Comments 
We might summarize this analysis as follows: 
(I.) Asia (including West Asia and Japan) accounts for approximately one-third of U.S. farm exports with major 
emphasis on wheat, rice, cotton, and edible oils sold under government-aided programs. 
(2.) The forces which created this export market, namely the relatively slow rate of food production increase relative 
to population growth and the easy availability of surplus U.S. food commodities on soft currency terms, are both 
changing. 
(3.) Most significantly, the Green Revolution, the application of scientific agriculture to cereals production, has 
changed the potential production future for the region. The impact, past and present, is clearest for wheat. The 
impact for rice has been more variable, but the physical potential is clear and the problems identifiable and 
correctable. Corn, sorghum, and millets likewise promise high growth potential in areas to which they are adapted. 
(4.) The result is that the Asian export market for U.S. foodgrains, particularly wheat, appears to be softening. 
(5.) In this regard it should be noted that the Green Revolution appears to be having its greatest impact in Asia. The 
large markets of Africa and South America may be growing sufficiently fast to absorb the decrease to Asia. The 
softening of the Asian market may not be difficult to absorb; the total U.S. export market for foodgrains may shift 
directions rather than decrease significantly in total size. 
(6.) On the other hand, Asian markets for oils, cotton, tobacco, dairy products and other farm commodities with 
high income elasticities of demand may be growing markets for U.S. farm commodity exports. Closely related to this 
should be a growing Asian market for U.S. exports of farm production inputs and U.S. foreign investment. Through 
foreign aid and other forms of assistance, the U.S. can actively promote the economic growth which will generate 
these import demands. 
Two fmal comments are in order. First, it should be recognized that this analysis is impressionistic based on a 
first-hand observation of conditions in India, primarily, but also in West Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines and 
a perusal of secondary data and other people's impressions. I have particularly borrowed heavily from the ideas of 
my colleagues presently in the field. However, projections of the future confidently predicted by some more 
knowledgeable than I profess to be were proved wrong only two to three years ago. Sometimes fortune turns on a 
narrow edge-a few grains of Norin wheat remained in the seed bags to plant a second time when the first sowing was 
totally lost in the early days of the Rockefeller Foundation program in Mexico; the Watts riots and the outbreak of 
the Indo-Pak War did not keep the first large order of Mexican wheat seed from reaching India and Pakistan just in 
time for the sowing season in 1965; the breeders at the International Rice Research Institute took a second look and 
reversed their original decision to throw out three rows of experimental rice varieties among which was IR-8. [27] 
W For example, the projected annual growth rates in domestic consumption demands in India for selected non-foodgrains are (8]: 
edible oils 4.7 percent 
fruits and vegetables 5.2 percent 
meat, fish, and eggs 5.2 percent 
sugar 5.7 percent 
milk 6.5 percent 
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The situation must be watched closely and projections frequently reassessed. For this reason, we have taken more 
space than might ordinarily be devoted to the technical aspects of the Green Revolution in order that some of the 
key variables-those to be watched-are identified. 
Secondly, it is in the political and economic interests of the U.S., including the farm sector, to encourage 
continued development of the Green Revolution in Asia. The forces for change were inevitable. The successes are 
very visible. The U.S. gains standing in the world political arena from having been associated with the really 
significant "Asian Drama." On more practical terms, it is in the U.S. economic interest to support these changes. 
Developed countries are their own best trade partners. This applies to agricultural as well as non-agricultural 
commodities. Inevitably in the longer run, a country must generate hard currency in order to be an equal economic 
participant. The Green Revolution gives Asian countries the agricultural base on which to launch their economic 
development. It may also be the necessary trigger which enables the breakthroughs to be made in the 
implementation of population planning. The U.S. can continue to aid with increased technical and capital assistance. 
While the short-run implications of the Green Revolution may be (but do not necessarily have to be) softened export 
markets for selected farm commodities, this certainly does not apply to all farm commodities nor to total U.S. trade. 
The longer-run implications are clearly to the advantage of the U.S. 
A flexible policy which supports and adjusts to longer-term trends will have the largest pay off to the U.S. farm 
sector. 
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Long-Range Land and Resource Conversion Programs 
Leo V. Mayer and Earl 0. Heady* 
For the last 15 years the United States has had a succession of land retirement programs in an attempt to 
control total agricultural production, raise prices and farm income, and improve the level of well-being in rural 
communities. Programs which retire land for multiyear periods are only one of several types which have been used 
for these purposes. But multiple year programs have appeal for various groups and hence their use and usefulness has 
been discussed at length over the last two decades. 
To the general public, public programs to conserve our national resources mesh well with the nation's long 
existing policies of conservation. When these programs also lend support to farm prices and incomes, there is even 
stronger support for them. In the 1950's when farm incomes fell, the idea of building a soil bank became widely 
supported. To the average citizen, the idea of building the nation a soil bank was attractive; land placed in this bank 
could be conserved and improved. In times of reduced production or increased demand, it was reasoned, it could be 
used to expand production of various crops. As with the average citizen and his personal bank account, few 
recognized that assets established in an account represent a liability to the bank. Likewise, few persons realized that 
any asset value built up under the old soil bank program accrued to the individual landholder and was offset in the 
long run by the liability the nation had established toward holding supply in check to support prices of farm 
commodities and incomes of agricultural producers. 
A second group for which long-range land retirement has had appeal has been professional agriculturalists. The 
appeal to this group has been based on somewhat different reasoning. This group starts with considerable evidence 
that a measure of overcapacity in crop production exists and will continue to exist in the agricultural sector. When 
faced with the overwhelming evidence of the severe economic shock that unrestrained output in the market place 
could cause for the farm economy, few in this group recommend dependence on price relationships as the sole 
means of removing excess resources from agricultural production. Instead, most professional agriculturalists opt for a 
less ruthless means of removing land resources from agricultural production. Based on a long period of experience 
with the excess capacity problem, many analysts have concluded that removing these acres from production for 
multiyear periods is the most acceptable means of reducing overcapacity to produce crops, particularly if the 
program is also designed to move the nation toward an improved long-run balance between land and other resources 
in agricultural production.ll 
Another group for whom long-range land retirement has had appeal is national policy makers. The appeal to 
this group culminated in the passage of the Agricultural Act of 1956 which established the Soil Bank program. The 
Soil Bank program included an Acreage Reserve which retired cropland for one-year periods, and a Conservation 
Reserve which retired cropland for up to 10-year periods. As the Congressional Quarterly pointed out in reviewing 
its passage: 
The soil bank had broad appeal. From the point of view of national policy, it was desirable because 
reduction of surpluses through land retirement would simultaneously exert an upward pressure on prices, thus 
boosting farm income, and lessen federal costs for acquiring and storing surplus commodities ... From a 
longer-range point of view, many who saw the surplus problem as an essential one of "too many farmers" 
hoped that some of the poorer farmers, who might retire their entire farms for several years under one title of 
the President's proposal, would find non-farm jobs and never return to agriculture [5). 
While few congressmen would have forthrightly stressed the idea that retiring farmers as well as cropland was 
desirable public policy, most wholeheartedly did support the idea of raising farm prices through reducing farm 
output. A second point which had general support was that retiring land and hence production was cheaper in the 
long run than storing large and increasing supplies of farm commodities. 
While the soil bank program of the 1950's is perhaps the best known example of land retirement, it is only one 
of several types of land retirement programs used in the United States for controlling production over the past 
*Assistant Professor of Economics and Distinguished Professor of Economics, respectively, Iowa State University. 
lJ For a set of views on long term land retirement see [ 1, 7, 11]. 
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several decades. The basic mechanism for controlling production of grains, tobacco and cotton has always been, 
presently is, and in future programs will be, retirement of cropland. In previous times these programs have had such 
labels as "Triple-A program," "feed grain program," "wheat program," "cotton program," etc. The label for the 
future is the "set aside program." Each new administration wants to identify its land retirement program under a 
different label than the previous one. But regardless of name, the foundation mechanism of all supply management 
or control programs has been land retirement. Supply control has never directly affected labor and capital, two 
resources which dominate land in magnitude of annual inputs and productivity. Land retirement in past and present 
programs has always resulted in a much smaller percentage reduction in labor and probably has resulted in no 
reduction in, or has even increased, use of capital. All past and present programs to reduce output and improve 
prices and income in farming have been based on land retirement, a point not well understood by the majority of 
people. 
Effects of Different Types and Patterns of Retirement on Costs 
Each of the many alternatives in land diversion programs, including the range of land retirement programs 
initiated in the 1930's and those in effect today, has a different impact in cost per unit of output control, total 
treasury costs, the distribution of payments and income among regional and commodity groups and the social costs 
falling on rural communities. Generally government cost for land retirement will be highest if the program retires 
partial farms in all regions, and in descending order will cost less if it (1) retires whole farms in all regions, (2) retires 
whole farms concentrated by regions but with an upper limit on concentration (the level of concentration allowed 
also can be set at many magnitudes with a different "cost of control" for each), (3) retires whole farms with no 
limits on regional concentration but applies only to cropland, and ( 4) retires whole farms with no limits on regional 
concentration or type of cropland. Several studies on alternative land retirement programs have concluded that 
long-term land retirement would be a cheaper means of controlling a long-term overcapacity to produce [2, 3, 10, 
12] . While not often pointed out, there are sound economic reasons for this differential, stemming from the greater 
efficiency of long-term planning and production horizons which are possible with a multiyear program of land 
retirement, especially if the whole-farm approach is used. 
Under such a program, a landholder is offered the opportunity to retire his farm for a specified number of 
years. To enter his land in such a program, the program payment per acre must equal or exceed his expected return 
above costs from cropping or other productive use. For an operator, comparing net returns from alternative uses 
becomes a question of which costs of production will no longer be incurred and which will continue and thus must 
be covered even though the land is no longer farmed. He has variable costs which will be incurred only if the acres 
are actually planted and harvested. He has other costs which will continue if the land is retired for only one year 
because all production resources (machinery, labor, etc.) will be maintained pending full production the following 
year. These same costs may be dispensed with if land is retired for 5 or 10 years because these production resources 
can be retired, sold or employed in other occupations. Finally he has fixed costs, most notably land taxes, which will 
continue whether the land is used for crop production or retired. Production cost can thus be broken down into 
three types: short run variable costs (srvc), long run variable costs (lrvc),l/ and fixed costs (fc). 
Given knowledge of these costs, the landholder can calculate the net return he can expect as payment on his 
investment in land and for his management. To do so, he starts with his gross return (gr) per acre and reduces this by 
all costs of production, giving an estimated net return (nr) per acre as payment to the land and his management. This 
return is given in Equation 1 : 
gr- (srvc + lrvc + fc) = nrcp (Equation 1) 
In considering the possibility of participating in a land retirement program, the landholder will still require an 
equal return per acre for his land and management. To calculate his expected return, the gross return per acre is 
replaced by the expected payment under the program, and those costs which he will still incur are deducted. 
Whether land is cropped or retired, fixed costs must be covered. By contrast, short run variable costs must be 
covered only if the land is placed in crop production; if the land is retired, these costs need not be covered. The 
remaining costs, long run variable costs of production (lrvc), can be reduced or eliminated if land is retired for an 
extended period of time by selling machinery, equipment, storage, etc. and perhaps employing operator labor in 
other occupational pursuits. On the other hand, if land is retired for only one production period, these costs must be 
covered in the retirement payment since there is little opportunity to sell these resources one year and reemploy 
them the following year. 
lJ Where the long run is defined as 5 to 10 years in length. 
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Thus for retiring cropland with an annual program, the government payment (gp) per acre must be adequate so 
that, after deducting both fixed cost and long run variable cost, the net return is still equal to that which could be 
gained from crop production; that is, an annual program (ap) must provide a payment large enough that nrap > nrcp 
where 
gp- (lrvc + fc) = nrap (Equation 2) 
In contrast, a multiyear program (mp) requires a payment large enough that, 
gp- fc = nrmp (Equation 3) 
Since (lrvc + fc) will always exceed (fc), the payment per acre under the annual program must always exceed the 
payment per acre under a multiyear program. With a lower payment per acre for the long-range program, total 
payments will also be lower if similar numbers of acres are retired. 
Finally, we should mention that while treasury costs decline as the time span lengthens and concentration in 
marginal areas of production increases, the overall impact of the program on the nonfarm population of rural 
communities, the social costs of adjustment, will increase as we move ( 1) from partial-farm and regionally dispersed 
land retirement programs to whole-farm and regionally concentrated programs, and (2) from short-term or annual 
programs to long-term or permanent programs. The magnitude of social costs also will vary directly with the speed at 
which we might shift from one type of program to another. For example, to shift immediately from our current 
annual, partial-farm, regionally dispersed land retirement programs to a long-term, whole-farm, regionally 
concentrated land retirement program would have much greater social cost for the rural communities involved than 
would a shift by small degrees over a period of 10 or 20 years. 
Hence, the potential "tradeoffs" among the level of treasury costs, the distribution of treasury payments 
among commodity and regional groups and the indirect or social costs which fall on the nonfarm population of rural 
communities are not discrete; they are alternatives which vary in degree. It is these substitutions that are relevant in 
determining which combination of features in land retirement programs is optimal to attain a given level of farm 
prices. For example, a schematic illustration of the opportunities for substitution is provided in Figure 1. If 
programs are rearranged to lessen social costs of nonfarm populations in rural communities and minimize 
disturbances in income distribution among regional and commodity groups (i.e. as we move down the curve) 
increasing rates of sacrifice must be made in the form of treasury costs of programs. On the other hand, if they are 
rearranged to lessen treasury costs (i.e. a movement up the curve), an increasing sacrifice must be made in the form 
of adjustment costs forced on the nonfarm population of rural communities. Farm retirement programs of the kind 
used in the 1930's or the 1960's provide two points on this curve. "Conservation Reserve" types of programs fall at 
a higher point and a long-term regional program of a particular type would fall even higher. The optimal point on 
this curve can be determined only by the society of farmers, nonfarm rural people and taxpayers (i.e. through their 
collective welfare function if one can be reflected through the political process). But to allow optimal choices, 
information must be provided on the costs, income distribution effects, rural community costs and other impacts of 
many alternative land retirement programs. All analyses of alternatives made to date (including those made by ERS 
and Land Grant university personnel) fall at different points on this curve. The comparisons we have made of costs 
of different types of programs represent only a few of the many possible points and alternatives, (including present 
land retirement programs represented in ongoing feed grain, wheat and cotton programs) that exist. 
Estimates of Retired Acres, Prices and Incomes 
As we have indicated, various kinds of long range land retirement programs could be established to control 
production of major crops and attain a given level of farm prices and incomes. In past research on this type of 
program, we have evaluated a number of different type long-range programs. We have summarized these programs in 
terms of their effect on harvested acres of major crop, acres retired under the program, levels of commodity prices, 
and levels of net farm income. 
One type of long-range program evaluated would provide for retiring only cropland in major crops on 
participating farms of the nation. This type program would be similar to the annual programs used after 1961 except 
for the multiyear type contract under which the land would be retired. In our evaluation, the program was analyzed 
for two levels, the retirement of 50 million acres and 60 million acres. Entry into the program would be on a bid 
basis with a resulting tendency toward retirement of land in marginal areas of production. Participation in the 
program would be limited to one-half the cropland in any production region, with the program reaching a maximum 
acreage over a 5 to 6 year period. 
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The major differences between retiring 50 and 60 million acres are those which might be expected, given the 
direct relationship between levels of cropland in production, levels of total production and levels of commodity 
prices. With 50 million acres retired, price levels are relatively similar to 1968 although soybeans are substantially 
lower. Government payments drop by $2.2 billion and farm income similarly declines (Table I). As we increase the 
number of acres retired from 50 million acres to 60 million acres, acres in crop production decline and prices of 
crops rise. Wheat price is projected at $1.42 with a corn price of $1.13. Along with higher crop prices, government 
payments also increase and the result is a higher net farm income. Total net farm income was projected to total 
$12.6 billion with a 50 million acre program and $14.0 billion with a 60 million acre program of this type, had such 
a program been in use for 1970. 
A second type of retirement program examined in a later study assumed the government to retire whole farms 
with both major and minor cropland entering the program. This program assumed similar restrictions on the 
proportion of cropland retired in any production region and the same bid procedure for placing land in the program. 
One major difference existed for this analysis: crop prices were set near recent levels and the analysis determined the 
level of land retirement necessary for these prices to be achieved in 1975. 
Savings in Other Costs (Social Costs of Nonfarm Population in Rural Communities, etc.) 
Figure 1. Tradeoffs on opportunities in structures of land retirement programs to attain given levels of supply 
control, commodity prices and farm income. 
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Given the expected changes in production capability and domestic and export demands, this study found 
major crops to require 197 million acres of cropland in 1975 compared to 205 million acres in 1968. To hold 
acreage to this level and maintain $1.25 wheat and $1.05 corn, the control program would need to retire 55.3 
million acres of cropland from the major crops-wheat, feed grains, soybeans and cotton. In addition, some 15.5 
million acres of cropland from minor crops would also be retiredJI for a total of 70.8 million acres. This size of 
program would cost the government an estimated $1.8 billion. With the commodity prices specified, cash receipts 
(including government payments) would rise to $49.8 billion. But cash expenses and depreciation costs also rise, 
leaving an estimated net farm income of $15.8 billion, up somewhat from $14.8 billion in 1968. 
Finally, this study also examined the effects of allowing approximately one-half of the 70.8 million acres of 
cropland to be grazed. This analysis assumed that fewer acres would be removed from crop production to provide 
'lf If the farms had a distribution of crops similar to the experience of the Soil Bank program of the 1950's. 
Table 1. Acreages produced and retired, price and income levels for alternattve multiyear land retirement 
programs for 1970 and 1975. 
Proposed Programs of Multiyear Land Retirement 
Actual Major Cropland Only: 1970!/ Major & Minor Cropland: 1975?J 
Acreages 
Major Crop Acres3/ 
Major Crops Retired 
Other Acres Retired 
Retired Acres Grazed 
Total Acres Retired 
Prices 
Wheat 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Cottonil 
Cattle~ 
Hog~ 
Incomes 
Cash Receipts 
From Crops 
From Livestock 
Gov't. Payments 
Cash Expenses 
Depreciation 
Net Farm Income.QJ 
1/ Source: Adapted from [9]. 
1/ Source: Adapted from [8]. 
1968 
205,153 
47,800 
47,800 
1.24 
1.06 
2.42 
.219 
.234 
.186 
47,848 
18,846 
25,539 
3,462 
29,917 
6,184 
14,786 
'lf Includes wheat, feed grains, soybeans and cotton. 
50 Million 
Acres 
60 Million 
Acres 
(thousand acres) 
191,911 188,334 
50,176 60,046 
50,176 60,046 
(dollars per bushel) 
1.29 1.42 
1.03 1.13 
2.05 2.38 
.235 .238 
.220 .220 
.182 .182 
(million dollars) 
43,897 45,412 
17,693 18,412 
25,316 25,316 
1,258 1,748 
29,548 29,603 
5,500 5,500 
12,649 14,009 
.... 
1J Dollars per pound of cottonlint. 
i1 Dollars per hundredweight. 
Without 
Grazing 
196,949 
55,333 
15,491 
70,824 
1.25 
1.05 
2.25 
.260 
.220 
.182 
49,837 
19,847 
28,178 
1,812 
31,400 
6,321 
15,761 
§! Includes farm perquisites and inventory changes. 
With 
Grazing 
200,137 
27,824 
7,588 
27,108 
35,412 
1.25 
1.05 
2.25 
.260 
.190 
.173 
49,688 
19,960 
28,168 
1,560 
31,713 
6,425 
15,195 
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for increased feeding requirements and that some farmers would be encouraged to graze their idled acres, with 
eligibility limited to one-half the crop acres in any production area. With grazing allowed, beef production is 
estimated to increase by 13.5 percent with beef prices declining by a slightly larger amount.'!! Also, grazing 
privileges were assumed to reduce the amount of government payments necessary to hold the land out of crop 
production. With the decreases in livestock prices and in government payments, total cash receipts are slightly lower 
compared to the no-grazing program. Since cash expenses are estimated to increase slightly, net farm income would 
decline to $15.2 billion for this type program, compared to $15.8 billion with no grazing allowed. Consumers would 
gain, however, with a 15 percent reduction in beef prices at the farm level. 
Estimates of Effects on Rural Communities 
Besides having considerable effect on farm production and prices and incomes, long-range land retirement 
programs also have many implications for rural communities. Land retirement programs which retire marginal land 
on a whole-farm basis have a tendency to concentrate their effects in particular locations. This tendency toward 
concentration arises because of many factors: one is that the physical characteristics of soil in some areas of the 
nation make it less productive. Also, the variability of temperature and rainfall of various regions has considerable 
effect on productivity. Many areas of the Great Plains tend toward aridity and certain sections of this region would 
return to grass under a marginal land retirement program. All major farm regions have some land which would be 
offered for retirement under this type of program. But regions with large numbers of marginal acres would be most 
affected by such a program. 
In our recent study, we attempted to establish some basis for analyzing the effects on rural communities of a 
program which removes up to SO percent of the cropland from crop production. To do this, we gathered data for 
two regions in the Northern Plains. An 11-county area located in Nebraska represents extensive-type farming with 
livestock production on pasture and range as the major farming activity. This region, largely restrained by soil and 
climatic conditions, already has a farming and community structure based on extensive-type farm operations. A 
second 13-county area, located in South Dakota, is a more general farming area with considerable crop and livestock 
production. Research measuring the competitive position of this latter region consistently suggests that crop 
production is marginal in this particular area. Further, the conservation Reserve Program of the 1950's, also on a 
voluntary bid basis, retired a large acreage of land in this particular region. If a land retirement program were 
instituted on a bid basis to remove marginal land from production, our results suggest that this region would 
participate up to the maximum rate. 
If the area participated to the maximum amount and grazing was allowed under a program which removes 
large acreages of cropland from production and returns it to grass, the marginal farming area would slowly shift-to 
an extent consistent with soils and climate of the area-toward a structure of agriculture now existing in the 
grassland area. While this shift would be slow and require at least a decade, the changes implied are considerable. In 
Table 2, data for the two areas are of similar size and total land in farms is nearly equal. But here, because of 
different natural conditions and farm production patterns, the similarities of the two regions end. 
Less than one-fourth as many people live in the livestock farming area as in the marginal farming area. Of 
these, about the same proportion of people live on farms, 30-35 percent. There is also a large difference in the 
number of towns and communities which each farming base supports. The livestock area has 41 towns while the 
marginal farming area has 81 towns. 
The primary explanation for the difference in structure of towns and population is found in the cash flows 
which the farming operations create in each of the areas. Cash receipts in the grassland area were $50.9 million in 
1964, the date of the last Census of Agriculture. The marginal farming area receipts were over twice as large, $115.0 
rnillion.i/ Cash income above cash expenses was $26.2 million in the grassland farming area compared to $62.4 
million in the marginal farming area; the per farm net cash income was $7,599 and $7,254 respectively. Cash 
expenditures by farmers were twice as great in the latter area. The machinery inventory, indicating past expenditures 
for large capital items, was considerably larger in the marginal farming area. 
~ Consumption and prices of other livestock commodities would also be affected and these effects were taken into account. 
~ Even if the livestock area doubled cash receipts, of course, there would still be a difference in the service sector surroundi111 
agriculture and in the number of people required because of the large differences between intensive and extensive type of farming 
needs. 
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The data presented above tend to clarify why shifts away from crop production and toward marginal land 
retirement programs or more extensive farming activities are resisted by the nonfarm public in rural areas. These 
groups tend to lose their economic base unless other programs of economic expansion are simultaneously set up 
along with the land retirement program. But it should not be forgotten that these trends are occurring under present 
programs where only a few acres on each farm are removed from production. The process of farm structural change 
is slowed by annual-type programs but the conversion of land resources from crop production to less intensive uses is 
similarly slowed. Eventually the nation must face up to transferring some of its land resources to other uses. 
There are ways this could be started under a long term land retirement program. If, for example, in return for 
the payments received, acreage bases for major crops were to be removed from the cropland placed in the program, 
it would have a greater tendency to remain in grass or trees after the program expired. Under present and past 
programs, land still retains acreage bases and eligibility for price supports and income payments as contracts expire. 
The result is that this same land remains eligible for present and future feed grain, wheat and cotton programs. If the 
acreage bases had been removed as part of the contractual payments, a larger portion of this land would likely have 
remained in grass, trees or other uses. 
Table 2. Major characteristics of a marginal farming community and of a grassland farming community in the 
Great Plains. 
Area Marginal Crop Grassland 
Characteristics Units Farming Area Farming Area 
Total Land Area acres 8,576,640 9,011,840 
Land in Farms acres 8,238,881 8,583,681 
%in crops percent 45.7 15.3 
%in pasture percent 38.0 81.7 
Number of Farms number 8,602 3,448 
Average size acres 958 3,506 
Total Population number 108,782 23,795 
%on Farms percent 31.6 36.9 
Number of Towns number 81 41 
Under 1,000 pop. number 71 38 
1 ,000 to 2,500 pop. number 7 2 
Over 2,500 pop. number 3 1 
Total Cash Receipts dollars 115,025,330 50,886,412 
From Crops dollars 35,584,189 1,374,186 
From Livestock dollars 79,379,837 49,504,186 
Total Cash Expenses dollars 52,579,292 24,675,393 
For Livestock dollars 18,528,518 8,945,002 
For Feed dollars 11,149,385 7,774,235 
For Fuel dollars 10,842,236 2,999,350 
For Seed dollars 2,806,097 230,085 
For Fertilizer dollars 1,300,987 329,215 
Machinery Inventory 
Automobiles number 11,609 3,505 
Motor Trucks number 12,611 3,767 
Tractors number 23,432 8,500 
Source: [13, 14] 
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Importantly, a long-range land conversion program of the type outlined above would represent a reversal of 
government policies and programs of the last century. Those programs continue to shift additional land from a state 
of low productivity to an advanced state of crop production. Programs which continue to shift additional cropland 
into production compound the problem of excess production and raise the cost of controlling total farm output. 
Instead, programs are needed which return land from intensive crop production to extensive uses on a long-term 
basis. Such programs more nearly fill the present need for national farm policy. 
Equity and Acceptance of Programs 
While long-range land and resource conversion programs would have lower costs and provide a more permanent 
measure of resource adjustment, they will not have broad acceptance until and unless they are made equitable to all 
major groups concerned. As we have long emphasized, the basic foundation for public agricultural policies is that of 
equity [ 6]. While one might debate over the efficiency of the means, there is a strong economic and welfare basis 
for the initiation of programs designed to bring equity between the two major sectors concerned-commercial 
farmers and consumers. That basis was well established in the past: The developmental policies pursued by 
society in behalf of agriculture (new technologies, irrigation, land improvement and other activities financed by the 
public), plus the initiative of private industry once agriculture became highly commercialized and provided a large 
market for capital inputs representing new technologies, soon pushed supply ahead more rapidly than demand for 
food grew. Without public compensation policies, food consumers benefitted while farm producers sacrificed. The 
new capital technology served, on the one hand, as a substitute for labor. Hence, a larger amount of this resource 
was freed to produce more of the nonfarm goods and services which enjoy high demand elasticities under growing 
per capita incomes. The new capital technology also served as a substitute for land, but as this resource "hung back 
in production" (because of its low supply elasticity to crop production), output increased rapidly; with an inelastic 
demand, consumers could buy the same or more food for lower budget outlay (for the farm portion of food 
expenditures) and real price. In contrast, the farm population sacrificed through reduced revenue and declining 
employment opportunities. 
It was in this sense that direct payments and modest supply controls have an equity basis in restoring or 
maintaining "mutual gain" benefits from agricultural progress. It can be proven that while technological progress 
alone (at a high stage of development where supply increases faster than demand) will benefit consumers at the 
expense of farmers, a combination of agricultural development, transfer payments and supply control, separately or 
in combination, can assure benefits from technological progress to both food consumers and farm producers. This is 
the important economic and welfare base upon which farm programs of the past can be justified. 
Hence, while farm programs appropriately structured have an important equity basis, it is equally important 
that long-range land and resource conversion programs do not transfer the costs of farm structural adjustments from 
one group to another in society. It is unlikely that long-range land retirement programs will have economic and 
political acceptance if they provide gains to one group and sacrifices to another. There are numerous types of 
long-range land retirement programs which could make the producers of field crops as well or better off, improve the 
position of taxpayers through lower treasury costs but transfer a burden to other farmers and to particular rural 
communities. As we have indicated previously, to solve long-run land adjustment programs through a reduction of 
grain production and an increase in grass and beef production would maintain or improve the position of the crop 
farmer at the expense of the cattle producer. Or to lessen the treasury costs of programs through shifts which 
suddenly remove vast areas of crops from regions of lowest comparative advantage and allow them to concentrate in 
areas of greatest comparative advantage, would cause merchants of the latter rural communities to gain at the 
expense of merchants in the former communities. We have not, and do not now, propose transfers of this type, since 
equity among commodity and regional groups of agriculture is equally as important and justifiable as equity between 
consumers and farmers at large. 
Yet it is not necessary that long-range land diversion and improved land use, relative to the stage of 
development and structure of consumer demand in the nation, be attained through gain for one group at the expense 
of another group. Programs can be structured, with respect to rates of supply changes, timing of adjustments, and 
compensation to groups concerned so that no major group sacrifices, as compared to past and current programs. 
Even if these programs are applied so that slow changes are made in public costs, their rates of disturbance are small. 
Perhaps 30 years are required to bring economic balance and market returns or resources for farming, but they could 
eventually be accomplished. We have already "been at farm programs" longer than this and still haven't attained or 
approached this end. 
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And while we defend farm programs as a means of maintaining or attaining equity between food consumers 
and farm producers, we must emphasize that past and current policies do not assure equity among all groups of the 
rural community. A major benefit of existing programs, in their effect on bolstering farm income and maintaining 
prices, has been to bring capital gains to agriculture. Through price maintenance, technological advances, yield 
increases and direct payments, farm land prices have advanced rather continuously for three decades. Cochrane 
placed the total capital gain to agriculture at $112 billion between 1940 and 1965 with the major share due to 
public programs and agricultural development [4]. But as farmers have enlarged their units to realize these gains and 
take advantage of scale economies, the farm population and work force have declined to an extent that the capital 
loss to merchants and others in rural towns has been tremendous. While the countryside around is characterized by 
increased land values and capital gains, the capital loss of many rural towns is expressed physically by empty store 
buildings with loose siding, teetering on the corner of their foundations, and former dwellings with crumbled 
chimneys and broken windows. 
While previous programs have brought some equity to agriculture, they have not solved these problems and 
frequently have accentuated them. Modifications of programs are possible which could increase equity of present 
programs, both with respect to the half of farms with lowest incomes, and with respect to disadvantaged rural youth 
and other groups of our rural communities. These modifications could provide improved prospects for long-run 
solutions of our land and human resource adjustment problems. We have vast amounts of food and land. It is 
inconsistent that we have farm programs which are only partially equitable, that we still have large consumer sectors 
suffering malnutrition, that our massive population centers only grow larger, and that our recreation areas threaten 
to become as crowded as our cities. Certainly a nation which can explore the moon must also have the imagination 
to fashion programs which are equitable to the various groups of agriculture, erase disadvantage from other groups of 
our rural communities, and increase the productivity of both our land and labor resources. 
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Agricultural Production Control Programs with Mandatory Participation 
Leroy Blakeslee and Norman Whittlesey* 
Our central objective today is to assess the possible consequences and acceptability of mandatory control 
programs for wheat and feed grains-two commodities which receive a major share of government attention under 
farm price and income programs. Our scope is limited to consideration of a policy instrument. The more 
fundamental question of justification for an income transferring policy is beyond the scope of our paper. 
Our approach to assessment of mandatory programs is through a consideration of inducements in comparison 
to the logical alternative-purely voluntary programs. There are a multitude of control devices used to reduce 
production and thereby gain price and income rewards above those that would result from decentralized decisions in 
competitive markets, but we consider only a dichotomy of two basic classes: 
Voluntary- compliance is on the basis of individual choice based on proferred financial inducements 
Mandatory - compliance is required of all producers or a penalty is imposed, provided the program is first 
approved by most producers. 
The proviso of producer acceptance of mandatory controls is not theoretically necessary, but is universally 
followed in U.S. programs. It is important because it introduces the element of producer choice in mandatory 
programs, putting them on a more equal basis with voluntary programs. In either case, producer acceptance depends 
on the strength of the inducements offered relative to the alternatives perceived by the producers. 
Conceptually, the inducements take two basic forms: ( 1) higher market prices than would result with a larger 
supply, generally supported by government purchase guarantees; and (2) direct payments from the Treasury. 
However, the level of market prices and the amount of direct government payments to farmers are often 
interdependent. To the extent that cooperators do reduce output and price rises result, a portion of the total 
inducement cost is paid by consumers in their market purchases, and lower Treasury costs may be possible [7, 
p.62] . But higher market prices, if achieved, then become an inducement for individual present and potential 
producers to produce more, not less, industry interests notwithstanding. Thus, mandatory programs, because of their 
promise of more positive control of non-quota production, would appear to offer possibilities for improving farm 
income at lower inducement cost to the Treasury, and of containing the "reverse inducement effect" of the resulting 
higher prices.lJ 
Before examining this issue further, we will discuss three past supply control programs which we believe are 
relevant to an evaluation of similar programs for wheat and feed grains in the future. These are the historical 
mandatory programs for tobacco and wheat, and the marketing order for California cling peaches. The discussion of 
these past programs will help us focus on some of the program and industry characteristics that have influenced their 
success or failure. Some of the important factors include political acceptability, industry organization and 
leadership, and availability of data for decision making. Foremost, however, we will find that economic inducement 
is the overriding factor in determining the producer acceptance of any supply control program. 
The Tobacco Progra,m 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 set the stage for today's tobacco program. This act provided for 
marketing quotas when prospective total supply seemed likely to create an excessive supply-disappearance ratio. It 
also provided a penalty for enforcing marketing quotas, and authorization for non-recourse loans on agricultural 
commodities including tobacco. One further provision that has had important effects on many programs since that 
time was the establishment of the "one-grower one-vote" principle in referendum voting on marketing quotas. 
Currently two-thirds of the growers voting must approve a program for its implementation [4]. 
* Assistant Professor and Associate Professor, respectively, of Agricultural Economics, Washington State University. We wish to 
acknowledge several helpful suggestions by Walter Butcher during the preparation of this paper. Responsibility is ours for any errors 
or omissions. 
1J This does not necessarily mean lower total inducement cost if we include the loss of consumer surplus. 
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Growers approved marketing quotas on tobacco for 1938. Producer net returns had suffered in 1937 when 
production increased 182 million pounds but gross revenue increased only $2 million. Though burley production 
was lower in 1938 than in 1937, the reduction in acreage was not sufficient to prevent continued increase of supply 
relative to disappearance. The result was even lower prices in 1938 than in 1937 [4, p.l3]. The apparent reward to 
farmers in 1938 for approving marketing quotas and underplanting their allotments was a decrease in prices. They 
were badly disillusioned regarding such a program. Thus, burley growers rejected marketing quotas for the 1939 
crop, and overplantings caused prices to drop even further in that year. 
In 1939 Congress increased the penalty for tobacco produced in excess of quotas and provided that quotas 
could be approved for 3-year periods. Growers approved the program in 1940 and have continued to do so since. In 
1964 a record number of growers of flue-cured tobacco turned out to vote on a choice between a 19.5 percent cut in 
acreage or no program, and 96.5 percent of the vote was in favor of continuing the program [ 1] . This reflects the 
importance that growers place on supply control. In the following year, 1965, the flue-cured tobacco producers 
voted in favor of an acreage-poundage program by a three-to-one margin. The tobacco program is, therefore, an 
example of a mandatory program which has gained wide acceptance by all participants. 
The acreage devoted to tobacco in the United States is quite small, only .37 percent of cropland harvested in 
1964. However, tobacco accounted for 3.1 percent of gross U.S. farm income in that year. Tobacco also registers 
impressively as an export crop [ 6] . 
The income potential of tobacco is highly valued by farmers. Seagraves and Manning compared the capitalized 
value of flue-cured tobacco allotments over a 20-year period [8, p.3] . They found that net revenues had 
decreased from 25.6 cents per pound in 1943-52 to 23.7 cents per pound in 1953-62. Meanwhile, allotment values in 
cents per pound had increased from 63.5 to 151.2, a 138 percent increase. 
Thus, farmers have come to depend on the mandatory tobacco program. The income benefits have been 
heavily capitalized into land values. To lose the program or a similar method of supply control would be 
economically disastrous to many tobacco growers. Grower dependence and confidence in the program is being 
reflected in the high proportion of producers who have voted for the program in recent referendums. 
The program has continued to have Congressional support because of its relatively low cost to the taxpayers. 
The costs of maintaining favorable farm price levels through this program have been largely passed on to the 
consumer of tobacco. Because tobacco is a luxury, there has been no reluctance to tax the consumer in this way. 
In summary, the tobacco program has been effective in maintaining a relatively high price for tobacco while 
providing sufficient penalties for non-allotment production to be effective in supply control. Farmers are vitally 
interested in the income benefits because there are no alternative crops with an income potential even close to that 
of tobacco on similar acreages. Also, because of the small acreages involved there has been no necessary concern with 
the use of diverted acres. Thus, in total, most of the factors necessary to make this a workable program do exist. 
The Cling Peach Marketing Order 
Marketing orders are a type of mandatory program. Not all orders attempt direct supply control, and present 
laws do not permit marketing orders for wheat and feed grains. However, the form is close enough to make 
experience with marketing orders directly relevant to determination of necessary conditions for successful 
mandatory wheat and feed grain programs. 
A marketing order is a regulation of federal or state government which is established only after careful and 
often time-consuming hearings. A stated percentage of affected producers must then approve the order, whereupon 
it becomes applicable to all members of the defined industry segment [3, p.lO]. One distinguishing feature of 
marketing orders is that there can be no restriction on entry of producers. Once a producer enters through his own 
choice, however, he is subject to all controls of the order. 
Marketing orders and producer cooperatives have been subject to numerous attacks aimed at their status of 
exemption from corporate income taxes; but their privilege to use monopolistic bargaining practices has seldom been 
subjected to severe criticism from outside the group itself [3, p.7]. If farmers had actually succeeded in gaining 
substantial benefits from the freedom of collusion the law allows them, then related industries and economic groups 
would likely have opposed such monopolistic practices. However, there is general indifference among consumers and 
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even among wholesale and retail food distributors toward these activities. The source of the indifference may stem 
from a lack of knowledge of the nature of these exemptions from anti-trust policy, or from the relatively minor 
importance of the products concerned. 
If cartel privileges were extended to wheat and feed grains, we would likely encounter a great deal more 
consumer and processor antagonism than has been the case with most marketing orders. There is no question, 
however, that mandatory programs in effect, and those which have been at times proposed for wheat and feed 
grains, are similar to currently operating marketing orders in that the degree of monopolistic control exerted is 
probably insufficient to cause concern in most industries. 
The application to the cling peach industry is a classic example of a workable marketing order. California cling 
peaches have been subject to industry-wide cartel-type marketing orders since 1927. During four of the six years 
from 1927 to 1932, voluntary volume-control programs were established through joint efforts of growers and 
canners. Between 1933 and 1963, the crop has had some type of control under a Federal or California marketing 
order for 26 of the 31 years [3, p.224). 
The effect on cling peach prices has been mainly to stabilize them rather than to raise them substantially [3, 
pp.l42-148]. Perhaps even more important, the available evidence suggests that while returns from cling peach 
production have been sustained at a level profitable to producers, they have not risen to where peaches are 
excessively profitable relative to other crops. 
Jamison and Brandt summarize the characteristics of the cling peach industry as follows: 
The cling peach industry seems to exhibit most of the attributes often set forth as 
necessary to the success of marketing orders. Production is concentrated in a relatively small 
area of California's central valley. An active growers' association has long existed as a focal 
point of industry activity. Data collection and analyses have been carried on for many years 
to provide a vast amount of helpful information for the industry. There has apparently been 
strong industry leadership by major grower and canner interests favorable to the order 
during most of the years that they have been in effect. [3, p.224] 
We note in summary these are the same characteristics which would be optimal for the operation of any 
mandatory program, if the industry concerned were faced with low or unstable returns as a result of oversupply or 
great fluctuations in output. 
The Wheat Program Prior to 1962 and the Transition to a Voluntary Program 
As a final example of past experience with mandatory programs, we review some history which many would 
prefer to forget-the wheat program of the 1950's and early 1960's. The characteristics of the program are well 
known and we will not repeat them here. Over the I 0 years from 1953 to 1962, the mandatory program was favored 
by an average of 81 percent of farmers voting in the referendums. Nevertheless, the outcome was persistent 
over-production and stock accumulation which would have been even worse had not some of the pressure been 
relieved by P .L. 480 exports and the Soil Bank program. 
We include the mandatory wheat program in our discussion to make three points. The first is that even though 
this program constitutes the largest scale effort we have made to apply mandatory production controls, the results 
have little relevance in evaluating the effectiveness of mandatory programs as they are contemplated today. 
Producers were never required to submit to output limitations which were realistic in relation to existing market 
conditions. The law required the Secretary to determine annually a national wheat acreage allotment which, together 
with beginning carryover, would produce a total supply equal to a normal year's domestic consumption plus exports 
plus a 30 percent carryover. However, the law also established a 55 million acre minimum national wheat allotment. 
In each year from 1954 to 1962 the required acreage was less than the statutory minimum and the 55 million acre 
allotment became effective.Y In 1960, 1961, and 1962 the Secretary was required to set a 55 million acre allotment 
when the formula indicated a "required" acreage ofzero [II, June 1959,p.l9;June 1960,p.25;June 1961,p.21]. 
The establishment of more realistic allotments in the wheat program of the 1950's would have provided a significant 
test of the mandatory approach to supply control in a major commodity sector. However, this was not the case. 
JJ The 1962 program did provide for a mandatory 10 percent acreage diversion. 
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Our second point is that if either mandatory or voluntary programs are to succeed they must be designed so 
that non-compliers are denied the inducements available to compliers. By making acreage controls and penalties 
inapplicable to producers with allotment Jess than 15 acres while supporting the market price at a high level through 
loans to cooperators, the program encouraged holders of small allotments to expand production.J/ In 1961 wheat 
acreage on farms planting less than 15 acres was 16 percent of total U.S. wheat acreage, while allotments of less than 
15 acres accounted for 10 percent of the national wheat allotment [11, June 1962, p.26]. Inclusion of these 
producers under the provisions of the penalty regulations would have significantly improved the results of the 
program. 
Finally, we wish to consider the events surrounding the transition from the mandatory program prior to 1962 
to the voluntary program which has existed since 1964. The overriding policy concern was to reduce wheat 
production. After 1962 and 1963 when the prior program was modified with some success by adding mandatory and 
voluntary diversion features, the Kennedy Administration and Congress produced the ill-fated proposal of 1963. 
Wheat farmers rejected a program which would have imposed strict output controls on all producers in return for a 
substantial package of guaranteed market and non-market rewards. It is not our intent to examine the various 
interpretations of the May, 1963, referendum results which have been offered.~ However, the characteristics of the 
proposed mandatory program of 1963 and the voluntary program which followed its defeat illustrate our third 
point. It is not the mandatory or voluntary nature of programs which ultimately determines the effectiveness of 
supply control so much as it is the strength of the inducements to accept controls. The defeated mandatory program 
and its voluntary successor contained essentially the same economic inducements. Enrollment under the voluntary 
program has ranged from 76 percent of the U.S. allotment in 1964 to 89 percent in 1969, and significant acreage 
reductions have been possible. 
Undoubtedly a mandatory program could have been approved in 1963 had the inducements been high enough. 
However, we see no reason to conclude that a set of inducements could have been formulated which would have 
been acceptable to farmers and which would have resulted in the same degree of supply control at less inducement 
cost than has been realized in the intervening years under the voluntary program. 
The importance of the history of wheat programs is that it provides clear illustrations of both ineffective and 
effective use of Treasury expenditures to obtain producer compliance with supply control measures. To the Bureau 
of the Budget it may be that one Treasury dollar spent on farm programs is indistinguishable from any other. For 
our purposes, however, we find it useful to distinguish one set of costs from the total. That set constitutes 
expenditures which directly affect an individual farmer's comparison of net returns from cooperating in a supply 
control program with those from not cooperating. We argue that these consist of direct, non-market payments on 
production plus diversion payments; the second of the two inducement forms discussed above. These costs were 
singled out because they play the dual role of contributing to program costs and of inducing participation. The 
remainder includes costs of operating the loan program, managing CCC inventories, export subsidies, domestic 
consumption subsidies, etc.-costs which ultimately affect the market price received by all producers. 
In the next section we trace out in detail the dual role which these inducement parameters play as we seek to 
evaluate prospects for future supply control programs. 
Mandatory Programs for Wheat and Feed Grains in the 1970's? 
We now turn to an evaluation of the acceptability and performance of programs for wheat and feed grains 
requiring a minimum level of participation by all producers, but permitting higher level participation on a voluntary 
basis. It is likely that farmers who have participated in present voluntary programs would find this kind of 
mandatory program very familiar in its basic form. We shall argue that in most essential respects the procedure 
farmers use in evaluating the economic consequences of voting for or against such a program is logically similar to 
that used to evaluate the choice of entering or staying out of present voluntary programs. 
In the following discussion we relate the acceptability of supply controls, either mandatory or voluntary, to 
four key elements: the level of direct payments on production, diversion payments, the required minimum diversion 
rate, and the market price of the controlled commodity. We show how these factors simultaneously determine the 
level of government costs and a farmer's decision to support or not to support a supply control program. Against this 
background, we then offer our assessment of the future for mandatory programs for wheat and feed grains. 
]J Producers in non-commercial states were in a similar position though their impact on total output was never significant. 
11 See for example [2) and [9). 
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We proceed by considering more formally how an individual farmer might take account of program options in 
making his farming decisions. We first investigate the relationship between net returns above variable costs and the 
level of acreage diversion for an individual farmer with a given quantity of cropland. The focus is on the present feed 
grain program, though the same approach applies to the wheat program with minor modifications. 
Relative to the operations of an individual farmer, we define the following: 
A 
y 
c 
p 
NR 
= total cropland acreage 
= feed grain base acreage 
= acreage of feed grain base diverted, or the amount by which feed grain acreage is reduced below Ab 
=minimum diversion as a fraction of Ab (.2 in 1969) 
= average feed grain yield (actually, a function of Ad) 
= yield per acre of competing non-feed grain crops 
= variable cost per bushel of feed grains produced (actually a function of Ad) 
= variable cost per unit output of competing crops 
= market price per bushel for feed grains 
= price per unit of output for competing crops 
= direct payment per bushel on acreage diverted in excess of the minimum required for participation ( 4S 
percent times the loan plus price support payment in 1969) 
=direct payment per bushel on projected production of complier's feed grain base (SO percent times the 
price support payment in 1969) 
=farmer's net returns above variable cost from farming 
First, note that the variable Ad, diverted acreage, is defined over the range Ab · A~Ad .s;; A b. That is, we 
admit the possibility of negative diversion corresponding to planting feed grain acreage in excess of the feed grain 
base. This total range of Ad can be partitioned into four sub-ranges where different relationships between net 
returns, NR, and diversion, Ad, will result. These are (1) Ad<fAb, the level of diversion is less than the minimum 
necessary to earn direct payments on production; (2) fAbc:::Act:=.-SAb, the farmer may either idle an acreage equal 
to Ad and receive direct payment on production and diversion payments on the diverted acreage in excess of fAb, or 
grow competitive crops on the diverted acreage and decline the direct payments; (3) .SAb<Adc::Ab, the farmer may 
either grow competitive crops on the diverted acreage and remain outside the program, or idle the diverted acreage 
but receive no diversion payments on the diverted acreage in excess of SO percent of his base; (4) Ad= Ab; i.e. 
diversion of the entire feed grain base where, in the case of cooperating small farms, diversion payments may be 
earned on all idled acreage. In the latter case, a non-cooperator would be planting all cropland to competing crops. 
Our concern will be primarily with the frrst two of these. We begin by considering the curve describing returns 
to a program cooperator who diverts an acreage fAb~Ad~ .SA b. Net returns in this case are the sum of returns 
from feed grains produced and sold (or fed), plus direct payments on feed grain production, plus returns from 
competing crops produced and sold, plus diversion payments. In terms of the variables defined above, the resulting 
expression is given in equation (1 ), or, after rearranging terms, in equation (1 '). 
(1) NR = (P-C)Y(Ab·Ad)+PpYAb+(P0 -C0 )Y0 (A·Ab)+PdY(Ad·fAb) 
(1 ') NR = (P 0 -C0 )Y0 A+ [(P-C+P p·fP d)Y -(P 0 -C0 )Y 0 ] Ab + (P d-P+C)Y Ad; 
fAb"C::::::AdC::::...SAb 
-62-
We note in equation (1 ') that net returns from additional diversion will be positive or negative according to whether 
the per acre diversion rate, P d Y, exceeds or falls short of per acre net returns from feed grain production, (P-C)Y, at 
the minimum diversion level. 
If a farmer elects to plant more feed grain acres than ( 1-f)Ab, or if he plants less than this amount but plants 
the remainder to competing crops, then his net returns will equal the sum of net returns at market prices for the feed 
grain and competing crops which he produces as shown in equations (2) and (2'). 
(2) NR = (P-C)Y(Ab-Act) + (P 0 -C0 )Y 0 (A-Ab+Act) 
(2') NR = (P 0 -C0 )Y0 A+ [(P-C)Y-(P 0 -C0 )Y 0 ] Ab + [(P0 -C0 )Y0 -(P-C)Y0 ] Act; 
Ab- A<Act<Ab· 
For the sake of brevity, we do not consider explicitly the relationships describing returns to a complier over 
the range .5Ab <Act<Ab, though they can be readily formulated. Over the entire range of Act there are, of course, 
other determinants of net returns which are not incorporated above. Among these are wheat-feed grain substitution 
provisions, the excess wheat option, program characteristics associated with alternative crops, returns from 
permissable uses of diverted acres under the program, rotational considerations, etc. However, these could be 
considered only at the expense of more cumbersome detail, and the relationships above capture the essentials 
required to support the analysis and conclusions which follow. 
A graph showing NR as a function of Act will consist of two curves: a "non-cooperation curve" defined for all 
values of Act and a "cooperation curve" defined for Act~fAb· Under typical conditions both will be concave from 
the origin. For equation (1 '), the "cooperator curve," the concavity reflects the idling of increasingly productive 
feed grain acres at a constant diversion payment rate. Equation (2'), the "non-cooperation curve," reflects the 
opportunities for substituting competing crops for feed grains. Its concavity follows from increasing marginal rates 
of substitution between feed grains and alternative crops. 
An evaluation of the economic consequences of compliance or non-compliance requires a farmer to estimate 
the maximum point on this 2-part curve. But in doing so, different farmers will be confronted with quite different 
curve configurations. We illustrate this by considering the possible slopes of the two curves at the minimum diversion 
level, i.e. the sign of the coefficients of Act at the point Act= fA b. Note first that in equation (1 ') the coefficient 
equals the per acre diversion payment minus per acre net returns from feed grains at market prices, and in equation 
(2') the coefficient equals per acre net returns from competing crop minus per acre net returns from feed grains. 
Now consider the following four cases: 
Case 1. Net returns for other crops:;:.net returns for feed grains-> diversion payment. We might conceive of this 
situation for a farmer who produces feed grains at low cost but who also has profitable alternatives. The graphs of 
equations (1 ')and (2'} for this case appear in Figure 1. 
Case 2. Net returns for other crops<::net returns for feed grain<:diversion payment. This situation corresponds to a 
farming situation with high feed grain production costs but no particularly good alternatives. Figure 2 shows this 
situation. 
Case 3. Net returns from other crops-c:::net returns from feed grains, and diversion payment <net returns from feed 
grains. Here, we have a farmer who produces feed grains at low cost and who has no closely competitive alternatives. 
Figure 3 illustrates this situation. 
Case 4. Net returns for other crops :::-net returns, and diversion payments:::=-net returns from feed grains. This final 
situation corresponds to a farming situation when feed grain production costs are high and where profitable 
alternative land uses are available. Figure 4 shows this relationship. 
In each of the following figures we have drawn curves showing returns from cooperation in the program at the 
minimum diversion level as being higher than returns from non-cooperation. This will not be true in all cases, but 
only for those where direct payment on feed grain production exceeds net returns from alternative crops on the 
mandatory acreage diversion; i.e. if P P. Y Ab:::>(P 0 -C 0 )Y 0 fAb. But this leads us to our first conclusion. It is not the 
comparison of net returns at the minimum diversion level which decides the issue. This is never the relevant 
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comparison, and for this reason it does not really matter whether the curve of equation (1 ')lies above or below that 
of equation (2') at Act= fAb· If farmers decide on program participation on the basis of net returns, they must 
compare the maximum on the "cooperation curve" with the maximum on the "non-cooperation curve" and these 
generally occur at quite different values of Act. To illustrate this, note that participants in the 1968 feed grain 
program diverted an average of 45 percent of their feed grain base, while planted corn and sorghum acreage on 
non-participating farms was 108 percent of the total feed grain base on these farms [10, Feb. 1969, p.19]. 
Earlier we have noted that a major factor explaining farmer acceptance of controls is the strength of the 
inducements relative to the alternatives perceived by farmers. The preceding paragraphs illustrate this concept for 
the present voluntary program. We believe that with only slightly different interpretations, they are appropriate for 
use in analyzing prospects for wheat and feed grain programs requiring mandatory diversion at a low level by all 
producers, but permitting additional diversion on a voluntary basis. 
Conceptually, each farmer would face a "mandatory participation curve" similar in character to equation ( 1 '). 
He would also face a "program rejection curve" similar in character to equation (2'). The economic input to the 
voting decision on the mandatory program would hinge primarily upon a comparison of the maximum of the first 
Figure. 1. Net Returns - Case 1 jJ Figure 2. Net Returns - Case 2 
NR NR 
EQ.I' /EQ.I' 
/ ~ 
2' 
(-) 0 fAb (+)Ad (-) 0 tAb l+ )Ad 
Figure 3. Net Returns- Case 3 Figure 4. Net Returns - Case 4 
NR NR 
EQ.I 1 
~ 
(-) 0 fAb (-) 0 tAb 
~ Figures 1-4 are designed to show only the concavity of the curves and their slopes at the minimum diversion level. In none of the 4 
cases discussed can a universal conclusion be drawn as to whether the maximum on equation (1 ') is less than, equal to, or greater than 
the maximum on equation (2'). 
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with the maximum of the second. Aside from farmers' (and Congress') values relating to the principle of mandatory 
controls, the central question becomes, is it feasible to structure a program where 2/3 or more of producers would 
perceive that the highest point on their "mandatory participation curve" exceeds the highest point on their 
"program rejection curve"? 
It must be emphasized that the relevant decision criterion is a comparison of NR at the maximum of each 
curve, not the NR at the point of minimum diversion. 
In our discussion of the tobacco program, and to a lesser extent the cling peach marketing order, we noted 
that one form of inducement which can be effective is higher market prices. In the present context this would imply 
that farmers perceive a higher value of P in the "mandatory participation curve" than in the "program rejection 
curve." This could come about through either a "program rejection curve" reflecting a free market alternative and 
lower prices, or a "mandatory participation curve" reflecting the higher prices which could result from a very 
restrictive supply management policy. 
The first alternative for establishing a price differential between the two curves is, of course, available. 
However, we see little chance for the latter. The inelastic demand curves needed to make this technically possible 
appear to exist.& But, unlike peaches and tobacco, the commodities under consideration here are important in 
consumers' diets and are viewed as necessities. These factors, plus the current hypersensitivity about increasing living 
costs, make it doubtful whether Congress would support such policies.l/ In 1965, when faced with opposition to a 
"bread tax," Congress declined the opportunity to shift a substantial portion of the voluntary program inducement 
cost to consumers by establishing a 75 cents per bushel domestic certificate cost to flour millers rather than the full 
difference between the loan and parity which was offered to participating farmers. William Mo's recent statistical 
estimate of the U.S. domestic demand curve for food wheat affords a crude estimate of the maximum amount which 
could have been extracted from domestic consumers [5]. For 1964, the estimated maximum total revenue amounts 
to about 41 percent or $437 million more than was actually realized from domestic consumption. The estimated 
revenue maximizing price is, of course, prohibitive-$5.38 per bushel, farm basis. Essentially, Congress' price setting 
standard was then and, we believe, is now a historical one. To the extent that farm policy determines prices of 
necessities, the price shall not be higher than in the recent past.fu' 
The second form of inducement mentioned earlier consists of direct, non-market payments to farmers from 
the Treasury. If the minimum or required diversion is decreased, the "mandatory participation curve" is shifted 
upward and to the left . .2/ This increases its maximum relative to the maximum for the "program rejection curve" for 
all producers and, hence, increases the inducement effect. If the program is then accepted, the resulting costs to the 
Treasury for inventory management, operation of the loan program, export subsidies, etc. might fall, but 
inducement costs would probably be higher. Compensating attempts to cut inducement costs by lowering P d and/or 
P would, in turn, lower the "mandatory participation curve" throughout, and hence cut the inducement effect of 
tCe program.!.Q/ Thus, we see the dilemma: increasing the minimum required diversion, or lowering direct payments 
to contain treasury costs lessens the likelihood that the program will be accepted. 
Conclusions 
Finally, we will summarize our evaluation of the prospects for such programs in the wheat and feed grain 
sectors. We believe that if wheat producers were presented today with the choice of either a mandatory program of 
the type described, including somewhat lower direct payments and mandatory diversion, or almost any program 
with minimum controls, but lower price prospects, then the mandatory program would be accepted. In 1963, the 
last year in which a referendum was held, 1,223 thousand votes were cast [11, June 1963, p.19]. In 1969,981 
~For wheat, this assumes that the domestic food, feed, and export demands can be effectively separated. 
1J It would also be difficult to justify them on welfare grounds. 
'§/ This conclusion, if true, provides a basis for some interesting speculation on the reaction of Congress and the Courts to an effective 
NFO bargaining program . 
.2/ In equation (1'), QNR/3 f = -Pp YAb <0. 
lJlJ In equation (1 '), a NR/ a Pp = YAh>O, and 
3 NR/:1Pd = Y(Ad- fAb)>O for Ad:::>fAb. 
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thousand farms accounting for 89 percent of the national allotment, enrolled in the voluntary program [ 11, May 
1963, p.23]. Obviously, it is impossible to assess the degree of farmer opposition to the principle of mandatory 
controls, or to say conclusively what portion of wheat farmers would perceive that acceptance of mandatory 
controls would result in greater returns than the alternative. However, in view of the broad acceptance of the present 
program, it seems likely that a configuration of direct payments and minimum diversion could be devised which 
would gain acceptance of 2/3 of producers, and which would result in about the same or somewhat less total 
government cost without increasing food prices. If the alternative were the present program, we suspect that it might 
still be possible to get the necessary 2/3 "yes" vote. Again, this conclusion is based primarily on the wide acceptance 
of the present program and the fact that those who now consider participation at the minimum diversion rate would 
find the program even more inducing with a slightly smaller mandatory minimum diversion. 
We are considerably more negative about prospects for a mandatory feed grain program. Again, a credible 
threat of free market prices as the alternative might bring acceptance. However, if the alternative were the present 
program, or even a similar one with somewhat lower direct payments, we doubt that the necessary support would be 
forthcoming. In 1968 less the 1/2 of farms with a feed grain base participated in the voluntary program while 
inducement payments (diversion and price support payments) totaled $1.36 billion. With this historical record it 
would seem that the inducement cost necessary to gain acceptance of a mandatory program would likely outweigh 
any savings that could be realized in other program costs to the Treasury. 
Our summary and concluding observation is that the seemingly twin tasks of assessing the acceptability and 
performance of mandatory supply control programs for agriculture are, in fact, inseparable. Cause and effect are 
blurred in a pattern of joint dependence. We hope the analysis we have presented may contribute toward 
understanding of the relationships among the several components bearing upon this challenging task. 
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Economics of Expiration or Extension 
of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 
Walter W. Wilcox* 
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 expires at the end of the 1970 crop year. If new legislation dealing 
with price supports and acreage adjustments is not enacted to apply to the 1971 and subsequent crops, the 
continuing price support legislation enacted prior to 1965 will become operative. 
Wheat. The continuing wheat price support legislation provides for wheat marketing certificates with 
processors required to pay the full value of the domestic certificates. The mandatory price support level (loans plus 
certificates), if marketing quotas are approved, is not less than 65 or more than 90 percent of parity for wheat 
produced for domestic consumption. 
The Secretary is required to make a determination by April 15 as to whether wheat is likely to be in over 
supply and, if so, as now appears probable, he must announce a marketing quota program for the following crop, 
including acreage allotments and penalties for overplanting allotments. The announced marketing quota program 
must be approved by two-thirds of the wheat growers to become effective. 
If the announced marketing quota program is not approved by two-thirds of the growers, price support loans 
at 50 percent of parity, about $1.45 a bushel in 1971, would be available to producers who planted within their 
allotments. There would be no marketing certificates, however, and no penalties for overplanting allotments. 
Feed grains. The continuing feed grains price support legislation provides that price supports shall be made 
available to corn producers, at such level, not less than 50 or more than 90 percent of parity, as the Secretary 
determines will not result in increasing Commodity Credit Corporation stocks. Price supports may be made available 
through loans or purchases and shall be made available on other feed grains at levels which are fair and reasonable in 
relation to the price support level on corn. Fifty percent of parity would probably be about $.90 a bushel for the 
1971 corn crop. 
In evaluating the probable effect of such a change in feed grain price supports it is important to keep in mind 
that 2 million tons were added to feed grain stocks from the 1968 harvest and more may be added from the 1969 
harvest, even though about 30 percent of the eligible acres were diverted from production each year by the annual 
adjustment programs. 
Cotton. The continuing price support legislation for cotton requires that the Secretary make price support 
loans available at not less than 65 or more than 90 percent of parity to producers who plant within their allotments. 
The national allotment shall be not less than the number of bales which can be grown on 16 million acres. If the 
Secretary finds that the prospective supply of cotton would exceed normal he must announce a marketing quota 
program, including heavy penalties for overplanting allotments. 
In view of the minimum mandatory support level of 65 percent of parity, equivalent to about $.32 a pound 
for the 1971 crop, it is probable that more than a normal supply would be produced in the absence of marketing 
quotas. (The possibility of devising a successful voluntary adjustment and price support program at 65 percent of 
parity, using a combination of a loan at world price levels and payments, is under investigation.) 
If marketing quotas were announced but not approved by a two-thirds majority, the overplanting penalties 
would not apply and loans would be available at 50 percent of parity to those who planted within their allotments. 
However, cotton marketing quotas have always been approved by large majorities. 
The authority to sell or lease cotton allotments in the 1965 Act also would expire. 
Wool. The continuing price support legislation for wool is entirely discretionary, similar to that provided for 
other non-basic commodities. The Secretary could not continue the current direct payment program to wool 
growers but could, at his discretion, support the price of wool by loans or purchases at not more than 90 percent of 
parity. 
* Senior Specialist in Agriculture, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. 
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Cropland Adjustment Program. The 1965 Act provides that the Secretary may offer a long-term cropland 
adjustment program each year, designed to divert up to 10 million acres of cropland to soil conserving and other 
uses, for periods of 5 to 10 years. This authority would expire and there is no continuing authority for long-term 
cropland diversion programs. 
Economic Evaluation of the Five Major Changes 
The program committee for this seminar asked that each policy choice be evaluated on the basis of 12 
different criteria. The criteria range from effects on "treasury costs" to effects on "value of farm and non-farm 
assets," and the "differential income effect on landowners, renters and hired labor." 
Rather than attempt a complicated detailed tabulation of the effects of the five important changes in price 
support and acreage adjustment legislation which would occur if the 1965 Act is allowed to expire, the major 
probable effects will be noted. 
Farm prices and farm income would fall in 1971 and decline further in subsequent years if the 1965 Act is 
allowed to expire without replacement. Wheat producers would probably lose all their wheat certificate payments 
which will amount to about $900 million in 1970. It is probable that wheat marketing quotas would be defeated but 
for the first year wheat prices might be higher than at present. The minimum price support level would be 50 
percent of parity or about $1.45 a bushel in 1971. However, acreage allotments probably would be reduced sharply 
the second year or new legislation would be enacted authorizing the Secretary to make wheat price support loans at 
or near feed grain price levels. Otherwise the government would accumulate unmanageable stocks. 
Cotton producers might actually receive higher incomes the first year. They would be permitted to plant the 
full minimum national allotment of 16 million acres and the price would be supported at not less than 65 percent of 
parity if marketing quotas were approved. But again, this would create a great imbalance between production and 
marketings. Either a legal basis for a successful voluntary program would have to be found in the continuing 
legislation, or new legislation would be almost imperative the second year. 
Feed grain producers would be most adversely affected in 1971. They would lose all their current payments, 
which may total $1.5 billion in 1970, and market prices would decline to or below the $ .90 a bushel price support 
level. The loss of income from these two sources would be substantially more than the additional income from 
cropping the diverted acreage. 
Wool producers need not suffer any loss in income if the Secretary uses his discretionary authority to maintain 
wool price supports at current levels. He would, however, have to acquire the wool as a result of loan or purchase 
operations, rather than support the price as at present by direct payments. 
Although feed grain producers would incur the most serious income losses in 1971, if the continuing price 
support and adjustment legislation were allowed to become operative, the cotton and the wheat growers might incur 
the greater income losses over a 3 to 5 year period. The continuing legislation for these two groups is unworkable 
over a 2 or 3 year period and probably would be repealed after the first year. 
Treasury costs might be reduced about $1 billion the first year and farm income would probably decline more 
than treasury costs. 
If the cotton and wheat price support levels in the continuing legislation were lowered after the first year, both 
treasury costs and farm income would decline further-perhaps as much as $3 billion for treasury costs. The decline 
in farm income, for the first 3 to 5 years at least, would be larger than the reduction in treasury costs. 
Most of the loss in farm income would be absorbed by the 540,000 farm operators who market 71 percent of 
all farm products marketed. 
Food processors and consumers would benefit, especially after a year or two. The current programs are 
holding 50 to 60 million acres of near average quality crop land out of production. If the 1965 Act is allowed to 
expire much of this land would be used to produce grains and soybeans. Larger supplies of these crops would soon 
be converted into expanded livestock numbers and increased marketings of livestock products. After the first year, 
marketings of hogs, poultry and beef would be larger than otherwise. There also would be some expansion in egg and 
milk production in response to lower feed grain prices. 
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Lower grain and soybean prices would lead to larger exports, and cotton probably would continue to be 
produced for export at world prices in larger quantities than in recent years. 
After the first year or two the lower prices of grains, soybeans, cotton and livestock products would result in 
lower values for all agricultural assets. Cattle breeding herds and ranches might increase in value for a year or two but 
they, too, would be expected to decline in value after that. 
The decline in agricultural asset values would adversely affect all rural financial institutions and all public 
institutions in rural areas. The financial pressures created by lower asset values would affect the one million largest 
farms most severely. The current high rate of decline in number of farms might be slowed because of difficulties in 
arranging financing for continued farm enlargement. 
If one looks beyond the first 5 to 10 years to a period in which the rural institutions will have become 
adjusted to lower prices and asset values, it is difficult to generalize as to the probable effects. Technological progress 
probably would be slowed. The rate of returns on all agricultural resources probably would be lower in relation to 
rates of return in other sectors of the economy. 
Economic Aspects of Extending the 1965 Act 
There are wide differences of opinion as to how the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 should be amended if 
its life is extended. Unable to obtain unanimous agreement on any proposed changes, the House Committee on 
Agriculture in 1968 agreed to an extension for one year, without any changes. 
A coalition of 22 farm organizations has recommended its extension with a few farm-income increasing 
amendments. They, however, would increase treasury costs substantially. The American Farm Bureau supports 
proposed legislation which would phase out the commodity programs over a 5-year period. It provides a large, 
long-term cropland retirement program and financial assistance for small farmers interested in shifting to other 
activities. 
In this discussion no attempt will be made to evaluate changes which would result in increased treasury costs 
because of the small probability of their enactment. Before attempting an evaluation of an extension of the 1965 
Act, however, it is important to note several of its features. 
As the 1965 Act is being administered in 1970, government payments to feed grain, wheat and cotton 
producers are expected to be as shown below: 
Estimated Payments as 
government percent of 
payments value of 
production 
(million) (percent) 
Feed grains $1,516 22 
Wheat 900 54 
Cotton 900 71 
Wool and Mohair 62 69 
Wheat, cotton and wool price supports and payments are at the minimum levels required by the provisions of 
the 1965 Act, but feed grain price supports and payments are higher than required to meet minimum requirements. 
Both the parity index and crop yields increase almost every year. Wheat and cotton price supports and 
payments, now at the minimum required levels, will have to be increased in the next few years due to increases in 
parity prices and acre yields. Annual government payment increases due to these required adjustments may amount 
to $50 to $100 million for wheat and about the same for cotton. 
Feed grain prices are supported at 71 percent of parity this year although they could have been as low as 65 
under existing legislation. The Secretary of Agriculture has much discretionary authority in formulating the annual 
feed grain programs. He could lower the price support loan with or without increasing the price support payment, 
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yet meet rmmmum statutory requirements. He also could increase the current 20 percent minimum diversion 
requirement, as a qualification for price support payments and loans. Any significant reduction in treasury costs 
achieved by such adjustments, however, would result in even greater reductions in producers' incomes. 
It is of interest to note that, in world markets, corn prices are substantially higher in relation to the U.S. parity 
price than are either wheat or cotton prices. 
Corn per bushel!J 
Wheat per bushel 
Cotton per pound 
lloecember 1969. 
U.S. farm prices 
equivalent to 
world market 
prices 
$1.09 
1.15 
0.20 
u.s. 
Parity 
Price 
$1.74 
2.78 
0.48 
U.S. farm equiv-
alent of world 
prices as per-
cent of Parity 
63 
41 
42 
There is little basis for expecting a marked uptrend in the world prices for any of these crops in the near 
future. It is doubtful that U.S. farmers would find cotton prices at world levels sufficiently attractive to produce 
more than would be needed for domestic use and usual exports. In the absence of adjustment programs, however, at 
world price levels, U.S. wheat and feed grain producers would be expected to produce excessive supplies, depressing 
world prices even further. 
Although the Department of Agriculture estimated about 35 percent of the 1968 and 1969 cotton program 
payments were for supply adjustment and 65 percent were income transfers or income supplements, almost all 
payments may be supplemental income payments in 1971 and subsequent years. Also 49 percent of the wheat 
payments were designated as income transfer payments in 1968-69. If wheat price supports are continued at current 
levels in 1971 and later years, well over half of the wheat program payments would be income transfers rather than 
payments for acreage diversion. 
In view of the above facts, in evaluating the economic aspects of extending the Agricultural Act of 1965, it is 
assumed that a limit might be placed on the amount of payments to an individual farmer; the requirement of price 
support at 65 percent of parity for all cotton produced on permitted acreage might be modified; and the 100 
percent of parity price support requirement for wheat used for domestic consumption might be modified. 
The consideration of the economic aspects of extending the 1965 Act with these three specific modifications 
is not intended to imply their approval or disapproval. 
Farm Income and Treasury Costs 
As the coalition of farm organizations learned, all amendments which would increase farm income significantly 
also increase treasury costs, and by about the same amount. There is little possibility for a Secretary of Agriculture 
to administer the provisions of the 1965 Act in such a way as to raise farm prices and incomes above current levels 
without increasing government costs. 
It would be possible to maintain farm prices and income with slightly lower government costs if a long-term 
cropland retirement program, as authorized in the Act, were utilized to supplement the annual adjustment programs. 
Government payments under the annual programs are an important part of farmer income, however, and lower 
government payments for land diversion would need to be offset by higher farm prices or increased output at stable 
prices if the farm income were to be maintained at current levels with lower diversion payments. 
Payments under a long-term cropland retirement program would in part replace annual adjustment payments 
now going to the same individuals. In part, however, these payments would go to different individuals. A higher 
proportion of the long-term cropland retirement program payments would go to small and part-time farmers and to 
older operators. 
Almost all long-term cropland retirement payments would go to owner operators or landlords. Tenants would 
be adversely affected in some cases by the loss of land they had formerly cultivated. 
The economic effects of a limitation on the size of payments to an individual producer would be dependent on 
the level of the limitation, and on related adjustments in the acre:!ge diversion provisions. 
. 71 . 
The Department of Agriculture has not released a comprehensive analysis of the effect of payment limitations 
at different levels on the acreage adjustment features of the wheat, cotton and feed grain programs. Representative 
Conte of Massachusetts, however, has proposed a payment limitation of $5000 per program-the lowest level that 
has been proposed thus far.!J He notes that 92 percent of the cotton producers in 1968, 97 percent of the wheat 
producers, and 98 percent of the feed grain producers would not have been affected by a $5000 payment limit per 
program. With appropriate changes in program regulations to minimize the adverse effects of payment limits on 
achieving adjustment goals, a $5000 program payment limit appears administratively feasible. 
Had a $5000 limitation per program been in effect in 1968, approximately 85,000 producers would have had 
their payments limited. It would have limited the 85,000 producers' payments which totaled $917 to $424 million. 
Although the maximum reduction in program costs resulting from a payment limit at this level approximates 
$500 million, the actual reduction in costs would be substantially less. Producers would split up farms to the extent 
possible to avoid such a limitation. Also, since most of the feed grain program payments are acreage diversion 
payments, reductions in payments to large growers would be partially offset by increased payments to others. 
A $5000 limit on feed grain program payments in 1968, with comparable adjustments in acreage diversion 
requirements for these large growers, would have reduced feed grain acreage diversion about 7 percent. Program 
changes to induce the remaining producers to divert 7 percent larger acreages would absorb a part of savings achieved 
by a payment limit. 
A number of proposals have been made for payment limits at higher levels-$10,000 per program; $20,000 to 
three programs, wheat, cotton and feed grains; and several sliding scales which would limit payments to $100,000 or 
less. 
The obvious and direct effect of payment limits at any level is to reduce the payments to specific individuals 
below what they would have been in the absence of such a limit. Eight percent of the cotton producers, 3 percent of 
the wheat, and 2 percent of the feed grain cooperators would have been affected by a $5000 per program limit in 
1968. These are the individuals with the highest incomes and the largest assets. Even smaller percentages of the total 
growers would be affected by the higher limits proposed. 
Reductions in government costs will depend on the limit imposed. A $37,500 limit might have reduced 
government expenditures about $150 million in 1968; a $20,000 limit might have resulted in a $180 million 
reduction; a $10,000 limit per program would have resulted in up to a $250 million reduction; and a $5000 limit per 
program would have resulted in up to $400 million reduction in government expenditures. 
Any evaluation of the economic effects of modifying the minimum price support levels in the wheat and 
cotton programs must be in general terms. If lower levels of price support are authorized, it is probable that the 
administration would lower the price support levels in order to reduce government costs. 
It does not appear to be administratively possible to reduce government costs for these programs, however, 
without similar reductions in producer incomes. 
An extension of the 1965 Act with the three modifications mentioned, a limitation on producer payments and 
a reduction in mandatory price support levels for cotton and wheat, would permit the administration to reduce farm 
program costs substantially if it chose to do so. But all significant government cost reductions would be translated 
into reductions in producer incomes. 
To the extent that most of the savings were achieved by a limitation on payments, most of the reduction in 
farm income would be borne by producers with the highest incomes and the largest assets. To the extent that savings 
were achieved by reducing price support and price support payments, the reduction in farm income would be borne 
by producers in proportion to the value of their marketings. 
An extension of the Agricultural Act of 1965, with the modifications mentioned, would continue provisions 
permitting the administration to raise price support levels if it chose to do so. It could expect government costs to 
increase by about the amount of the increase in farm income achieved by raising price support levels. 
1J Congressional Record. July 21, 1969. E6121. Vol. 115. 
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If the 1965 Act were extended with the modifications listed, the effect on farm prices, consumer prices, farm 
income, farm asset values and many other factors would depend on the policies followed in its administration. It 
would permit a continuation of policies which would stabilize farm prices, incomes and asset values at or near 
current levels, with modest reductions in government costs. 
Since up to one-half of current government payments are income transfers, reductions in government costs 
could be achieved with roughly equivalent reductions in farm income, but without adverse effects on farm prices, 
and with minimum adverse effects on farm asset values. 
Depending on the specific modifications made in the minimum cotton and wheat price support provisions, the 
administration might be given authority to substantially reduce market price support levels. (It now has this 
authority with respect to feed grains.) If additional authority of this type were granted and used, farm prices, 
incomes and asset values would be expected to fall. Rural financial and public institutions would be adversely 
affected by such a decline in farm income and asset values. The extent of the decline and the extent of the adverse 
effects would depend on the acreage adjustment and market price support policy followed. If a substantial part of 
the currently diverted grain acreages were allowed to come into production in the next few years, the adverse effects 
on farm income, farm asset values, and rural institutions would be severe. 
Major Problems and Alternative Programs for Cotton 
Frank Lowenstein* 
For years the cotton industry has been faced with seemingly insuperable problems. Prices have declined 
gradually from their highs of the early SO's and acreage has also declined. The cotton industry has proposed one 
program after another to solve these ills. In each case, the primary criteria for these programs have been to support 
and increase farm income. The implied definition of farm income has been the gross cash return from disposal of the 
cotton crop. 
In reality, the cotton industry has ignored the basic problem, namely, the demand for cotton. Disappearance 
of cotton declined from about 14.9 million bales in 1960 to an estimated 10.6 million bales during the current 
season. Most of this decline occurred because of shrinking exports. 
In addition, there is little reason to be encouraged by the trend in domestic use of cotton. Consumption of 
cotton by U.S. mills in 1968 was about the same as in 1960. At the same time, the consumption of manmade fibers 
increased more than 50 percent over the period. In other words, cotton has obtained smaller proportions of a 
rapidly expanding market with each succeeding year. Other fibers are replacing cotton in our domestic markets. The 
same development has occurred abroad with the additional complication of steadily growing competition from other 
cotton producing countries. 
In the U.S., consumption of all fibers by U.S. mills increased by 3.3 billion pounds, equivalent to about 11.1 
million bales of cotton, from 1960 to 1968. As stated above, the consumption of cotton in 1960 and 1968 was 
about 8Y-t million bales. If cotton had captured only one-fourth of the expansion in the domestic fiber market, its ills 
would now be close to being cured. 
In the Foreign Free World, manmade fiber production over this same period increased by almost 6 billion 
pounds, equivalent to almost 18 million bales of cotton. At the same time, cotton production in the Foreign Free 
World increased by 7 million bales. U.S. exports over this period declined from about 6.6 million bales to about 2.7 
million bales. Acquisition of 10 percent of the expansion in the fiber market in the Foreign Free World would 
have made the solution to our cotton problem very easy. Instead, we lost markets equivalent to about 18 percent of 
this expansion. 
The solution to the cotton problem, if there is a solution, must lie in developing commercial demand for U.S. 
grown cotton. We cannot afford to maintain expensive cotton programs while cotton is losing its markets. Any 
program which does not stimulate the expansion of cotton markets from current levels is of little value. 
Despite the very large problems which the cotton industry faces, no program can be designed for cotton which 
does not consider the effect of such programs on other commodities. Substitute crops for cotton farms are mainly 
soybeans and feed grains. For example, in eight mid-South and Southeastern states (North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee), from 1963 to 1969, acreage harvested for corn 
and cotton declined by 3.8 million acres, and acreage harvested for soybeans increased by 5.0 million acres. The 1.2 
million difference in the two figures largely represents the clearing of additional land for cultivation. Changes in the 
cotton program affect feed grains and soybeans; changes in the feed grain programs affect cotton and soybeans; and 
changes in the soybean loan level affect cotton and feed grains. Therefore, the programs for all these commodities 
must be coordinated if they are to accomplish the desired objective. 
Furthermore, changes in the programs for these commodities affect the production of and prices for livestock 
since all three of them furnish feedstuffs for livestock. We should consider the principal objectives for commodity 
programs, in general, before we talk about specific programs for any commodity, and especially for cotton. The 
principal objectives which I have considered are: 
{1) Commodity production should be of a quality and quantity which will be absorbed by consumers at home 
and abroad in approximately the same quantity as produced. 
*Chief Economist, Kohlmeyer & Co. 
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(2) The market price for commodities should be at levels which will encourage their use vis-a-vis competitors, 
produced domestically as well as abroad. 
(3) Transfer payments from the federal treasury to producers should be at reasonable levels, and by that I 
mean sharply below the levels of recent years. 
( 4) Farm income should be maintained at a reasonable level, but it should not necessarily be maintained at 
levels of recent years which have been inflated by exorbitant payments from the federal treasury. The basis by 
which reasonableness is judged should be geared to commercial sized operations and not to price-parity 
concepts. 
(5) Output should continue to shift toward the more efficient farms. 
Programs and Poverty 
There are some things which commodity programs cannot accomplish. Among the unobtainable objectives is 
that of relieving rural poverty. About one-third of the country's farmers now produce approximately 86 percent of 
the total farm output. These farmers had an average income from farming in 1968 of $10,95 8, in addition to 
off-farm income of $3,343. The other two-thirds of the country's farmers cannot earn an adequate living from 
farming and apparently do not intend to do so. In 1968, the 2 million farmers with gross sales of less than $10,000 
earned more from off-farm sources than from farming.ll The income of the average farm family in this category was 
$7,280, of which $5,511, or 76 percent, was earned from off-farm sources. 
It would be practically impossible, through the use of commodity programs, to relieve poverty among those 
farmers who are not earning an adequate income from farming. 
Programs to help needy small farmers should be developed, but they should be separated from commodity 
programs. Such programs should include many facets, such as education, employment opportunities, medical care, 
changing locations to take advantage of job opportunities elsewhere, income payments from the federal treasury to 
prevent poverty, etc. The exploration of such programs is beyond the scope of this paper. I mention them only to 
indicate that it is not a valid objective for commodity programs to support farm income at some predetermined level 
because there are 2 million farmers whose income from farming is relatively small. 
Now, let us review cotton policies and programs of the recent past. Expenditures under the Act of 1965last 
season were about $1.1 billion, including producer payments, net loans made by CCC, P.L. 480 costs, carrying 
charges, and administrative costs. These expenditures exceed the returns that growers received from the sale of their 
cotton which was valued at about $900 million. In other words, cotton farmers have essentially been producing 
cotton on better than a 100 percent matching receipt basis with the federal government. 
A concomitant development of this situation was the very large payments to certain cotton producers. This 
development led to the fight concerning payment limitations. The payment limitations fight is, in large part, the 
result of the high rates of payments to farmers. Since much of the cotton crop is produced by a relatively few 
farmers, high rates of payments lead to large payments to these large producers. 
The first step in attacking the payment limitations problem should be a reduction in the level of payments to 
cotton producers, as a whole. At the same time, the proportion of the farm income stemming from farm marketings 
should increase. 
Demand and Price 
Now let us return to the demand for cotton. The downward trend in the demand for cotton is closely 
associated with prices for cotton. Many people talk about inherent quality characteristics for the manmade fibers 
and some people talk about cheap labor in the cotton producing areas of foreign countries, but price is certainly a 
pertinent factor which the cotton industry has been unable to adequately consider in the past. Even though the Act 
of 1965 lowered the loan rate sharply, market prices for cotton rose sharply in 1967 and were high relative to 
manmade fibers throughout most of 1968. 
ll U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS. Farm Income Situation. FIS 214. July, 1969. 
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Comparison of cotton prices with prices for manmade fibers is somewhat complex. One cannot price cotton 
on the farm and list prices for manmade fibers and get a fair price comparison. One must look at the discounted 
prices for which mills buy manmade fibers, the cost of getting cotton to the mills, the difference between the 
covering power of the fibers, and the difference between mill waste for manmade fiber and cotton. Manmade fiber is 
priced delivered to the mills, net weight. When cotton sells for 28 cents per pound on the farm, it is equivalent in 
price to 42 cents for polyester staple. Mills are now buying polyester staple at about 42 cents per pound, unbranded, 
and the price could drop from here. At 22.77 cents per pound, the price at Memphis for Strict Low Middling 1-1/16 
inch cotton in September, the equivalent price is about 35.89 cents per pound. In the summer of 1968, the 
equivalent price was about 45 cents. 
For polynosic rayon staple fiber, the equivalent price in September was 28.82 cents per pound and, in the 
summer of 1968, it was approximately 36.16 cents. Polynosic rayon is now selling to mills at about 30 cents per 
pound. Mills have a tendency to use the cheaper of polynosic rayon or cotton in blends. In other words, they will 
tend to use the cotton-polyester blend or a polynosic rayon-polyester blend, depending on the relative prices of 
cotton and polynosic rayon. 
Once mills have switched to manmade fibers, it takes some time for changed price relationships to persuade 
them to switch back to cotton-particularly if the price advantage is relatively small. In short, prices for cotton have 
encouraged manmade fiber producers to increase their production and to move into fiber markets which were 
formerly held largely by cotton. Lower prices for cotton will have to be maintained for several years if cotton is to 
reclaim some of the markets it has lost to manmade fibers. 
Most fabrics still need the absorbency and the feel that cotton or rayon provides and which polyester fiber 
cannot provide. But these qualities can be passable when less than half of the fiber content is cotton or rayon. In the 
face of this threat, the cotton industry, as a whole, has fought the use of blends. Manmade fibers, therefore, have 
captured a larger proportion of the blend market than probably would have occurred if the cotton industry had 
developed and promoted higher level cotton blends. 
In the past, manmade fiber manufacturers have watched prospective pricing for cotton closely. In 1966, when 
the Agricultural Act of 1965 first carne into effect, manmade fiber manufacturers were hesitant to expand their 
capacity. They postponed expansion plans to await developments. If cotton prices had stayed at the level that they 
anticipated-close to the loan level of 1966-manmade fiber ma.nfacturers would have been reluctant to expand their 
capacity so rapidly. However, there were small crops in 1966 and 1967 caused by relatively small acreage and poor 
weather conditions. Cotton buyers panicked because of these small crops, and prices rose sharply in 1967, as 
explained earlier. Now the expansion in manmade fiber production capacity is history but plans for the future 
continue. By November, 1970, non-cellulosic manmade fiber manufacturers are expected to expand their capacity 
by 40 percent above their capacity of November, 1968. Much of the same kind of development in manmade fiber 
production is occurring abroad and for much the same reasons. 
Cotton's markets vis-a-vis manmade fibers probably cannot be regained by fabrics made entirely of cotton. I 
believe that the day of the blends is with us to stay. However, if the cotton industry will give up its pursuit of the 
impossible, there may be some hope. Cotton's market could be expanded by increasing the percentage of cotton 
used in the blends. At the present, the predominate blend is 65 percent polyester and 35 percent cotton or rayon. 
Cotton markets can still further expand by substituting cotton for rayon. In my opinion, developments such as these 
largely depend on consistently lower prices for cotton so that mills at home and abroad will fmd it advantageous to 
use more cotton. 
High prices for cotton also encourage the expansion of cotton production in other countries, which, in turn, 
supply cotton markets which were formerly ours. Thus, U.S. cotton has two-pronged competition abroad. 
Price-Cost Spiral 
Now, I want to turn to production costs. In the past, there have been many statements to the effect that 
cotton should be supported at a high target price until research develops more efficient methods of production. 
When this development occurs, it is reasoned, the cost of production will fall and the support program can be altered 
accordingly. 
Unfortunately, under the programs we have known in the past, the day will never come when the total cost of 
production will be sufficiently low to warrant a reduction in the target price. This conclusion stems from the nature 
of the cost computations which many farmers and farm organizations are considering. They are considering total 
costs of production including charges for land. 
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Such a concept, under existing programs, prevents increased production efficiencies from being adequately 
reflected in the cost of production computations. Under these programs, as the production process becomes more 
efficient, the profits stemming from these efficiencies have an irrepressible tendency to be capitalized into land 
values. The higher land values are then used as a basis for computing higher production costs-a price-cost spiral. 
We must break through this circular reasoning. This can be accomplished by basing a program upon direct 
costs of production. Direct costs of production do not include charges for land use and general overhead. 
Three Programs 
Now, let us consider three alternative programs for cotton. The first is the program as it now exists under the 
Food and Agricultural Act of 1965. The second is the Set-Aside Program which has been proposed to the Congress 
by the Department of Agriculture. The third is a program, which I explained to the American Cotton Shippers 
Association in May of last year, which I call "The Direct Cost Program." These three programs will be considered in 
light of the objectives explained above. 
The cotton program under the Act of 1965 has been quite successful in reducing surpluses of cotton and 
maintaining large expenditures by the federal government. This program has been singularly unsuccessful in 
expanding production of cotton. Furthermore, market prices have been entirely too high to let cotton hold its 
market. 
The Act of 1965 requires cotton production on permitted acreage to be supported at 65 percent of parity. 
This support level is accomplished by making a price support payment. At the present time, the parity price for 
cotton is 48.31 cents per pound. With a loan of about 19.9 cents, the difference between the target price and the 
loan would be 11.50 cents per pound. The payment rate would then be altered arithmetically so that the total 
payment would be made on the domestic allotment or 65 percent of the acreage allotment. Under our example, the 
actual payment on the domestic allotment would be 17.69 cents per pound. 
Since farmers have to plant only 90 percent of their domestic allotment to receive their payments, many of 
them choose not to plant more than their domestic allotment. Thus, it is difficult to increase production under the 
Act of 1965. 
The requirement that production be supported at 65 percent of parity makes it impractical to reduce the loan 
level to encourage the use of U.S. cotton, even though the law states that the loan level shall be 90 percent of the 
world market price in the year in which the cotton is marketed.£/ If the loan were reduced to levels which would 
encourage the use of U.S. cotton, expenditures from the federal treasury would expand even beyond the very high 
levels that now exist. 
There are other weaknesses in the program under the Act of 1965, including the matter of projected yields, 
but I shall not take the time here to delve into them. 
Set-Aside Program 
The Set-Aside Program has not been completely developed, at least for public consumption, as of this date. As 
I understand the Set-Aside, a domestic allotment would be declared which would eventually be reduced to the level 
of actual domestic use. However, there are some indications that this reduction would be done over a period of 
several years. A farmer would receive a loan on his cotton, which would be based on 80 to 95 percent of the 
preceding three-year average price for Middling l-inch cotton on the 12 designated markets. There is talk for 1971 of 
18.25 cents per pound for Middling l-inch. A farmer who participates in the program would receive payments on his 
domestic allotment. In return, he would be required to set aside and add to his soil conserving base an acreage equal 
to a specified percentage of his domestic allotment, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
The payment rate now being mentioned for 1971 is 12 cents to 17 cents per pound. Expenditures under such 
a program, with a 17 cent payment, would not be too different from current expenditures under the Act of 1965. 
Since farmers would receive very large payments on their domestic allotments, there would be little incentive to 
produce more cotton than the domestic allotment. Lower levels of payment would make the Set-Aside Program 
more acceptable with respect to the expenditures and attainment of production targets. 
JJ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ASCS. Compilation of Statutes. Agricultural Handbook No. 361. January 1, 1969. pp.153-154, 
paragraph (D) (2). 
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Initially, the domestic allotment would be distributed among farms as acreage allotments are now distributed. 
There would be little chance of shifting domestic allotments from inefficient to efficient farms in the first year or 
two. This proposal would permit complete redistribution of those allotments which were not planted over a 
four-year period or at a rate of 20 percent a year, but the proposed program is not clear concerning the 
redistribution of allotments between states. However, in the first year, efficient farmers could increase production 
which was not included in their domestic allotment, if they so desired. 
Essentially, the two programs explained above, the Act of 1965, and the Set-Aside, make payments to farmers 
at a fixed rate regardless of the market price. We had a situation, in 196 7, in which the market price for cotton rose 
above the target price and price support payments were still made. It seems to me that one way of keeping 
expenditures on a cotton program at a reasonable level would be to make payments which were the difference 
between the market price and the target price, rather than the difference between the loan price and target price. 
Under such a concept, the payment would diminish as the market price increased. In some years, such a provision 
would not be important but, in others, it might make a significant difference in the size of payments. 
Direct Cost Program 
Under the Direct Cost Program, there would be a domestic allotment equivalent to actual domestic use. There 
would be a target price equal to 125 percent of the U.S. average direct cost of producing cotton as determined by 
the Department of Agriculture. Payments to farmers would be the difference between the market price and 125 
percent of the direct cost on the domestic allotment. A farmer would be allowed to produce up to a maximum of 
175 percent of his domestic allotment, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. There would be a 
non-recourse loan, based on 75 percent of the direct cost of producing cotton. Each farm's share of the domestic 
allotment would be based on the farm's total production for the preceding two years divided by the total production 
of the U.S. for the same years. Crop insurance would be available to all farmers with premiums based on actuarial 
experience. 
Such a program would, I believe, go far to accomplish the objectives which are essential to the preservation of 
the cotton industry. Market prices for cotton would be largely determined by market conditions and cotton could 
effectively compete with substitutes, including manmade fibers and foreign produced cotton. Expenditures on the 
cotton program would be reduced to less than $500 million in the first year of the program, compared with the 
present expenditures of about $1.1 billion. The program would maintain gross farm income from cotton at about 
$1.6 billion, compared with $1.6 billion from the 1967 crop and $1.8 billion from the 1968 crop. Production of 
cotton would shift to the more efficient farms under such a program, as a two-year history of cotton production 
would be the only factor determining the allocation of acreage. In subsequent years, the expenditures would decline 
as larger proportions of cotton output shifted to more efficient farms, thus reducing average direct costs. 
Indeed, a shift in production toward the more efficient farms has been in progress for some time. In 1964, 
about 39.3 percent of the cotton crop was produced at a direct cost of 18 cents a pound, or less. In 1966 (the last 
year for which data are published) 48.2 percent of the crop was produced for a direct cost of 18 cents, or less.1' It 
will be interesting to see these data for 1967 and 1968 when they are released. 
The Direct Cost Program is designed to utilize a low rate of price support payments, probably somewhere 
between 7 cents and 8 cents per pound in the first year. This contrasts with the present program which would have a 
rate of payment of more than 17 cents a pound, if continued for another year. It also contrasts with proposals under 
the Set-Aside Program for rates of payment from 12 cents to 17 cents a pound. 
High rates of payment would make it difficult to design a program which would permit cotton production to 
move to the more efficient farms. With high payment rates, there would be a tendency for cotton producers to 
produce cotton to preserve a history in order to receive the large payments, regardless of the profitability for cotton 
when the crop was sold in commercial markets. A program designed to accomplish the objectives, listed earlier in 
this paper, must have a relatively low rate of price support payment in order to be successful. 
I have not explained all the details of each of these programs as time does not permit. I have tried to cover the 
major features. It may be that the cotton industry cannot survive under any circumstances, no matter what kind of 
program we have. If this be the case, we cannot keep it alive indefinitely by making ever larger transfusions of 
money from the federal treasury. If it cannot survive by disposing of its output in commercial markets, I suggest that 
within a few years the U.S. cotton industry will be dead, no matter what the progra~ for cotton may be. 
2/ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Cost of Producing Upland Cotton in the United States, 1964, with 
annual supplements. Agricultural Economic Report No. 99. Washington, D.C. September, 1966. 

An Economic Appraisal of the Set-Aside Proposal 
Luther Tweeten* 
The Administration is to be applauded for taking a fresh look at farm policy and extending a new proposal. 
The set-aside proposal is designed to "provide restraints on production that will permit satisfactory levels of price 
and income and will neither inhibit the growth of markets nor place needless obstacles in the way of efficient farm 
operation" [ 1, emphasis in original] . 
A strong feature of the proposal is the move toward greater freedom in production and marketing decisions for 
producers-toward the "market orientation" called for by the Food and Fiber Commission and by many others. The 
proposal is evolutionary, not revolutionary. A revolutionary proposal would be academic; it would not pass 
Congress. The evolutionary proposal also has critics: some claim that the program will benefit few poor, will entail 
large Treasury costs, will create market uncertainties, and will run against the ubiquitous tide toward creating 
"orderly markets" through supply management. 
But before we can intelligently evaluate the proposal, it is well to review what is in it. After reviewing the 
principal features of the proposal, I estimate its economic implications for crop acreage, production, prices and value 
of production in 1971. The proposal is then evaluated in terms of the level of Treasury cost, the level of farm 
industry income, the incidence of benefits among large and small farms, and numerous other criteria. Throughout 
the paper, the set-aside proposal is compared mainly with the 1969-type program as each program would operate in 
1971. 
The proposed program's economic implications, as portrayed in this paper, are based on a number of sources, 
including some estimates from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. While I have attempted to use the latest data and 
the best outside estimates as well as my own judgment, it is well to recognize that the proposals as well as the 
economic implications attending them are subject to misinterpretation and change. The proposal likely would 
undergo considerable modification before it would become law. All of the implications should be interpreted 
cautiously-to avoid repetition, this caveat is not sounded as often as it applies in this report. Needless to say, all 
misinterpretations, errors and omissions found anywhere in this report are solely the responsibility of the author. 
Ten Principal Features of Set-Aside Proposal 
The following features were part of the new program as outlined in the fall of 1969 [ 1, and miscellaneous 
sources]: 
{1.) Continuation of a domestic allotment for cotton and wheat and, in addition, a national feed grain base. 
{2.) Price support loans and price (income) support payments offered participating producers who would be 
required to set aside a crop acreage equivalent to 75-100 percent of the domestic cotton or wheat allotment 
and 30 to SO percent of their feed grain base. 
(3.) Price support loans at 80 to 95 percent of a moving average of market prices. The Secretary of 
Agriculture would have flexibility in setting nonrecourse loan support rates within these limits. There would 
be an effort to avoid substantial stock accumulation by the Commodity Credit Corporation. 
(4.) Price (income) support payments to cotton and wheat producers on the normal production of their 
domestic acreage allotment and to feed grain producers on the normal production of half of their feed grain 
base. Wheat marketing certificates would be issued to farmers with a face value set by the Secretary, not (as in 
the past) necessarily providing 100 percent of parity on the domestic portion. The originally announced face 
value of certificates may be adjusted downward at the end of the marketing year to the extent that market 
prices for wheat exceed the farm price target originally considered in establishing the certificate value. The 
wheat certificate gross value is based on the domestic allotment multiplied by the 1967-69 average yield. 
Processors shall not pay more than 75 cents per bushel for wheat certificates. 
*Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University. James Plaxico and Houston Ward contributed 
numerous constructive suggestions. 
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(5.) The Secretary may, in addition, make land diversion payments to producers who divert to conservation 
uses additional acreage of cropland on the farm. Set-aside and diversion program acres shall be protected from 
erosion and pests, and may be devoted to wildlife habitats. Additional payment may be offered to producers 
who provide public access to the wildlife plots for hunting, fishing and other sports. 
(6.) The Secretary is not opposed to payment limitations, and at least three formulae are being considered: 
(a.) The Findley-Conte proposal: a flat $20,000 cut-off. 
(b.) Ancher Nelsen proposal: Reduction of 10 percent of payments exceeding $10,000 and less than 
$15,000. The percentage reduction would be graduated, increasing to a maximum of 55 percent on 
payments exceeding $1 million. 
Producers affected would not necessarily face the choice of coming into the program at the level 
required of non-affected producers, but could participate at lower levels that would not trigger large 
payment limitations. 
(c.) USDA proposal 1: Reduction of 10 percent on payments in excess of $20,000 and less than 
$40,000. The percentage reduction would be more steeply graduated than the Nelsen proposal, 
increasing to a maximum of 100 percent on payments in excess of $200,000. 
(d.) USDA proposal 2: Payment limitations applicable only to the direct grant or income supplement 
portion of payments, i.e. payments in excess of amounts needed for resource adjustments (production 
control). The reduction would be 10 percent for an income supplement over $1,000 and less than 
$2,000. The percentage reduction would increase to a maximum of 100 percent on income supplements 
in excess of $10,000. 
(7.) Not to exceed one percent of the State domestic allotment for any crop may be apportioned to farms for 
which there was no domestic allotment for the preceding crop. 
To reduce slippage and the individual producer's incentives to raise yields, yields established on 1967-69 
history are modified in accordance with trends for the region rather than the individual farm. However, 
provision is made for adjusting yields in hardship cases. 
(8.) If the total acreage of wheat planted on a farm is not at least equal to the farm domestic allotment for the 
crop, the farm domestic allotment for the succeeding crop shall be reduced downward by 20 percent. If no 
wheat were planted for four consecutive years, the domestic allotment is lost to the individual. The provision 
applies also to cotton. 
(9.) Whenever the Secretary of Agriculture determines that the carryover of a commodity (under a set-aside 
program) at the end of any marketing year will be less than 25 percent of the estimated export and domestic 
consumption of such commodity during such marketing year, the Commodity Credit Corporation shall not sell 
any of its stocks of such commodity during each year for unrestricted use at less than 115 percent ( 120 
percent for wheat) of the current loan rate plus reasonable carrying charges. 
(10.) Several long-term features are included: 
(a.) The Cropland Conversion Program, established in 1962, was initially a pilot program designed to 
convert cropland to other income producing purposes. The program, which has not been used for some 
time, would be funded and activated. 
(b.) Under a small program, perhaps 50,000 acres per year, cropland would be purchased by state and 
local governments for use as parks, airports and the like. The program would be similar to Greenspan, 
operated under the Cropland Adjustment Program, under which 7,000 acres were purchased. The 
Federal government paid one-fourth of the purchase price. 
(c.) An easement program would be a new tool to convert whole farms permanently from cropping to 
other uses. Cropping rights would be sold to the government, but title to the land would remain with the 
farmer who could reside on the land and use it for purposes other than crop production. Each of the 
above three programs would be on a small scale. Total cost of the three would be about $100 million per 
year, and only 34 million acres would be retired annually. 
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Family Assistance Plan for Low Income People 
The Administration recognizes that the above programs will do little to help the people who are poor and who 
live on small, inefficient units. The President has proposed the Family Assistance Plan fo:r low income people. An 
estimated 400,000 farm operator families would be eligible, and might receive a total of $400 million annually in 
benefits. 
Subsequent discussion of the Administration program is largely restricted to the 10 points that apply 
principally to commercial farmers. 
Application ofthe Set-Aside Proposal to Individual Farms 
Table 1 illustrates how the set-aside program would work on selected farms. The participating producer on the 
cotton farm would need to set aside (to noncrop uses) 75 percent of his domestic cotton allotment of 100 acres plus 
his 125 acre conserving base, a total of 200 acres. The remaining 300 acres in the farm could be planted to any crop. 
In return for cooperation, the producer would be eligible for a nonrecourse loan on his production at a rate perhaps 
of 16-19 cents per pound lint, and for payments of perhaps 17 cents per pound times the normal yield on the 
allotment acres. With a normal yield of 500 pounds per acre, the payment would be 500($.17)(100), or $8,500. 
The program would work similarly for the feed grain farm and for the wheat farm. In return for the set aside 
of 30 percent of his feed grain base plus his conserving base, the cooperating producer would be eligible for a 
nonrecourse loan at perhaps 85 cents to $1.00 per bushel (corn or equivalent) and would receive a payment of 
around 30 cents per bushel on the normal yield of half of his base acres. If the normal yield were 100 bushels per 
acre, the payment would be 100($.30)(100), or $3,000. He could divert additional acres and receive more payment. 
The cooperating wheat producer would need to set aside 100 percent of his domestic allotment plus his 
conserving base, a total of 600 acres in the Table 1 example. The nonrecourse loan rate would be between $1.00 and 
$1.20 per bushel. Payment might be $1.60 per bushel on the normal yield on the domestic allotment. With a yield of 
30 bushels per acre, payments on the farm would be 30($1.60)(500), or $24,000. It is apparent that as in the past 
the wheat and cotton programs (as I interpret them) would give considerably larger income support per dollar of 
market receipts and would remove less production per Treasury dollar than the feed grain program. 
Economic Implications of Set-Aside Proposal for the Farming Industry 
Subsequent tables show the estimated implications of the 1969-type program and set-aside program for the 
U.S. farming economy for 1971. It is well to remember that the estimates apply to specific features of the program, 
Table 1. Examples of set-aside program applied to three hypothetical farms. 
Total acreage in farm 
Domestic allotment or base 
for cotton, feed grain 
and wheat, respectively 
Conserving base 
Domestic allotment or base 
to be set aside 
Total set aside 
Acres free to use as 
farmer pleases* 
Unit 
acres 
acres 
acres 
per cent 
acres 
acres 
Cotton 
farm 
500 
100 
125 
75 
200 
300 
* Except participating farmer would Jose allotment, if it is not planted for four years. 
Feed grain 
farm 
300 
200 
50 
30 
110 
190 
Wheat 
farm 
2000 
500 
100 
100 
600 
1400 
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which are subject to change. By raising payments on one crop and lowering them on another, the distribution of 
income among crops can be greatly altered. Despite such vicissitudes, the following analysis does give some insight 
into certain fundamental features of the program that are likely to continue if the proposal is enacted into law. 
Feed Grain 
The flexibility provided by the set-aside program enables farmers to increase feed grain planting to 125 million 
acres compared to 115 million acres under the 1969-type program in 1971 (Table 2). Though yields would decrease 
slightly, production of feed grains would rise about 5 percent. Based on a price elasticity of demand of -.33, the 
price is $.90 per bushel compared to $1.05 under the 1969-type program. Farmers might be somewhat more willing 
to participate in set-aside than the 1969-type program because the former would allow more flexibility and 
high-value crop production on non-diverted acres-hence the payment rate brings in slightly more acres at less cost 
than the 1969-type program. The inelastic demand and greater production reduces income from feed grain, however, 
under set-aside. To raise income of feed grain producers, the payment rate under set-aside might be raised to more 
than $.30 per bushel or payments raised for additional diversion. 
Livestock production would not respond much to greater feed supplies in 1971. In a longer period, livestock 
production would expand to absorb increased supplies of low cost feed. Livestock producers would experience lower 
incomes as output would expand against an inelastic demand. 
Soybeans 
Restrictions on feed grain acreage have encouraged soybean production under recent programs. The set-aside 
program would enable producers to plant feed grain rather than soybeans. The initial result would be a decline in 
Table 2. Estimated implications of 1969-type and set-aside programs for 1971, feed grain. 
Planted, all purposes 
Cropland set aside 
Cropland diverted from 
feed grain 
Production 
Use* 
Payment rate 
Corn price 
Farm value of production 
Payments to farmers 
Payments for set-aside or 
diverted acres 
Gross income 
Unit 
mil. ac. 
mil. ac. 
mil. ac. 
mil. tons 
mil. tons 
$/bu. 
$/bu. 
$mil. 
$mil. 
$/ac. 
$mil. 
1969-type 
program in 
1971 
115 
36 
190 
185 
.30 
1.05 
7125 
1476 
41 
8601 
set-aside 
program in 
1971 
125 
38 
26** 
200 
194 
.30 
.90 
6428 
1432 
38 
7860 
*The price declines from $1.05 to $.90 per bushel, a 14.3 percent decrease. If the price elasticity of demand for feed grains is -.33 
(including demand for stocks), then the price decrease of 14.3 percent is consistent with a 4.72 percent increase in use. 
**Includes acres taken out of feed grain by set-aside program. 
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soybean acreage (Table 3). The price of soybeans increases markedly, but because the demand for soybeans is 
assumed to be only slightly inelastic, the farm value of soybeans rises very little under the set-aside program. Table 3 
applies to the initial year-the higher soybean pricewould lead to more soybean acreage in 1972 and eventually to a 
more realistic soybean-feed grain price ratio than that apparent in Tables 2 and 3. To hold down feed grain 
production and promote soybean production, outlook personnel might stress the kind of results apparent in the 
tables and thus reduce the imbalance. Also, release of soybean storage stocks could hold down the price in 1971. 
Wheat 
The set-aside program would no longer tie the domestic allotment support price to 100 percent of parity. But 
to obtain political support for the programin wheat areas, the new program would need to provide a 1971 income 
comparable to that under the 1969-type program. To do so, diversion payments would need to be on the order of 
$1.60 per bushel on the domestic portion (Table 4). Cropland set aside by the program would total an estimated 14 
million acres, but wheat acreage would be slightly higher than under the 1969-type program. Based on a short-run 
demand elasticity of -.33, the market price of wheat would be $1.10 per bushel. The farm value of wheat production 
would decline, but larger payments would nearly compensate, leaving gross income under the two programs in Table 
4 nearly at the same level. 
Cotton 
The set-aside program allows considerable flexibility in setting diversion payments and price supports, but in 
the short run would likely be designed to maintain income to cotton at near the level of the 1969-type program. 
With payment rates of $.17 per pound and 6 million acres set aside, planting would be an estimated 12 million acres 
(Table 5). As with other commodities, some stock accumulation is predicted. Greater production and utilization 
under the set-aside program reduces slightly the farm value of production. 
No provision is made for payment limitations in Table 5. Such limitations not only would reduce payments to 
farmers, but would result in higher production and in lower prices and receipts from the crop. However, if a 
payment limitation scheme were accompanied by requirements for greater set-aside on participating farms, acreage 
and production could be held to the levels depicted in Table 5. 
Land Utilization and Farm Income 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize outcomes from data in Tables 2-5. The set-aside program is less effective than the 
1969-type program in reducing acreage of major crops. But the set-aside program is estimated to reduce acreage of 
other crops by up to 15 million acres. The increased acreage of major crops coupled with an inelastic demand for 
farm commodities reduces the farm value of production of major crops by about $1 billion. But this is partially 
offset by a $.5 billion gain in the value of other crops, thus the total net farm income differs by $.5 billion between 
the two programs for 1971. 
To facilitate income comparisons, I made each of the two programs cost the Treasury $3.2 billion.l/ An 
Alternative procedure would have been to design each program to provide the same farm income, then to compare 
Treasury cost. If this were done, the difference in Treasury cost would have been approximately a half billion 
dollars. If Treasury outlays were raised, the incremental payments might well focus on feed grain. 
Criteria for Evaluation 
The foregoing analyses provide considerable data for evaluating the set-aside proposal. The evaluation is made 
below using several criteria. 
Treasury Costs 
The program is estimated to cost the U.S. Treasury $.5 billion more than the 1969-type program in 1971 to 
achieve the same farm income. By making a strong effort to administer the program efficiently, removing the most 
production per government dollar spent (particularly in the wheat and cotton provisions where the tendency is 
greatest to pay farmers more than required to cut production), the new program might be made to maintain farm 
income at the 1969-type program level with no increase in government cost. 
l/Includes wheat certificates paid by processors. 
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Table 3. Estimated implications of 1969-type and set-aside programs for 1971, soybeans. 
1969-type set-aside 
program in program in 
Unit 1971 1971 
Acreage planted mil. ac. 43 35 
Acres diverted from soybean 
production mil. ac. 0 11* 
Production mil. bu. 1096 910 
Use mil. bu. 1096 910 
Soybean price $/bu. 2.25 2.75 
Farm value of production $ mil. 2466 2503 
*Taken out of soybean production by set-aside program for grains and cotton. 
Table 4. Estimated implications of 1969-type and set-aside programs for 1971, wheat. 
1969-type set-aside 
program in program in 
Unit 1971 1971 
Acreage planted mil. ac. 54 56 
Cropland set aside mil. ac. 14 
Cropland diverted from 
wheat mil. ac. 12 10* 
Production mil. bu. 1458 1484 
Use mil. bu. 1450 1476 
Payment rate $/bu. 1.54 1.60 
Wheat price $/bu. 1.20 1.10 
Farm value of production $ mil. 1750 1623 
Payments to farmers $mil. 936 980 
Payment for set aside or 
diversion $/ac. 78 70 
Gross income $ mil. 2686 2603 
* Includes acres taken out of wheat production by set-aside program. 
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Table 5. Estimated implications of 1969-type and set-aside programs for 1971, upland cotton. 
Acreage planted 
Cropland set aside 
Production 
Use 
Payment rate 
Cotton price 
Farm value of production, lint 
Farm value of seed 
Payments to farmers 
Gross income 
Unit 
mil. ac. 
mil. ac. 
mil. bales 
mil. bales 
~/lb. 
$/bale, lint 
$mil. 
$mil. 
$mil. 
$mil. 
1969-type 
program in 
I97I 
II 
12.1 
11.5 
I7 
95 
1150 
242 
750 
2I42 
Table 6. Estimated implications of 1969-type and set-aside programs for 1971, cropland utilization. 
Acres planted* 
Feed grain 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Cotton 
Cropland diverted or set aside by program 
Feed grain 
Wheat 
Cotton, upland 
Total of above 
Reduction in other crops through 
set-aside 
Total. 
1969-type 
program in 
197I 
115 
54 
43 
11 
36 
12 
271 
271 
(million acres) 
set-aside 
program in 
I97I 
I2 
6 
I2.6 
I2.0 
I7 
85 
107I 
225 
750 
2046 
set-aside 
program in 
1971 
I25 
56 
35 
12 
38 
14 
6 
286 
15 
271 
* Total planted acres may be similar for cotton and other crops under the two programs, but the "acres" may be different land. 
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Table 7. Estimated implications of 1969-type and set-aside programs for 1971, farm income. 
Value of production 
Feed grain 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Cotton, upland (seed and lint) 
Total gross value 
Production costs (average of $34 per acre) 
Net income 
Income generated by set aside of other crops* 
Total net farm income associated with 
respective program 
Value of government payments 
Feed grain 
Wheat** 
Cotton, upland 
Total value of payments 
1969-type 
program in 
1971 
7,125 
1,750 
2,466 
12,733 
7,582 
5,151 
5,151 
1,476 
936 
750 
---
3,162 
(million dollars) 
set-aside 
program in 
1971 
6,428 
1,623 
2,503 
11,850 
4,098 
492 
4,590 
1,432 
980 
______lli, 
3,162 
*Computed as follows: The 15 million acre set-aside of other crops, corrected for slippage, is assumed to reduce production by 12 
million acres of other crops valued at $26 per acre-the total value is $312 million, or .69 percent of farm output. Each one percent 
decrease in farm output has been estimated to raise net farm income 6 percent, so .69 percent raises net farm income .69(6) = 4.1 
percent. If net income (excluding government payments) is $12 billion, then the increase is .041 ($12 billion)= $492 million. 
** Includes portion paid by processors. 
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Effect on Level and Stability of Commodity Prices 
The set-aside proposal would be a little less effective than the 1969-type program in reducing variability in 
farm prices and incomes. Setting support prices at 80-95 percent of a moving average of prices in the most recent 
past three marketing years would allow some variation in prices and incomes. At the same time, it would provide 
greater flexibility, and encourage a more nearly optimal adjustment of resources and commodities to changing 
economic conditions, than would the 1969-type program. 
Income Effects on the One Million Largest Farms and on the Two MiUion Smallest Farms 
In the absence of payment limitations, the new program would distribute payments and other benefits about 
as have past programs. Even payment limitations would not change the pattern of the 1960's programs for the two 
million smallest farms. 
Payment limitations would alter the pattern for large farms, the extent depending on the actual limitation 
formula adopted. A $20,000 limitation on payments from all programs to any one recipient would reduce payments 
by approximately $190 million (payments in excess of $20,000), almost all of it for the one million largest farms. 
Income would not be reduced this much, because payment limitation would partly be offset by greater receipts from 
production freed from controls. If payments were always just equal to rent or profit on cropland removed from 
production, as under an efficient payment scheme, and controls were merely shifted among farms so that the 
farming industry production and prices were unchanged, then income of the large (and small) producers would 
remain essentially unchanged. But payments for 1966 and 196 7 averaged $1.40 for each dollar of production 
removed by programs. This means that each $1.40 of payment loss would be compensated by roughly $1.00 of 
increased receipts. Therefore, the $20,000 payment limitation would reduce income of the one million largest 
producers by only $54 million, a comparatively small sum. And when breakup of units and other measures to avoid 
limitations are considered, the sum would be reduced even more. A $10,000 limitation on payments under any one 
program would reduce total payments by an estimated $261 million, or in net by $75 million compared with $54 
million under the $20,000 limitation. Enactment of the $10,000 limitation seems unlikely. In fact, limitations when 
finally put into law may be even less severe than the $20,000 Findley-Conte proposal, and are more likely to follow 
the Ancher Nelsen or other lenient formulae. The conclusion is that payment limitations probably will not affect 
significantly the income of large producers. 
Effect on the Number and Size of Farms, on the Value of Farm Assets and on Resource Returns 
It has been contended that commodity programs have provided capital and security to large farms, enhancing 
their competitive advantage, and may have reduced the number and increased the size of farms [3]. In the absence 
of stringent payment limitations, the set-aside program would operate in this respect much as the 1969-type 
program. Severe payment limitations could reverse the pattern, and contribute to maintenance of the family size 
farm. But as stated above, such severe limitations seem unlikely. 
It has been argued that economies of size, partly the result of government programs, explain low resource 
returns in farming [4]. Severe payment limitations would reduce economies of large units, and could raise average 
rates of return on farm resources. The result of payment cutoffs would be to lower land prices for large and small 
farms by reducing the competitive advantage of the large producer, who would have less incentive to bid land away 
from the small producer. There would be a loss in asset values and wealth but, ironically, an increase in the ratio of 
resource earnings to asset values for the farming industry. 
Effect on Balance of Agricultural Trade and Export Levels 
Export demand is inelastic in the short run, hence the lower prices and higher exports under the set-aside 
program would in the short run slightly lower export earnings from farm commodities. But export demand is 
elastic in the intermediate run and highly elastic in the long run, thus the program would raise exports, export 
earnings and the U.S. share of trade, and would improve our balance of payments. Dollar gains would not be large, 
however, because prices would not be very much lower than under the 1969-type program. 
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Effect on Consumer Food Prices 
The lower farm prices of the set-aside program would restrain the rise in consumer food prices. The farm price 
reduction would be small and, given the behavior of the marketing sector, the influence on consumer food prices 
would be negligible. 
Effect on Per Capita Costs of Supporting County and Community Institutions 
Costs per capita of supporting institutions depend heavily on population density. Most rural areas face a 
decreasing average cost curve; more persons would reduce per capita costs. A strong program of payment limitations 
and a substantial Family Assistance Plan could retard outmovement of farm people and reduce per capita costs. On 
the other hand, these programs might not increase the tax base proportionately to population, hence could reduce 
the income per capita to support schools and other services in rural areas. 
Effect on the Income and Assets of Nonfarm Rural People 
The impact of farm programs on the income and assets of nonfarm people can be judged from income 
multipliers. One study for Oklahoma estimates the income multiplier for livestock and livestock products to be 3.0 
and for crops to be 1.5 [ 2 ] . Estimates of the change in farm income under the set-aside program were based on the 
value of crop production, but in a longer run must also be based on the value of livestock production. 
The $.5 billion reduction in the value of crop would mean a 1.5($.5) = $.75 billion reduction in income, of 
which approximately $.25 billion would be in the nonfarm sector. If asset values are tied to income in perpetuity by 
a discount rate of 10 percent, the reduction of nonfarm asset values could be $2.5 billion. The above data suggest 
that neither nonfarm income nor asset values would be reduced to a really substantial extent by the change in 
programs. Of course, the effect could be significant in some local communities. 
Differential Income Effect on Landowners, Renters and Hired Labor 
The proposed legislation could require that payments be shared in a reasonable manner between renters and 
owners. While difficult or impossible to adequately enforce, such measures may help in the short run to keep 
benefits from accruing only to the landowner. Because the allotments and bases (and hence payments) are tied to 
land, the landowner eventually reaps the benefits. Renters competing for land will bid the rent up to a level that will 
equal the benefits of allotments, rather than rent farms with smaller allotments and payments. Even if the 
government payment is made directly to the tenant, the landlord can raise the cash rent to recoup the payment. If 
rent is on a crop-share basis, the landlord can raise the share or switch to cash rent to gain the government payment. 
The set-aside proposal would operate about as the 1960's programs in this respect. 
The hired laborer has received little benefit from past commodity programs, a situation likely to continue. 
Other Differences in Program Incidence 
The set-aside proposal would have a different impact than the 1969-type program in other ways: 
(a.) Houston Ward has suggested that the new program would raise the relative advantage of the producer with 
a small allotment (base) and conserving base. This pro<lucer would not have to set aside much acreage to be 
eligible for price supports. 
(b.) Freeing of direct restraints on the production of cotton would tend to concentrate cotton production in 
areas and regions where the crop has a strong comparative advantage. A similar conclusion applies to feed grain 
and wheat. 
(c.) Some states have dropped or deemphasized the conserving base. The dropping of direct restraints on the 
production of allotment crops means that the conserving base will become a relatively more important factor 
than before in controlling production. States which have dropped the conserving base will be relatively 
advantaged. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
The set-aside program offers several advantages. It is a trend toward a greater market orientation. It offers 
farmers greater freedom in making production and marketing decisions. It keeps the incidence of benefits largely 
intact, avoiding large welfare gains and losses that would attend a major departure from past programs, yet has 
sufficient built-in flexibility to adjust the incidence as well as the level of benefits in the future. The opportunities 
for converting cropland to wildlife areas, airports and recreational uses, and the payment limitation features appeal 
to urban people. The program would inhibit economically efficient cropping patterns less than programs of the 
1960's. It would keep the U.S. highly competitive in foreign markets. 
The relative position could improve for producers with small bases and allotments, for producers of feed grain, 
cotton and wheat in regions where these respectively have a strong comparative advantage, and for producers in 
states which have a low conserving base. 
Many of the program advantages are also disadvantages. Compared with programs of the 1960's, the greater 
flexibility and freedom permitted under the new program come at a cost: either in lower farm income with a given 
government outlay, or the same farm income with a higher government outlay. 
More flexibility in production and marketing also provides greater opportunity for price and income 
instability. Some crops, such as soybeans, could initially be planted on too few acres then, with higher prices, could 
be planted on too many acres, etc. More flexible CCC storage policies than those envisioned could help provide 
stability. 
The proposed program retains much of the same incidence and focus of benefits as past programs. This helps 
to make it politically feasible, but also does not satisfy critics who claim that help should go to low income farmers. 
The set-aside feature has some similarity to a general land retirement program, but does not satisfy proponents of 
the latter because it does not focus on permanently removing marginal land and whole farms with long-term 
contracts. 
The opportunity to adjust prices downward (based on past market price trends) to correct for an oversupply 
departs from parity pricing which farmers have treasured, and is difficult for many farmers to accept. Opportunities 
to adjust direct payments downward during the year if prices are higher than anticipated also is a departure from 
past practice, and is not easy for farmers to accept. 
Farmers would lose program benefits if they did not plant their allotment for four years. Instead, payments 
might continue for a longer period so that producers would not be "forced" to plant allotment crops that could 
more efficiently be produced elsewhere. 
To reduce the potential grain oversupply, the program could be revised to require producers to plant within 
allotments or bases on set-aside acres. This would make the set-aside program similar to the 1969-type program. 
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Opportunities and Alternatives in Program Modification 
Earl 0. Heady and Leo V. Mayer* 
The past decade has gone by so rapidly that the basic problems and outlook for U.S. agriculture have changed 
little. Only 10 years back, we were looking forward with anticipation to the "soaring Sixties." Given the absence of 
war, the a priori prospects for economic growth promised national and per capita incomes which were nearly beyond 
the grasp of the average imagination. Viewing the decade ex post, these expectations for the national economy have 
been fulfilled. After a short period of relative economic stagnation, growth in the economy has accelerated 
throughout most of the decade. Augmented by our enlarged participation in the Vietnam conflict, growth in 
employment and output has become so strong that at the end of the decade the overriding national economic 
problem has been reversed; namely, restraining increments in investment, prices, employment and demand have 
become the issues. 
These are complex problems not yet solved. They caused the decade to turn into "a long one" for public 
administrators and elected officials. Yet even though the decade has been so "long" that the nation shifted from one 
set of national economic problems to their opposite, it has also been so short, and the links which connect 
agriculture to the national economy so weak, that no similar reversal has taken place in the problems and outlook 
for agriculture. 
And the next decade promises little change in these parameters. The basic problem set for agriculture remains 
the same as it was a decade back. One decade was too short for increases in population, per capita incomes and 
foreign demand to place an upward strain on the farm profit function. The next decade will be just as short for 
agriculture, so short that the major variables relating to food demand will not offset our large and increasing supply 
capacity. 
But it will seem long in the sense that even rapid farm structural changes will not offset the pressure of supply 
on commodity prices and incomes for the average crop and livestock farmer. It also will seem long in the sense that 
continued structural changes, especially trends toward fewer farms and a reduced farm work force, will intensify the 
economic and social problems of a great many rural towns and communities. 
The Outlook for Agriculture 
Numerous projections show the 1980 outlook simply to be a continuation of the factual situation during the 
1960's. Our own analysis shows that we can readily meet increases in domestic demand due to population and 
income growth and have a vast amount to export even on our 1965 base acreage [7] . With an efficient spatial 
allocation of crops, 1980 domestic demand could be met and enough "left over" production to export 2.1 million 
bushels of wheat, an amount exceeding existing world trade in the commodity, and very large increase could be 
made in export of feed grains, soybeans and cotton. Their potentials are so large that it is not likely that export 
demand can begin to absorb them by 1980. 
Similarly, our recent study [10) projects that midway in the next decade, expected levels of domestic and 
export demand can be met and the existing level of basic crop prices maintained with 100 million acres of land 
withheld from production.lJ Along with these production potentials, both studies indicate that the posed levels of 
food production could be attained by 1980 with a conservative 40 percent reduction in the farm labor force. 
Similarly, the recent study by Daly and Egbert [ 4] projects that total output could increase to 160 percent of the 
1957-59 average by 1980, a level similar to our own. Abel and Rojko [1] show that if less developed countries 
increased their production at historic rates (a rate now being questioned in light of the "green revolution" now being 
posed for Asia), the U.S. could meet their total import needs and farm only 186 million acres of grain in 1980.V In 
addition, Upchurch [12] estimates that the U.S. has 150 million additional acres of land that could be cropped if 
(and some of this land moves into crop production each year). 
The basic outlook for U.S. agriculture is largely the same for the 1970's as for the past decade. The farm sector 
can produce enough to bankrupt a large number of farmers if the full supply capacity is unleashed over a time period 
*Distinguished Professor of Economics and Assistant Professor of Economics, respectively, Iowa State University. 
11 Assuming (a) crops are generally allocated in terms of spatial comparative advantage and (b) non-cropland, as well as cropland, is 
removed from production to allow land retirement on a whole-farm basis [ 8). 
1J The U.S. has been harvesting 165 million acres of grain, with around 55 million acres withheld from production. 
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as short as a decade. Expanded foreign demand has not absorbed enough producing capacity to offset advancing 
technology. The supply elasticity for credit and new capital technology is still so great that less mobile resources, 
such as labor, suffer depressed returns as demand for them declines in agriculture. By contrast, the supply elasticity 
of farm labor, "sunk" capital forms like buildings, outdated farm technology and skills is so low that outward 
migration has not been fast enough to raise returns to the level of full employment elsewhere in the economy. The 
relative concentration of poverty in agriculture is just as persistent today as it was a decade back. 
Known a decade ago, it is even more apparent now that in a nation at the stage of economic development and 
with the large farm supply capacity of the United States, full employment, rapid economic growth, and inflationary 
factors have weak linkages with farm commodity markets and agricultural income improvement. The linkages that 
do exist have their greatest impact in the generation of new capital technology which moves rapidly into agriculture, 
accentuating the decline in farm labor demand and the structural transformation of the farm firm. These linkages 
draw labor out of agriculture to more remunerative employment elsewhere, but at a speed which increases the 
relative return of human effort in agriculture at only a snail's pace. 
While these forces of change will prevail for at least another decade, agriculture has made some noteworthy 
progress in the last 10 years. It does have programs that restrain supply advance. The consuming and taxpaying 
publics have expressed a willingness to siphon a modestly greater share of national income to agriculture. These 
programs, while certainly not optimal with their unequally diffused benefits among the many geographic, income 
and commodity sectors of agriculture, have removed the burden of storing large commodity stocks and have lessened 
the pressure of supply on farm income. These are accomplishments for agriculture which should not be overlooked 
and, having been attained in the last decade, they ,PtOvide a foundation for moving on to other attainments or 
improvements in the next decade. 
Using the basic structural problems of agriculture which existed a decade back as the criterion, there is as 
~' much need for continuation of the current mix of policies as there was to develop or reinitiate them over the past 
decade. As we predicted midway in the decade, population growth and world food demand did not come forward to 
tax our supply capacity, inflate farm commodity prices or accelerate the flow of inputs to agriculture as widely 
projected at the time. The bulge in output and recession of farm income which resulted from program modifications 
three and four years ago, to conform with these "hopeful" projections, have carryover effects even to the present 
time. No miracle appears in sight which will bring economic development of humanitarian concerns for large world 
populations and hungry people to levels causing evaporation of U.S. commercial farm problems in the next decade. 
Additionally, there can be guarded expectations that extension of the green revolution and changed values and 
policies towards population control will improve the world food balance over the next two decades. In the absence 
of appropriate domestic policies, the two basic domestic problems of U.S. commercial agriculture (large supply 
capacity relative to domestic demand, and structural transformation of farms into large units with the continued 
replacement of labor by capital) may remain unsolved as far in the future as 1990. 
The Policy Game 
For practical and planning purposes the basic situation will continue, and economically appropriate and 
politically acceptable programs will be needed over a period longer than the foreseeable elected life of public 
administrators, elected officials and farm organization officers. In addition, the public seems willing to finance 
income transfers and provide institutional means to assure a reasonable degree of aggregate equity for the farm 
industry. While a few scattered complaints are expressed, any organized or massive move on the part of the public or 
its representatives to lessen the treasury costs of farm programs and remove the modest restraints on supply are 
lacking. It is even possible that if an effective coalition were formed among farm organizations, rural communities 
and farm operators, society at large would be willing to invest even more in achieving equity throughout the rural 
sector and in enlarging economic opportunities for its members. Such a coalition is unlikely, however, so long as 
sharp conflict prevails within and around agriculture over the needs or means to do so, political efforts of the rural 
quarter of the population are so widely diffused, and agricultural leaders emphasize equity between agriculture and 
general society but not within agriculture. 
Since the basic problems of commercial agriculture remain the same as in the past, there is a strong tendency 
for groups to support a continuation of past programs for meeting these problems. This generally is the result when a 
sector is surrounded by as many diverse and conflicting economic and political interests as is agriculture. Once a 
major policy has been initiated and has become "bedded down" over a few years, the conflicting interest groups 
restrain any important departures; political conflict makes it easier to add a few patches here and there and continue 
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with the same general format. While the existing policy structure has not been considered "first best" by the current 
administration, the previous administration or the majority of commodity and organizational groups that represent 
segments of agriculture, in game strategy context it is a "saddle point" which various political and economic groups 
are willing to accept "as one of the better of the worst outcomes that could happen to us." It is clearly the case that, 
to most groups, present policies are optimal to none but better than the potential payoffs of numerous others. 
The policy "game" is much more among commodity, agribusiness and farm organization groups-each with its 
own minimax strategy-than among consumers, taxpayers and farmers. With appropriate strategy shifts, it is not 
unlikely that consumers (taxpayers) and the farm public could agree on improved farm policies which could better 
guarantee market returns on resources used in agriculture, better guarantee equity and welfare within agriculture, 
and improve economic opportunities for those in rural communities who prefer either or both occupational and 
geographic migration. 
With the "need" for farm programs demonstrated and generally agreed upon, and given the general public's 
willingness to finance them, it might seem "best" simply to maintain the same policy format for the next 10 
years-or even the next 20 if necessary. Under certain conditions of fund availability, we probably could do so, with 
an important degree of peace between consumers (taxpayers) and the commercial farm public. However, without 
these conditions, the competition for funds may become more intense and the real value of present levels of transfer 
payments to agriculture may decline as: (a) a "lid" is held on the level of treasury payments and farm commodity 
prices when other social and urban groups intensify their demands for improved economic and living conditions, (b) 
inflation occurs and off-farm inputs or capital technologies continue to thrust up farm costs, or (c) small "chips" are 
broken from the block of farm program payments as marginal programs are eliminated over time. In this sense, the 
present level of payments may serve largely as an "upper bound," a "constant quantity" to be capitalized into 
resources and redistributed among farmers in the market as they exchange these resources with price premiums 
attached to them. Once payments become so capitalized, as under present conditions, they have little income value 
to a new generation of farmers who gradually take over control of these resources. 
For example, if the public made a 50-year contract with agriculture to provide it with $3.5 billion annually, 
the yearly payments would have no benefits to the farm owners in 45 years. While income and capital values would 
decline if payments ceased, operators who received them at that time would have no more income than if they had 
originally bought their resources at sufficiently lower prices. The value of present programs is to farmers (and their 
heirs) who were operating in the early period (i.e., before programs were fully capitalized into real estate values). 
And this is as it should be, since the programs were created for them. To remove programs from them not only 
would lessen their income but also would greatly reduce their asset values. In political reality, all major economic 
groups in our society react strongly when changes in legislation threaten large capital losses. 
But in equal reality, we must recognize that the capitalization process gradually reduces the realized value of 
current farm programs. Hence, while all evidence suggests that (1) problems of the current type will prevail in 
agriculture over the next one and likely two decades, and (2) the current generation of participants does benefit 
from existing programs, the eventual task is to create programs with benefits that do not become largely or fully 
dissolved through higher land values. Otherwise, we eventually end up with an annual transfer of $3.5 billion or 
more to agriculture from the Treasury which has no income benefit to the upcoming generation of farmers but 
serves only to hold a floor under the price of land. A complex question is: how do we maintain income benefits and 
prevent capital losses to the present generation of operators and owners, but prevent an extension of programs which 
benefit neither the general public nor the upcoming generation of farmers who respectively provide and receive 
government program payments over the long run? 
In review, we have said that: ( 1) we project that the basic problems of farming (large supply capacity resulting 
from the substitution of new capital technology for land and fewer farms as new capital technology substitutes for 
labor with larger farms created to realize resulting scale economies) will continue, obviously for the next decade and 
almost certainly for two decades; (2) the general public will continue willingness to provide sizeable direct payments 
and legal machinery for restraining supply, but with near term ceiling or slight reduction of costs as other large social 
groups increase the "strength of their claims" for essentially the same purposes; and (3) the overall format of present 
programs will continue, largely because this is the easiest path to follow and represents an equilibrium or 
"saddle-point" when different commodity, farm organization and agri-business groups conflict so strongly over the 
ends and means of farm program attainment. 
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More Effective Compensation Programs 
Assuming that this is the realistic environment within which farm programs must operate in the foreseeable 
future, how do we go forward toward some "operational goals" to better guarantee that: (a) treasury payments and 
price support benefits go continuously to farmers, rather than becoming capitalized into supporting land values with 
neutral income effects for the future farm generation; (b) the consumer or taxpaying public better understands the 
need and purpose of farm and rural community programs and places them on the same level of priority as equally 
pressing urban problems; (c) greater equity in program benefits is achieved for all sectors of farming and rural 
communities-not just transfers to large, expanding commercial farms with particular commodities such as cotton; 
and (d) economic opportunity is provided the farm and rural community populations on a par with other 
nonpoverty segments of the national economy? 
An idealistic mix of policy elements could be suggested, as they have been in the past, to attain this 
combination of operational (i.e., nonultimate, generalized) goals. This mix could include these changes: (a) Divorce 
the benefits of treasury payments and price supports from land or real estate resources and attach them to people or 
human resources. Established as "claims to equity" at some past or present time, they would go with the individual 
and never become capitalized into land values. They could be realized rights equally for tenants as well as landlords, 
and they could move with families between farms, but only in terms of the original "human base" and not in terms 
of future land operated or volume produced. They could move off farms with the family, perhaps as an aid to 
mobility and provide an income stream offsetting reduced land values for the landowner. (b) Exclude from eligibility 
for benefits any new entrant into farming, since from the standpoint of equity he has never realized past losses from 
publicly induced shifts in supply and could be considered to lack claim to public payments or mechanisms to 
offset them. (c) Convert the functions of the Commodity Credit Corporation solely to those of price stability and 
remove the overriding function of income transfer that it has served at times in the past. Perhaps an independent 
board paralleling the board of directors of the Federal Reserve System would be optimal for this purpose. (d) 
Improve the mechanism for gearing supply to domestic and export demand at levels which bring returns on resources 
and in agriculture more nearly in line with resource returns throughout the economy. The farm program format of 
the last forty years has not brought parity resource returns in this sense to much more than a tenth of the farmers 
(13]. It has not done so because the capitalization process converted payments into higher fixed costs for the next 
generation, because labor has been replaced at a faster rate than it migrated from agriculture, and because the 
substitution of capital technology for land pressed output forward faster than market demand, even though supply 
restraints were applied. 
(e) Increase investment in education, guidance and vocational skills for youth and younger members of rural 
communities which upgrades their competitive ability and puts them on an equal footing in economic opportunity 
with the labor force in the rapidly developing urban centers and occupations. (f) Provide the consuming public a mix 
of commodities more in keeping with tastes and preferences associated with present levels of income as indicated by 
the magnitude of price and income elasticities which exist in the United States. Encourage through program 
elements an expansion in production of those food commodities with greater price elasticities and reduce price 
support levels on those commodities which act as inputs for these more elastic food items. These higher support 
levels on input commodities act as a tax on production of more elastic items and slow their growth as well as 
resulting in price levels to consumers which are greater than is consistent with demand growth potentials. (g) Provide 
the tax paying segments of society with some "final" solution of the problem for which they have rather steadily 
provided large funds toward expected solution. Numerous means could be suggested, and while they would be 
eagerly accepted by some farm groups, they would be equally opposed by others. Hence, while "idealized" means 
could be outlined readily, practical political realities are not likely to allow them. 
Parity Resource Returns and Improved Benefits for Consumers 
All evidence points to the willingness of the public to continue farm programs which support and stabilize 
farm income and to improve resource returns in agriculture. We believe that society at large will readily provide 
programs and investments to guarantee market rates of returns on resources used in agriculture in the future if: (a) 
workable means can be devised and agreed on by the many farm groups, (b) consumers are brought some "side 
benefits" from these investments and programs, and (c) the farm public establishes a closer linkage with the 
consumer and his needs, problems and knowledge. Not only do past farm programs and large treasury transfers 
indicate a willingness of the nonfarm public to support farm incomes at equitable levels, but precedent is also 
provided elsewhere in the economy. Means have been established, with prices or rates determined by boards and 
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commissions representing the public and directly aside from the market, in guaranteeing market rates of resource 
return for such services and sectors as air transportation, communication, electricity and other public utilities. To be 
certain, these provisions do not guarantee that every firm in these sectors will profit progressively, but in general 
they provide pricing procedures designed to return market rates on labor and capital resources for demand of given 
levels. Even for the services it provides, such as education, execution of law, police protection, roads; public 
buildings and others, society expects the capital and labor resources involved to realize return levels equal to 
competitive alternatives. Though the attainment is with a somewhat distributed lag under inflation, it "meets the 
competition" through a pricing schedule reflected in contracts. 
There is no evidence that society prefers it to be otherwise, even though the process of providing 
appropriations is usually a step or two behind the growing population and demand. It does not ask its teachers to 
subsidize its education at a permanent sacrifice in income. It does not ask contractors to provide public buildings at 
a sacrifice in income on the labor and capital resources employed. It guarantees such public utilities as AT&T, 
Commonwealth Edison and Peoples Gas companies that the price or rates for their products will cover the cost of 
both labor and capital (and it requires that benefits of technological advances and lower costs also will be passed 
along to the consumer). In fact, the "typical farm" would have fared better economically over the past two decades 
if it had declared itself a public utility and made a contract with society whereby: (a) society provided prices to 
guarantee nonfarm market rates of return on capital and labor used and, in turn, (b) farmers would pass along 
benefits of lower costs from expanded size and improved technology to consumers. 
Given the existing precedents, it is reasonable to suggest that agriculture might turn its emphasis from parity in 
commodity price supports to parity in resource returns. Parity in resource returns is not appropriately reflected in 
the orthodox comparison of price indices for farm commodity and farm input prices. This comparison is not an 
adequate gauge because of the constantly and rapidly changing mix and productivity of the individual resources or 
cost items used in agriculture, and because of scale economies associated with larger farms. In fact agriculture could 
do worse than have itself given the pseudo-classification of "public good or utility," not only as a basis for priority 
in mechanisms which guarantee it market returns on its labor and capital but also because it more nearly is a "basic 
or fixed need" of consumers than are postal facilities, public roads, public utilities or even educational services. 
Food in minimum amount is a prior necessity in life in order that one may enjoy or benefit from the 
nonpriced and subsidized services provided through postal services, public roads, schools and recreational facilities, 
or public utilities whose prices have "stable floors and ceilings" which guarantee {lagged) market returns to 
resources. In a society with such high incomes and low supply prices for food commodities as the United States, and 
with so few of our total labor and capital resources required for food production, a minimum collection (choice) of 
food should be guaranteed all consumers. To have not yet guaranteed this condition, given our level of wealth and 
economic development, is shortsighted in terms of consumers, food producers and humanitarian concern. But in 
guaranteeing it, as we should and eventually will do, we should not expect farmers to guarantee this level of food 
supply at prices any lower than required to provide market rate of return on the resources required to produce it. We 
provide elementary and high school education at zero prices for participants, but we do not ask teachers to supply 
these services at individually subsidized returns (aside from the distributed lag in meshing institutional prices with 
those of market prices for human resources). Similarly, we provide public highways under the assumption that 
contractors who build them will receive market rates of returns for labor and capital. 
As it does for public services and utilities, we believe, general society would readily provide farmers with 
parity or market returns on resources used in food production under certain conditions. It would be willing to 
provide prices and resource returns at this level, as readily as it does for public services and utilities, and allow farm 
groups to do it through market bargaining organizations, if farm organizations and commodity groups could only 
agree on the methods and conditions for doing so. After all, farming is a small sector as compared to the nearly 
two-fifths of the gross national product which passes through the public sector, and the public sector much more 
nearly earns market rates of return to its involved resources than does agriculture. 
Farmer-Operated Boards 
There are numerous means by which quantitative measures could be established and means could be provided 
for "bargained prices and supply levels" to guarantee this level of resource return.~ One means to attain the same 
would be farmer-exercized marketing boards which agree on: (a) the level of prices to provide market rates of 
lJ We recognize, of course, that there are farm groups which are both intensely for and against such guaranteed levels of returns and 
the means necessary to attain them. 
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returns on resources, (b) the technology, farm size, and related efficiency conditions to which they apply, and (c) 
effective and acceptable supply restraint measures. Society would perhaps readily agree to such a farmer-operated 
system if: (a) the lower bounds were those of resource returns at market levels with guarantees of progress and 
equitable distribution of the results among farm groups, and (b) upper bounds prevailed to prevent monopoly prices 
and the gain of specific commodity and income groups at the expense of others. 
In fact, we can even propose that a "new type of liberalism" is emerging wherein society will invite private 
groups to provide the machinery for attaining specific public purposes and goals to which it subscribes. This is in 
contrast to the old "liberal school" which supposed that every social goal could be better attained through federal 
governmental bodies than through the facilities and functioning of private groups. The turn from the old liberal 
concept is reflected in growing belief that a separated corporation might better provide postal services than direct 
governmental engagement, the substitution of private for public garbage services in some cities, the planned use of 
private catering services to supply food at army centers, and others. If farm groups wish these powers, with 
guarantees of lower and upper bounds specified, the first task is not necessarily to convince the rest of society, as 
these groups now apparently believe. Rather it is necessary that they convince each other on the means and 
conditions. 
But even then, the task is difficult in light of: (a) the millions of producers involved over the vast geographic 
expanse which separates them and causes their products and economic interests to vary so greatly, (b) the fact that 
one farm commodity is either a substitute or an input cost for another, (c) the complexity in specifying the farm 
and efficiency conditions which might be used in gauging commodity prices to provide market returns on resources, 
and (d) divergent notions among farm groups on supply restraints which are effective and acceptable. The price level 
must mesh with economic criteria and goals, rather than simply be pulled from the air. Prices cannot be at levels 
guaranteeing market levels of return only to the most efficient farmers who possess the capital for the most modern 
technology, or they will draw the scorn of society as being inequitable and will terminate with no benefit to the 
majority of farm families. Neither can prices be at levels which guarantee market levels of resource return to the 
smallest and least efficient producers, or they will draw the scorn of society as promoting inefficiency and will 
terminate as payments are capitalized into land values. 
The basic set of farm problems will last a long time. But the time required for farm groups to agree among 
themselves on a self-implemented and society acceptable program is likely to be just as long, particularly because 
they would have to allocate self-imposed quotas among themselves. However, a voluntary system of supply control 
tied to market rates of return on resources, based on public machinery, could be implemented over the possible two 
or three decades required for farm groups to come to agreement among themselves on a self-imposed program. 
Individual producers could participate or not, depending on their preference. In outline form it could take this 
general shape: First, the conditions of technology, efficiency and farm size to which guaranteed resource returns 
apply would be determined by adequate research on typical farms by U.S.D.A., after which agreement among a 
board of farm representatives, consumers and public representatives would be sought. Weights would be established 
for each relevant farm commodity and an overall quota would be established for each farm. The farm could produce 
any mix of products desired, as long as it did not exceed the aggregate level designed to restrain and mesh supply 
against demand. 
Initially, market prices would be imputed to all resources on the "typical" farms which define the size and 
technological conditions under which market returns are guaranteed. Farmers might enter into three-year contracts 
accordingly. At the end of three years, contracts and prices would be renegotiated: (a) to free farmers who believe 
they could progress more rapidly outside the program, and (b) to consider new conditions of technology, size and 
efficiency which have emerged during the period for those still wishing to participate. Current market rates of return 
would again be computed for labor and capital, consistent with these new sizes and technologies (as they are for 
public utilities). However, the price imputed to land would be the same as for the initial period, to guarantee that 
the program is not simply capitalized into land. Within each year of the contract, the "aggregate price" of the 
"aggregate product" would be computed at the end of the marketing year. Deficiencies between contracted price 
(guaranteeing market levels of returns in resources) and realized aggregate commodity price then would be 
distributed to participants as direct payments. It is expected, of course, that the contracted price would be higher 
than the market price of the aggregate commodity in order: (a) not to hold an unreasonable price umbrella over 
non-participants, (b) to prevent them from capitalizing the benefits of the program into land values as they expand 
volume to take advantage of lower supply and improved market conditions created by participants, and (c) to 
provide minimum food price equity for consumers. 
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Time and space do not allow us to detail further the specific measures and specifications of such a program. 
While seemingly complex, they are no more so than those implied in either current farm programs or publicly 
regulated prices for transportation, public utilities, education and similar service sectors. Further, while we have 
mentioned only two possible policy mechanisms for attaining market returns for resources used under specified 
conditions of farming, others are possible. As in the case of any commercial farm policy, however, auxiliary policies 
should be supplied to enlarge economic opportunities for those individuals with so few resources that they can never 
expect to approach the income and living levels of their skilled urban cousins. 
Alliance with Consumers 
As stated previously, the precedents of society and the absence of organized resistance movements suggest that 
attainment of market rates of return on resources used under specified conditions in agriculture are reasonably 
possible. It would be useful, however, if the farm public exerted a bit of effort to woo consumers in this direction. 
Farm groups are one of the few major producer groups which tend to view consumers as their antagonists and 
competitors. Producers of other commodities follow an opposite strategy. They organize campaigns and conduct 
studies to learn the detailed preferences of their consumers. They wage continuous propaganda campaigns to 
convince the consumer that his life and happiness are interlocked with the producer's commodity. But this is quite 
foreign to the producers and consumers of food where erroneous concepts and heated blasts are exchanged over the 
price of food. 
Farmers should borrow a cue from other producers, and woo rather than war the consumer. They should be 
intensely concerned with his welfare where food is concerned. They should try to provide him with as much benefit 
and utility as possible, not only from food per se but also in knowledge of costs and returns in food production, 
processing and distribution, and in "spin offs" from farm programs. They should convince the consumer that when he 
guarantees equitable returns in public programs related to food production, he also gains from this expenditure. 
Who should have been the first to discover and become shocked with existence of undernourished people in 
the United States, concentrated especially in rural areas? Who should have discovered that city school lunch 
programs frequently provide food unwanted and wasted by students because it is not adapted to the preferences of 
particular ethnic groups or is inappropriately prepared? Farmers and their representatives, of course, but instead it 
was urban people who did. We have large masses of land not needed for food production. But who is concerned 
about more of it being used for recreational purposes by urban consumers? Not farmers. Seemingly, they could care 
less. It is the urban hunters and Isaac Walton League who must and do fight to get more wildlife and recreational 
areas set aside. 
This is not to propose that problems of surplus supply capacity and farm structural changes can be solved by 
eliminating malnutrition from our population and increasing the amount of land for recreation. However, it does 
indicate both the lack of communication of the farm public with the consuming public, and the "opportunities 
foregone" in using our food and land surpluses to convince the dominant urban population that their investments in 
farm programs can bring benefits to the nonfarm public as well. An immediate reaction to the discovery of 
malnutrition in the countryside by urban representatives has been: "Why should we pay large subsidies to rich 
farmers not to produce food and let poor people starve?" Farm groups should have reacted by pressing for expanded 
food programs, recognizing that producing and supplying food is part of doing "their thing." After all, these same 
groups have strongly supported programs of shipping large quantities of foodstuffs overseas as a means of expanding 
demand. Such a reaction would have appealed to humanitarian feelings in both rural and urban society. 
Modern urban society is highly unknowledgeable about the nature and cost structure of food production, 
processing and distribution. It has no knowledge of the share of the retail price imputable to each of these sectors. 
For all it knows, most of the price it pays for food is received by the farmer. Farm groups should invest in and carry 
on intensive educational programs to help explain the distribution of food costs and the nature of food production 
and distribution. They should, as Farmland Industries is doing, form activities to inform and communicate with 
consumers. They should insist on extension programs to inform urban consumers about declining real food costs just 
as public utilities advertise declining costs of electric power. Few urban consumers realize that on the average the 
farm portion is only 37 percent and that the remaining 63 percent represents the freezing, packaging and other 
services demanded by the consumer as incomes and desire for leisure increase. Few understand that this 37 percent 
of their retail dollar, and the treasury payments they provide agriculture, does not cover costs of inputs used in food 
production. Today's urban consumer is far removed from farming. The farm public should extend itself as a partner 
with the consuming public, warring with it less and engaging more its sympathy and support through knowledge and 
through arrangements to provide it something also from government farm programs. 
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For example, the nonfarm population could be provided land for recreation, hunting, parks, city greenbelts 
and similar purposes at no incremental costs through existing programs. Over time, past programs have already 
provided payments for land retirement exceeding the market price of the land. All that is necessary is to acquire, on 
a voluntary basis even from older farmers who wish to retire with perhaps some premium payments to provide 
contiguous areas, land appropriately located under present program funding. The machinery and legislation for doing 
so already exist but pressure for implementing and funding the programs at a sufficient level has been lacking. Farm 
groups should shoulder the burden by joining urban consumers in a "great partnership" in supporting programs 
where both can gain. For some time, growth in agriculture has not been associated with expansion in cropland. 
Instead the reverse is true, output has grown as cropland was reduced. This same trend will hold true for the next 
several time periods. Other uses for this land exist and their demand should be made effective. Outdoor recreation, 
as a good with a high income elasticity of demand, ranks with health services, education, travel, clothing and similar 
services. But whereas per capita consumption of other services with high income elasticities has increased greatly in 
the last two decades, the quantity of recreational land per capita is now no greater than it was 20 years ago and the 
amount available "per user" has greatly declined. It is unrealistic that recreational land per capita should be static 
and large numbers of persons should suffer malnutrition in a nation which has a relative surplus of both land and 
food, and makes payments to have them nonused and nonproduced. 
Hence, there are great possibilities for farm representatives to form an alliance with consumers: to view food 
production and consumption, land use and government programs as a complementary set and "pseudo public 
utility" for the mutual benefit of all; to use a combination of price mechanisms and government programs to bring, 
on the average, market rates of return to resources used in agriculture while assuring progress and efficiency; and to 
provide agriculture with stability and some share of the development to which it greatly contributes. This would 
contrast to the way agriculture now suffers from progress because of the large number of small competitive 
producers surrounded by an inelastic demand, resources which have low mobility because of geographic isolation, 
and insufficient education and training facilities. 
But it is unlikely that this alliance can be readily fashioned without guarantees of equity within agriculture 
from the programs. The fundamental basis for public agricultural policies is equity. Because of the inelastic demand 
for food and the high supply elasticity of new capital technology to agriculture, the absence of programs causes the 
farm sector to suffer reduced revenue and reduced employment, while the consumer sector gains in a smaller outlay 
for food and a greater amount of resources to produce the other goods and services for which its income is partially 
released. Government programs restore equity through price and payment mechanisms which protect farm income 
but allow declining real prices for food. Yet while equity is the very overall basis for farm programs, equity is 
violated within agriculture through massive payments to large producers of particular commodities and only token 
transfers to smaller producers. One focus of U.S. society, and one which will continue in the next decade, is greatly 
extended equity and economic opportunity for disadvantaged groups. In attempts to provide broader equity and 
opportunity, society at large will be examining transfer programs which are unrelated to production of public 
services (e.g., schools, policy protection, etc.) and which contribute little to equity. It will annually chip a $100 
million here and there from programs (at least in real terms) that do not have these characteristics in order that 
equity and opportunity programs elsewhere can be more appropriately funded. Persons and organizations looking 
for means to fund other pressing urban or societal programs typically take a glance at agricultural programs and 
propose a chip from this "mass of treasury outlays" as a means of funding their own needs. A typical example is 
Sporn's statement in the recent C.E.D. report, a report analyzing needs in fiscal and monetary policy and directly 
removed from appraisal of farm problems: "We need to reduce our subsidies to agriculture on the simple basis that it 
is on the whole in excellent shape and is not threatened by any immediate collapse, whereas our cities are in grave 
danger" [3]. The same prevailing "glance" is reflected in the statement of Dr. Jean Mayer, commenting on 
recommendations of the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health, that the group was troubled by 
large expenditures not to grow food but lack of similar funds to get rid of hunger [ 5] . 
This is the continuous prospect which faces agricultural farm programs unless greater internal equity can be 
brought to them. And this lower bound in internal equity, at least over a decade, will not be sufficiently guaranteed 
in payment limits of $50,000, and certainly not in "sliding scale restraints" which still allow producers to collect 
$200,000 in treasury payments. 
Retention of Program Benefits for Farm Families 
In the setting outlined earlier, we have projected the basic problems of agriculture to continue and the 
willingness of the public to finance offsetting programs to continue under certain conditions of equity and extended 
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alliance between food producers and consumers for mutual benefit. We have indicated that market rate of return on 
resources used in food production is a standard and expected criterion or goal and one which might be attained for 
agriculture, given full knowledge and a partnership with consumers. 
Numerous mechanisms could allow attainment of this goal, with the policy mix ranging from farmer-imposed 
supply control to a mix of market mechanisms, direct payments to producers, and supply restrained by participants 
on an aggregate quota basis. Under proper communication and alliance with consumers, agriculture could likely have 
whichever mechanism it could agree upon to provide parity or market returns on resources, if equity and 
opportunity is provided also to the disadvantaged groups of the farm sector. However, because of the competition 
and "game against each other" attitude prevailing among commodity, organization and agri-business groups, we 
expect the present program format to continue as an "equilibrium saddle point." The evolution of future programs 
will be that of an individual tree in the forest. The future will still see an individual tree, but not a new one which 
has sprung up to replace an old one destroyed suddenly by a savage storm or by gradual death with the maturity of 
time. Instead it will be the mature one whose general configuration is the same, except a few old limbs will have 
fallen away and a few new ones will have grown. Perhaps it will be warped slightly in one direction as a neighboring 
tree has come partially to dominate nearby space, light and other resources. 
It is not unlikely that farm programs in 1980 will be the current set with slight modifications, largely because 
political stalemates so require, even though they are optimal for none of the many groups which contest each other 
to force this "saddle point." 
Under the assumption or likelihood that this will be true, what are the elements of improvement which might 
be melded into this general pattern? Importantly, the stability or availability of treasury-financed programs will 
require the increased equity already mentioned. Payment limits of $10,000 would allow supply control, with 
exceptions for cotton, at substantially present costs. Even a limit of $5,000 would allow an effective supply control 
program for feed grains and wheat under recent budget magnitudes with complete acceptance by the vast majority 
of farmers (since few participants receive such amounts this large). 
A second major improvement, even with the inflexibility of the present general program mix extended over 
the next 10 or 20 years, should be modifications to prevent the capitalization of program benefits into real estate 
values. The goal of farm programs has been to increase the stream of income relative to the value of assets and 
resources used. However, the capitalization process causes the income stream to return or approach the old "level." 
After the resources change hands through the market, the gains of the program are cancelled and the function of 
public expenditure is mainly to maintain asset values so that the new owner does not suffer a capital loss. This 
outcome could be eliminated most readily, under the present general program format and level of treasury 
payments, by establishing a "base of equity payments" to all eligible farmers. The payment base of perhaps the 
average of the 10-year period, 1961-70, then would become an endowment for the farmer as an individual. He could 
move with it to another farm or expand his present farm, but it would not increase or decrease with the scale of the 
new farm. Tenants would have the same opportunity, but the payment would be fixed regardless of the farm and 
volume operated in the future. The farmer might even be allowed to take the endowment with him, perhaps at a 
reduced rate, if he moved from the farm before retirement age. Outside investors moving into agriculture would be 
ineligible for payments. Also, new or beginning farmers could be excluded from payments under the argument that 
they have no equity claims, since they have not farmed in the past and hence have not realized any actual or posed 
income losses through the rapid technological advance of farming and the low elasticity of demand for food. Or, in 
the same vein as we suggested nearly 15 years back and as is now implemented in Holland and England, farmers who 
retire from farming early could, as a form of termination pay, start their social security benefits at an earlier age [ 6] . 
A less effective modification which would have a more delayed effect in separating payment benefits and land 
values is one which leaves the payment tied to the farm, but only for the existing operator. Supposing a fixed 
treasury restraint which would be "divided" for the future, the program could work this way: The format could be 
the same as the present, but program eligibility would be limited to only the current operator and his farm. The 
payment would be a fixed amount, but only for this operator and farm in combination. An outside investor coming 
into agriculture and buying the farm would not receive the payment or be eligible for a similar one. Hence, the land 
would have a greater value to the present oeprator than to an alternative owner. Suppose two farmers, A and B, 
participate in the program. Each receives a fixed payment for supply participation on his farm and is eligible for a 
stated level of price supports. Now A sells his land to B. However, B receives only the payment attached to his farm 
and participates in price supports alone for that portion of output resulting therefrom. He does not receive the 
payment which formerly went to A and the output he produces from A's farm must be sold at market prices. Under 
one alternative, if A dies or retires and his son takes over the farm, he would not be eligible for the payments and 
price supports which formerly went with the farm. Hence, all benefits would go to farmers who were actually 
engaged in the occupation at a given point in time (say the year prior to initiation of the program). The program, 
- 100-
conforming to the basic format of current programs, could be voluntary as now and those who select not to 
participate would not be eligible for future benefits. This would be true even if they enlarged their farm or created 
large estates by buying up land of the initial participants. 
The system would not prohibit larger farms. Any nonparticipant who could operate so efficiently as to pay the 
"own use value" of a farm to a participant could buy up land and establish a larger unit. However, the land would 
otherwise have greater value to the present owner and operator .'9:/ The transition to larger farms thus could be 
slowed but would not be prohibited. The retention of farming assets in family possession, for the current generation, 
would be strengthened. Outside investors (e.g. corporations) would not be prohibited from agriculture, but land 
would have less earning capacity to them than to existing farm operators. Under program contracts, flexibility 
clauses could be incorporated: (a) allowing adjustment in the benefits with changes in the general price index, and 
(b) allowing the government to buy up the contract under certain conditions of food emergency. With contracts 
extending over the operator's life and lack of inheritance rights, program benefits would gradually become wrung 
from land values. Upon death of a participant, funds from the given stock would be freed for gradual feeding into 
other types of farm programs under the emerging needs and longrun outlook of agriculture and society. 
Farm families might claim that while the current operator realizes income maintenance under this program, a 
capital loss would be realized when the unit passes from one generation to the next. If this were not acceptable (if 
the son was farming with his father in the initial year of the program he would, however, receive the same or a 
modified stream of benefits), the payment and price supports could be fixed to the farm and the family (rather than 
just the farm and the operator). Then upon death of the operator, his son could take over and realize the same 
benefits. But again, he could not sell his benefits or if he enlarged his unit through rental or purchase, he would be 
eligible only for the initial mix of payments and price supports attached to the "home" farm. In this case, the 
advantage is given to the family and family farming. It does not prevent larger farms, corporate operations and 
similar development. Yet family farming would be greatly strengthened in comparison with present programs. 
Evidence suggests that current programs encourage larger farms and fewer workers in agriculture [ 11] . 
Locational Modifications 
One additional degree of flexibility may prevail even within the restraints of the current program set. 
Differential rates of technological development, population growth and consumer markets over the country cause 
considerable modification in the comparative advantage of commodities among regions. To an important extent, 
reallocations of production patterns are greatly restrained by existing programs. This situation prevails especially for 
crops such as cotton and soybeans. Several studies show that a crop pattern conforming to modern comparative 
advantage would modify importantly the spatial allocation of land use among many regions [ 10, 9, 2]. 
The current "set aside" proposals insert some flexibility into crop patterns, especially in marginal areas where 
two or more different crops have close comparative advantage. The ability of the farmer to "set aside" a given 
acreage, but grow whichever crop he selects on the remainder, will allow some gradual and modest shifts. More 
important would be a gradual shift in the eligible cropland base among regions. While a one percent reserve held by 
the Secretary is now proposed, this could well be increased to 5 or 10 percent. The reserve so held then could be 
gradually reallocated among regions. The pain of reallocation could be lessened by reducing payment rates to 
expanding farms and regions and increasing payment rates on the remaining acreage for these regions with declining 
bases. These differential changes would conform broadly with an equity pattern of payment distribution since areas 
with declining advantage for particular crops typically are faced with a chronic depression of farm income while 
those with expanding advantage are characterized by well capitalized, progressive and high income producers. 
Other Horizons and Alternatives 
The assignment of this paper was to "throw out" some new propositions for examination and dialogue. 
Numerous rather standard suggestions for improving farm programs have been made in the past. Some of these are 
undergoing implementation in other countries. Others represent improvements, relative to specified criteria and 
certain generalized societal goals, in comparison with current programs but have never been enacted into legislation 
because they are: (a) too costly, (b) not politically acceptable among the diverse farm groups, or (c) relate largely to 
those disadvantaged segments of the farm and rural community sector which have no real organized spokesmen and 
pressure organization. Since these have been clearly stated in the literature, we have not repeated them. Rather, we 
have emphasized some modifications which could improve the functioning and goal attainment of the existing 
program format. While we have not exhausted the list of potential modifications, we hope we have provided some 
foundation for dialogue. 
~ Alternatively, to offset the reduction in asset values, it would be possible to make a long-term contract with the present owner 
under which he would continue receiving the payments even though he sold the farm. 
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Whose Voices Sway Farm Policy? 
John A. Schnittker* 
Whose voices sway farm policy? 
I will identify first a number of groups and institutions which have recently influenced agricultural policy. At 
the end, I will look at some new coalitions which may come forward. 
The Seniority System of Congress, and its blood brother, the one-party South, have been among the most 
important institutions influencing farm policy. These two institutions, working together, have permitted the agrarian 
interests of the country to retain great strength in Congress long after reapportionment. Southern and border state 
members usually hold six to eight ranking positions on the Democratic side of the House Agriculture Committee. 
Their colleagues on the Republican side, usually Midwestern, often hold views not greatly different from the views 
of the ranking Democrats. Southerners have held five or six ranking positions on the Democratic side of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee for as long as I can remember. 
Southern members also hold key committee chairmanships and ranking committee positions throughout the 
Congress. This is done in both Houses by virtue of the seniority system, and the fact that Southern members of 
Congress stay in office because of the lack of Republican competition in the South, at least until recently. If a new 
Congressman, or even a fairly well established member, wants to propose an agricultural policy reform which may 
strike a blow at one of the less creditable aspects of commodity legislation, he does so knowing that agrarian 
conservatives hold the highest seats on Appropriations, Armed Services, Ways and Means, and on many more 
powerful Committees. The possibilities for retaliation against programs dear to the district of the offending member 
are almost limitless. This inhibits innovation by amateurs who want to influence agricultural policy. 
A second institution of great importance is the Executive Office of the President, where the Bureau of the 
Budget and the Council of Economic Advisors are located. It is the duty of the Bureau of the Budget to rank 
alternative program and spending priorities for the President. In a sense, the Bureau is a "stopper." It seldom 
initiates proposals, but it is very good at finding loopholes and forcing revisions in Departmental proposals. In this 
capacity, it is extremely important in limiting what can be done in agricultural policy. 
The Bureau of the Budget has also taken as its duty the identification of poor budget and economic estimates 
in the Department of Agriculture. Unfortunately, they don't find them all. Even while I was in the Department, we 
occasionally made bad estimates. There was a time prior to the 1960's when poor estimates were the order of the 
day in USDA, because they were being made by commodity program administrators following political instructions, 
and not objectively by economists or statisticians. 
The President and the Secretary of Agriculture, representing institutions and persons are equal in importance 
to the Congressional seniority system. Since both serve in the Executive Branch, I will refer to them as one. The 
Secretary of Agriculture, by precedent and the Constitution, works for the President. He and the President together 
have great leverage on farm policy, if they will use it. This isn't important, however, unless they decide what they 
want, and fight for it. 
Not all Secretaries have used the powers inherent in their office. Not all Presidents have chosen to use their 
power in agricultural issues. Orville Freeman as Secretary of Agriculture often compromised to get what he could 
from Congress in the 1960's. But before he compromised he fought for what he wanted. He did not, of course, ask 
for exactly what he wanted, but for what he believed to be feasible and possible. Sometimes he asked for more than 
he got. 
One could say that those who opposed and defeated some of Freeman's key proposals were more decisive in 
influencing agricultural policy than Freeman was. For example, in 1961 Freeman made his first comprehensive 
proposal for what he called "An Enabling Act." He wanted Congress to give the Secretary of Agriculture authority 
to propose the details of various commodity stabilization programs to Congress under the Reorganization Act. If 
Congress did not say "no" within thirty days, the program would go to a producer referendum. Congress rejected 
that, and was clearly a decisive factor in influencing farm policy at that point. 
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Another example is the wheat program. In 1962, after an acrimonious struggle, Congress enacted a mandatory 
wheat program. In a subsequent referendum, the farmers rejected it decisively. Some say that farmers were the most 
important in determining the direction of the wheat program in the early 1960's. 
Yet the Secretary of Agriculture had the initiative nearly every step of the way. He took calculated risks to get 
one program through Congress. If that failed, he came back with another initiative. These tactics of direct and 
continuing leadership showed results in term of effective programs, often enacted under adverse circumstances. The 
result could have been a good deal worse in the 1960's. 
Secretary Hardin's leadership has not yet been tested. He showed considerable skill in holding off the House 
Agriculture Committee which seemed to want to pass a farm bill last year. If the Secretary can form a coalition 
which will support the proposals he makes, he may be able to get much of what he asks for without a great fight. 
But I expect it to be different. He will get essentially what the Administration proposes through the Congress, only 
if the leverage of the Presidency and of the Secretary of Agriculture are used to press them through. One cannot 
simply hand a farm bill to the Committee Chairman in the dead of night saying, "Here it is; we believe the 
Administration could support it and we hope you pass it," and then expect Congress to pass the bill. 
Farm organizations are important to farm policy formulation. The American Farm Bureau Federation is the 
largest in the United States. It is clearly the richest. It spends a lot of money lobbying in Washington. 
So far as agricultural policy is concerned, and leaving aside for a moment the ability to defeat or limit what 
others propose, the Farm Bureau has been least influential among the major farm groups in the past 15 years. It 
sways agricultural policy least in terms of initiating programs that eventually become law, and which ultimately 
influence farm production, prices and incomes. 
The only bill I can remember for which the Farm Bureau claims credit in the 1960's was S-109, a minor 
marketing bill. 
I will treat most of the other farm organizations together. The Grange, the National Farmers Union, and the 
National Farmers Organization are the three other major general farm groups. The Mid-Continent Farmers 
Association has also moved beyond Missouri, and is at least a regional organization. These four, together with a 
number of commodity groups, have formed a loosely-knit Farm Coalition. 
This Coalition has been working together for at least 6 or 7 years. It consists of the four general farm groups, 
plus the National Association of Wheat Growers, a number of milk producer organizations, some cotton groups, and 
one or two others. 
In a sense, the Coalition has been strong and effective. The bill they supported-the Food and Agriculture Act 
of 1965-is law. But it has been strong principally because the leading member of the Coalition, until last year, was 
the Secretary of Agriculture. Through the 1960's, this group worked more or less in tandem with the Administration 
in supporting voluntary acreage diversion and direct payment programs. Finally, it helped to bring a number of 
temporary approaches together into the Act of 1965. 
The Coalition has worked well with Congressional Committees. Herschel Newsome as Master of the National 
Grange was effective in welding the Coalition together. I am told that the new Master of the National Grange is 
serving capably in this capacity. Today, however, the Coalition is hard pressed to find a principal partner. It is 
casting about in the Congress and in the Executive Branch for additional members but has not yet found anyone 
with the leverage the Secretary of Agriculture provided in the 1960's. 
I want to mention one other group, the American National Cattlemens Association, in this discussion of farm 
organizations. The Cattlemen are effective. They do not take much interest in wheat, feed grains, cotton and milk, 
but they are interested in preventing beef imports from becoming any greater than they are. I respect them because 
they don't meddle outside their fence-lines. 
Some farm organizations pass resolutions on the merits of school prayer, and the proper interpretation of the 
Constitution. This is their right as citizens and I have no complaint about it. The Cattlemen, by the same token, 
could oppose government payments to farmers on principle. 
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I like the Cattlemen because they have risen above principle. They simply go to Washington and tell you that 
they want the beef quota law amended to reduce beef imports. At the very worst, they want the law administered so 
as to prevent greater imports. After that, they go back home. In an era when other groups pass resolutions on 
everything under the sun, this is a high recommendation. 
The dairymen deserve brief mention here. Some of the dairy groups are members of the Farm Coalition. The 
National Milk Producers Federation, like the cattlemen, seldom interests itself in general commodity legislation. It 
wants to learn how to use marketing orders more effectively; it is interested in controlling the milk supply, and how 
to restrict the flow of milk from one market area to another. 
Certain trade groups associated with agriculture, but not always allied with it, have also had an impact on farm 
policy in recent years. These are principally groups like the Grain and Feed Dealers National Association, the Cotton 
Council, the Feed Grains Council, the Cotton Shippers Association, and the National Grain Trade Council. 
These groups and the persons who represent them, by instinct and interest, are usually allied with the hopes of 
the American Farm Bureau Federation to limit or even to terminate agricultural stabilization programs. Deep down, 
they wish farm programs would go away. If we are to have programs, they want farm prices to be lower, and they 
want the Commodity Credit Corporation to be a minor factor in the market. 
Like the cattlemen, however, they have adapted themselves to the real world. They are not searching for a 
final solution. They tend to be market-oriented; they want price support schemes to allow price flexibility, in 
contrast to the rather rigid prices we had on some commodities in the late 1950's and early 1960's. 
Trade groups do not want surpluses, so they seldom oppose effective production adjustment programs. It is 
not in their interest to have so much corn and wheat in Government hands that prices are always at support levels. 
These groups have also been influential in gaining acceptance for direct payments. In 1962, some of the 
strongest supporters of a direct payment program for feed grains were representatives of the grain trade. They judged 
correctly that if the corn price support could be near $1.00, which was the market price, instead of $1.20 per 
bushel, market conditions would better serve the trade interest. 
Coalitions in Congress deserve mention. The coalition which provided the votes for the enactment of various 
farm bills in the 1960's, especially the Agricultural Act of 1965, was made up of urban and Northern Democrats, 
coupled with Southern and Mid-western Democrats and Republicans. 
This was principally a coalition born out of faith in Orville Freeman. Freeman, with the help of a dedicated 
legislative liaison assistant, Ken Birkhead, was the most important factor in welding this coalition together. It was 
only marginally a coalition of interests, because in most cases early in the 1960's, the urban and Northern Democrats 
got little for their vote. The trade-offs between food and welfare programs on one hand, and farm programs on the 
other, were extremely one-sided in the 1960's, with agrarian interests gaining the most by far. Late in the 1960's, 
especially in 1968, farm interests had to deal on somewhat more even terms with urban interests. 
There are also a number of free-lance operators. One of the most interesting commodity program happenings 
in recent years occurred when two Republican Congressman, Mr. Conte of Massachusetts and Mr. Findley of Illinois, 
convinced the House of Representatives that it should enact a $20,000 limit on payments to farmers in 1968 and 
again in 1969. This was done with little staff assistance. It succeeded against the opposition of the President, the 
leadership of both parties, and all the farm groups. 
Mr. Conte and Mr. Findley were not working closely together in this. They were, in fact, competing for the 
political credit associated with the proposed legislation. In the end, during the debate on the floor, they did work 
with each other. 
Other free-lance, or non-allied persons, in the Congress are extremely important. Congressman Neal Smith is a 
six-term Democrat. He was never on the Agricultural Committee. He is not strictly from an agricultural district. But 
he has lived on a farm. 
Members of Congress who operate like Neal Smith does are extremely important on farm and other issues. 
Smith does his homework. He never showboats. Since he is from Iowa and speaks with authority on agricultural 
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issues, he carries a lot of weight. Neal Smith's opposition to payment limitations probably discouraged some 
members of the Democratic Study Group, the liberal wing of Congress, from supporting the limitation. Many from 
this group supported it, however, in 1968 and 1969. 
There was a time when economists had great influence on farm policy. M. L. Wilson and John D. Black in the 
1930's are good examples. I wish there were more who took up the struggle directly in support of reform actions, 
acting like politicians as well as college professors. If they did, they would be more effective, at least in the short 
run. I recognize, however, that there are legitimate restrictions on what we may do when using state, federal, and 
foundation funds. 
Other groups, like the Committee for Economic Development, also try to play a role in agricultural policy. 
The CEO, The National Association of Manufacturers, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States interest 
themselves in farm policy sporadically. Only the National Planning Association takes a continuing interest. 
Urban Congressmen have been impatient and even hostile toward commodity programs for at least the past 10 
years. But partly because urban members feel that agricultural policy is complex, partly because there are too many 
other demands on their time, and partly because they are intimidated by the presence of senior members who are 
chairmen of so many committees, they tend to stay out. If liberal Congressmen will stir themselves, they can 
influence the next farm bill materially. 
Civil Service employees also influence farm policy. They help create it, with ideas, draft bills, and regulations. 
At their best, the career employees respond to their leader with accurate information, innovative administrative 
practices, and great skill in expressing objective views despite potential political pitfalls. At their worst, they will 
offer any estimate or any opinion pleasing to political superiors, or will withhold information if it does not suit their 
own purposes. 
I have seen far more strong career employees than rubber stamps. The government could not function without 
them. But they seldom function at their best unless they are firmly led. 
The most interesting potential force which may come forward in Congress is a coalition of Democrats and 
Republicans of the type which has supported extensive social welfare legislation since 1961. The programs they 
devised and enacted in the 1960's now require sharply increased funds if their objectives are to be achieved even 
modestly. 
This group has seldom moved itself on farm issues. This year is an exception, with early interest being 
expressed by liberals in both parties. 
If this coalition focuses on support of a few relatively simple amendments designed to end some of the most 
flagrant excesses in the farm commodity programs, it can be a powerful force for better farm programs. 
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